שבועות 32 — Soncino English Talmud

¹unless they hear [the adjuration] from the mouth of the plaintiff! — ‘If he ran after them’ he requires [to tell us]: I might have thought that, since he ran after them, it is as if he had said to them, therefore he teaches us [that it is not so]. But this we have also learnt: What is the oath of testimony? He said to witnesses, ‘COME AND BEAR TESTIMONY FOR ME’, [AND THEY REPLIED,] ‘WE SWEAR etc.’, [implying only] if he said, [‘Come and bear testimony’,] they are liable, but if he did not say it, they are not liable! — ‘HE SAID’ is not necessarily stressed [by the Mishnah], for if you will not say thus, then, with reference to deposit, where we learnt: What is the oath of deposit? He said to him, ‘Give me the deposit that you have of mine’, will you also say that if he said, [‘Give me the deposit’,] he is liable, and if he did not say it, he is not liable? [That cannot be,] for [the verse] and deal falsely with his neighbour [implies] in however slight a degree. Hence, ‘HE SAID’ is not stressed [in that mishnah], and here also it is not stressed. What is this! Granted, if you say that ‘HE SAID’ here [in our Mishnah] is stressed, he states it there because of here; but if you say, neither ‘HE SAID’ there is stressed nor ‘HE SAID’ here is stressed, why does the Mishnah say ‘HE SAID’ in both places? — Perhaps because it is the usual thing, therefore he teaches us [that it is to be taken literally]. It was taught in agreement with Samuel: If they saw him coming after them, and said to him: ‘Why are you coming after us? We swear we know no testimony for you’, they are exempt; but in the case of a deposit, they are liable. IF HE ADJURED THEM FIVE TIMES, etc. How do we know that for denial in the Beth Din they are liable, but outside the Beth Din they are not liable? — Abaye said: Scripture says, If he tell it not, he shall bear his iniquity; I do not say to you [that he bears his iniquity] except in the place where, if he would tell [his evidence], the other would be liable to pay money. Said R. Papa to Abaye: If so, say the oath itself, if [uttered] before the Beth Din, makes him liable, if not before the Beth Din, does not! — That cannot enter our minds, for we learnt: [Scripture says: when he shall be guilty] in one [of these things] — to make him liable for each one; and if it enters your mind [to say it must be uttered] before the Beth Din, is he then liable for each one? Surely we learnt: IF HE ADJURED THEM FIVE TIMES BEFORE THE BETH DIN, AND THEY DENIED IT, THEY ARE LIABLE ONLY ONCE. SAID R. SIMEON: WHAT IS THE REASON? BECAUSE THEY CANNOT AFTERWARDS ADMIT IT. Hence, we deduce from this, the oath [must be uttered] outside the Beth Din, and denial [must be] before the Beth Din. IF THEY BOTH DENIED IT TOGETHER, THEY ARE BOTH LIABLE. But it is impossible to ascertain simultaneity! — R. Hisda said: This is in accordance with the view of R. Jose the Galilean, who says it is possible to ascertain simultaneity. R. Johanan said: You may even say it is in accordance with the view of the Rabbis, [and the Mishnah means,] for example, they both denied it within the time of an utterance; and [two statements following each other] within an interval of the time of an utterance are considered one utterance. Said R. Aha of Difti to Rabina: Well, now, within the time of an utterance — what is its duration? As the greeting of a disciple to his Master (some say, as the greeting of a Master to his disciple); now, till they say, ‘We swear, we know no testimony for you’, the duration is longer! — He said to him: Each one within the interval of utterance of his neighbour. ONE AFTER ANOTHER, THE FIRST IS LIABLE, AND THE SECOND EXEMPT. Our Mishnah will not be in accordance with the view of this Tanna, for we learnt: If he adjures one witness, he is exempt; but R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon makes him liable. Shall we say that they disagree in this: One holds that one witness, when he comes [to bear testimony], comes [to make the defendant liable] for an oath; and the other holds that one witness, when he comes [to bear testimony], comes [to make him liable to pay] money? — Can you really think so? Surely Abaye said: All agree in [the case of] the witness of the sotah; and all agree in [the case of] the witnesses of the sotah; and they disagree in [the case of] the witnesses of the sotah. All agree in [the case of] one witness; and all agree in [the case of] the witness where his adversary is suspected of swearing falsely! — Well then, all agree that one witness, when he comes [to bear testimony], comes [to make the defendant liable] for an oath; and here, they disagree in this: one holds that which causes [extraction of] money is counted as [if it had actually extracted] money; and the other holds it is not counted as [if it had actually extracted] money. [To revert to] the text above: ‘Abaye said: All agree in [the case of] the witness of the sotah; and all agree in [the case of] the witnesses of the sotah, and they disagree in [the case of] the witnesses of the sotah. All agree in [the case of] one witness, and all agree in [the case of] the witness where his adversary is suspected of swearing falsely.’ ‘All agree in [the case of] the witness of the sotah that he is liable’ — the witness of defilement, for Scripture believes him, as it is written: and there be no witness against her — as long as there is [some testimony] against her. ‘And all agree in [the case of] the witnesses of the sotah that they are exempt’ — the witnesses of jealousy, for they are the cause of a cause.42^ᵃ^ᵇ^ᶜ^ᵈ^ᵉ^ᶠ^ᵍ^ʰ^ⁱ^ʲ^ᵏ^ˡ^ᵐ^ⁿ^ᵒ^ᵖ^ᵠ^ʳ^ˢ^ᵗ^ᵘ^ᵛ^ʷ^ˣ^ʸ^ᶻ^ᵃᵃ^ᵃᵇ^ᵃᶜ^ᵃᵈ^ᵃᵉ^ᵃᶠ^ᵃᵍ^ᵃʰ^ᵃⁱ^ᵃʲ^ᵃᵏ^ᵃˡ^ᵃᵐ^ᵃⁿ^ᵃᵒ^ᵃᵖ

^ᵃnote:Infra 35a; why, then, does Samuel need to tell us his ruling? It is already taught in a Mishnah!
^ᵇnote:‘Come and bear testimony.’
^ᶜnote:That he must definitely ask them, and running after them is of no avail.
^ᵈnote:And, were it not for Samuel, we might have thought that if he ran after them, they are also liable.
^ᵉnote:infra 36b.
^ᶠnote:The bailee.
^ᵍnote:If the bailee denied on oath having the deposit, will you say he is not liable, if the depositor did not in the first place ask for it!
^ʰnote:Lev. V, 21.
^ⁱnote:As long as he deals falsely (i.e., denies the deposit), he is liable.
^ʲnote:We would therefore have thought that if he ran after the witnesses (even if he did not say, ‘Come and bear testimony’), they are liable; therefore Samuel must teach us that they are not.
^ᵏnote:This is no argument.
^ˡnote:In connection with deposit, though it is not intended to be taken literally there.
^ᵐnote:In our Mishnah it has to be stated, and is intended to be taken literally.
^ⁿnote:Let them both be omitted. Obviously therefore we must say that at least in our Mishnah ‘HE SAID’ is to be taken literally; why, therefore, does Samuel need to tell us his ruling? It is implicit in the Mishnah!
^ᵒnote:We might have thought that the Mishnah mentions ‘HE SAID’, not because it is to be taken literally, but because it is usual for the plaintiff to say, ‘Come and bear testimony for me.’
^ᵖnote:Samuel.
^ᵠnote:Lev. V, 1.
^ʳnote:For denying knowledge of testimony.
^ˢnote:The emphasis is on ‘tell’, ‘declare’, i.e., before the Beth Din.
^ᵗnote:Lev. V, 5.
^ᵘnote:How can we know if both witnesses denied it actually simultaneously?
^ᵛnote:Bek. 9a.
^ʷnote:Who disagree (loc. cit.) with R. Jose.
^ˣnote:Which is explained below as the time required for the greeting: ‘Peace be upon thee, my Master!’
^ʸnote:[Dibtha on the Tigris, v. Die Landschaft Babylonien Obermeyer, J. p. 197.]
^ᶻnote:‘Peace be upon thee.’
^ᵃᵃnote:These words cannot be said in the time that a greeting can be uttered, for the greeting (in Hebrew) is three words, whereas the oath (in Hebrew) is six words.
^ᵃᵇnote:The interval elapsing between the denials of the two witnesses must not be longer than the time taken to utter the greeting.
^ᵃᶜnote:And he denies knowledge of testimony, he is exempt from bringing the offering.
^ᵃᵈnote:The first Tanna holds that one witness is not sufficient to make the defendant liable to pay what the plaintiff demands, but can only make him take an oath denying liability (v. infra 40a), and therefore, his testimony being ineffective, the witness, if he denies knowledge of testimony, is not liable to bring an offering.
^ᵃᵉnote:R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon.
^ᵃᶠnote:Though Scripture says: One witness shall not rise up against a man for any iniquity, or for any sin (Deut. XIX, 15), R. Eleazar holds it refers only to stripes or other punishment, but one witness is sufficient in money matters; therefore, if one witness denies knowledge of testimony, he is liable. Our Mishnah, in exempting the second witness, is therefore not in accordance with the view of R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon.
^ᵃᵍnote:That R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon holds one witness is sufficient in money matters?
^ᵃʰnote:Wife suspected by husband of unfaithfulness, Num. V, 11-31; all agree that in certain circumstances even if one witness of the sotah is adjured and denies knowledge he is liable; and in certain circumstances even if two witnesses are adjured and deny knowledge they are exempt; and in certain circumstances if two witnesses are adjured, R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon and the Sages disagree, the former holding they are liable, and the latter that they are exempt. The circumstances are explained below.
^ᵃⁱnote:That in certain circumstances (such as those at which R. Abba was present; infra 32b) he is liable, if be denies on oath knowledge of testimony.
^ᵃʲnote:The reference will be explained infra.
^ᵃᵏnote:That he is liable (v. infra 32b for reason). Now the reason for R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon's view that in certain circumstances witnesses of the sotah who are adjured are liable, is explained below by Abaye to be that they are the cause of pecuniary loss and this is so also in the case of one witness (in money matters) who, though his testimony is insufficient to extract money, is yet liable, if adjured, because he is the cause of pecuniary loss, for he makes the defendant take an oath (to deny liability), and since the majority of people do not swear falsely, the defendant would have to pay. The witness, therefore, by denying knowledge of testimony, causes pecuniary loss to the plaintiff. This consequently shows that even according to R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon no money can be extracted on the strength of the mere evidence of one witness!
^ᵃˡnote:R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon, in saying that if one witness is adjured he is liable, though if he had given evidence, he would have made the defendant liable for an oath only.
^ᵃᵐnote:This witness, though not actually extracting money, causes extraction of money, because the defendant, rather than take an oath, pays the claim.
^ᵃⁿnote:First there must be two witnesses before whom the husband warns his wife, ‘Do not go with So-and-so secretly’ (hube hsg, witnesses of his jealousy); and two witnesses that she did go secretly with him (vrh,x hsg, witnesses of the secret meeting). If now there is one witness that she actually was unfaithful at this secret meeting (vtnuy hsg, witness of defilement), the witness is believed, and the husband need not pay his wife her vcu,f (marriage settlement). If this witness of defilement avoids giving testimony by swearing falsely that he knows no testimony, he is liable to bring an offering, for he has, by his avoidance of evidence, occasioned a pecuniary loss to the husband (who has to pay his wife the kethubah).
^ᵃᵒnote:Lev. V. 13; though Scripture says, there is no sg (singular), it is explained (Sotah 31b) that sg (without the qualifying numeral sjt) denotes two witnesses; hence, Scripture means, ‘there be not two witnesses’, but only one.
^ᵃᵖnote:Even if they had given evidence, there is still the need of the other two witnesses that the wife had secreted herself with her paramour; and even these latter do not actually benefit the husband directly (by freeing him from paying the kethubah), but indirectly, for by their evidence they cause the wife to drink the ‘bitter waters’ (Lev. V. 17-24), and possibly, out of fear, she might confess her unfaithfulness, and lose her kethubah. Hence, the vrh,x hsg are merely the cause of pecuniary loss, and the hube hsg the cause of the cause, i.e., remote and very indirect cause. If, therefore, the hube hsg avoided giving evidence by swearing falsely, they are not liable, for they did not directly cause any pecuniary loss.

²‘And they disagree in [the case of] the witnesses of the sotah’ — the witnesses of the secret meeting; one holds that which causes [extraction of] money is counted as [if it had actually extracted] money, and they are liable; and the other holds it is not counted as [if it had actually extracted] money, and they are exempt. ‘All agree [in the case of the witness] where his adversary is suspected of swearing falsely’. ‘All agree in [the case of] one witness’ [in such circumstances as came] before R. Abba. ‘All agree [in the case of the witness] where his adversary is suspected of swearing falsely.’ Who is suspected? Shall we say the debtor is suspected; and the creditor could say [to the witness]. ‘If you would have come to bear testimony for me, I would have sworn, and taken [the debt]’? Let the witness say to him, ‘Who says that you would have sworn?’ — Well then, for example, if they are both suspect, in which case it has been said, the oath returns to the one who is bound to take it, and because he cannot swear, he pays. ‘All agree in [the case of] one witness’ [in such circumstances as came] before R. Abba; for there was a man who snatched a bar of silver from his neighbour; they came before R. Ammi, and R. Abba was sitting before him. He went and brought one witness that he had snatched it from him. The other said, ‘Yes, I snatched it, but it is mine that I snatched’. Said R. Ammi: How shall judges settle this dispute? Shall he pay? There are not two witnesses. Shall he be exempt? There is one witness that he snatched it. Shall he swear? Since he said, ‘Yes, I snatched it, but it is mine that [snatched’, he is like a robber. R. Abba said to him: He is bound to take an oath, and he cannot swear; and anyone who is bound to take an oath, and cannot swear, pays. R. Papa said: All agree in [the case of] a witness of death that he is liable; and all agree in [the case of] a witness of death that he is exempt. ‘All agree in [the case of] a witness of death that he is exempt’, — if he told it to her, and did not tell it to the Beth Din; for we learnt: A woman who said, ‘My husband died’, may remarry; ‘my husband died’, marries her brother-in-law. ‘All agree in [the case of] a witness of death that he is liable,’ — if he told it neither to her nor to the Beth Din. Can we deduce from this that if one adjures witnesses in connection with land [and they deny knowledge of testimony], they are liable? — No! Perhaps she had seized movables. IF ONE DENIED, AND THE OTHER ADMITTED, etc. Now, if in the case of one after another where both deny, you say the first is liable, and the second exempt, in the case where one denies and the other admits, is there any question? — It is not necessary [for the Mishnah to tell us this except in the case] where both denied, and then one of them turned and admitted within the interval of the time of an utterance; and this he teaches us, that [two statements following each other] within the interval of the time of an utterance are considered one utterance. Granted, according to R. Hisda who explains that [clause] as being in accordance with the view of R. Jose the Galilean; the first clause [establishes that] it is possible to ascertain simultaneity, and the second clause is necessary in order to teach us that [two statements following each other] within the interval of the time of an utterance are considered one utterance; but, according to R. Johanan, the first clause [teaches us the law with regard to statements uttered] within the interval of the time of an utterance, and the second clause [teaches us the law with regard to statements uttered] within the interval of the time of an utterance! Why do we need both? — You might have thought that only in the case of denial and denial [do we say that two statements within a brief interval are considered one], but in the case of denial and admission we do not say this, therefore he teaches us [that we do]. IF THERE WERE TWO SETS OF WITNESSES, AND THE FIRST DENIED, AND THEN THE SECOND DENIED, [THEY ARE BOTH LIABLE]. Granted, the second should be liable, because the first denied; but the first — why [should they be liable]?^ᵃᵠ^ᵃʳ^ᵃˢ^ᵃᵗ^ᵃᵘ^ᵃᵛ^ᵃʷ^ᵃˣ^ᵃʸ^ᵃᶻ^ᵇᵃ^ᵇᵇ^ᵇᶜ^ᵇᵈ^ᵇᵉ^ᵇᶠ^ᵇᵍ^ᵇʰ^ᵇⁱ^ᵇʲ^ᵇᵏ^ᵇˡ^ᵇᵐ^ᵇⁿ^ᵇᵒ^ᵇᵖ^ᵇᵠ

^ᵃᵠnote:If the husband adjures the two witnesses of the secret meeting (vrh,x hsg) to bear testimony for him, and they swear, denying knowledge of testimony, R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon (who regards the causing of pecuniary loss as the direct infliction of a money loss, as is proved by his view imposing liability on one witness who was adjured) will hold they are liable, for by withholding their testimony they cause a pecuniary loss to the husband (for, had they given testimony, the wife might have confessed rather than undergo the ordeal of the ‘bitter waters’, and the husband would have been exempt from paying the kethubah); but the Sages hold they are not liable, for their testimony would not have directly freed the husband from paying the kethubah.
^ᵃʳnote:If there is one witness for a debt, the debtor takes an oath denying liability; but if he is suspected of swearing falsely, the creditor takes an oath that the debt is due, and is paid (infra 44b). If the witness is adjured by the creditor, and denies knowledge of testimony, he is thereby depriving the creditor of his debt, and therefore all agree that in such a case he is liable. [The order of the text in cur. edd. is somewhat disarranged. MS.M. preserves a better order and reading which avoid the needless repetitions in our text, v. D.S.].
^ᵃˢnote:Explained below.
^ᵃᵗnote:Perhaps you would not have wished to swear, and would not have obtained your money. The witness is therefore merely a possible cause of monetary loss (and does not actually deprive the creditor of his money); the Sages (who disagree with R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon) would therefore not hold him liable. Why, then, say that all agree in this case?
^ᵃᵘnote:The debtor, infra 47a.
^ᵃᵛnote:Being suspected of swearing falsely.
^ᵃʷnote:The witness, therefore, by withholding his testimony in such a case, definitely deprives the creditor of his money, and all agree that he is liable.
^ᵃˣnote:The owner of the bar.
^ᵃʸnote:A man cannot free himself by saying, ‘it is mine that I snatched’, for if this excuse were accepted, no robber would ever be liable, even when there were two witnesses that he robbed, for he could always say, ‘I admit I took it, but it is my own property’; v. Tosaf. a.l. And since he is like a robber, he cannot take an oath.
^ᵃᶻnote:He cannot keep it by saying, ‘it is mine’, for there is a witness that he snatched it from some one else; and property is always presumed to belong to the one in whose possession it has been (unless there is definite proof to the contrary). He must therefore take an oath to deny the statement of the witness. This he cannot do, for he admits that he snatched it (agreeing with the witness), and since he cannot swear, he must return it; v. B.B. (Sonc. ed.) p. 156 and notes.
^ᵇᵃnote:The witness, therefore, if he had withheld his evidence, would have deprived the man of his bar of silver; therefore all agree that he must bring an offering for his false oath in such circumstances.
^ᵇᵇnote:That a woman's husband had died.
^ᵇᶜnote:That he knows her husband has died abroad; but when she adjured him to give evidence before the Beth Din, he denied the knowledge. He is not liable, because she can go to the Beth Din herself, and say her husband is dead, and requires no witness. He has therefore not occasioned any monetary loss to her by withholding his evidence, for she is believed, and can obtain her kethubah from the heirs.
^ᵇᵈnote:If her husband died without issue; Deut. XXV, 5.
^ᵇᵉnote:If the wife adjures him to give evidence, and he denies having any knowledge, he is liable, for he has deprived her of the kethubah, since he did not tell even her that her husband had died, and she has therefore no information at all on the matter.
^ᵇᶠnote:The kethubah was collected (in Talmudic times) from immovable property only; the witness of the husband's death is liable, according to R. Papa, if he is adjured and withholds information. But there is already a dispute between Tannaim on this point (v. infra 37b). Let R. Papa then merely say he agrees with one of the Tannaim!
^ᵇᵍnote:The wife had in her possession during the husband's lifetime some of his movable property; and if the witness had given evidence, she would have retained it in settlement of her kethubah. R. Papa's ruling may refer to such a case, and not to a case where the kethubah has to be collected from immovable property.
^ᵇʰnote:Though be could say, ‘Why should I be liable? My testimony alone is of no avail, since the other also denies’, yet because when he denies, the other had not yet denied, he is liable.
^ᵇⁱnote:Surely, it is obvious that the first is liable, for the second admits knowing testimony; hence, the first, by withholding testimony, deprives the claimant of his money. Why, then, does the Mishnah mention this clause? It is superfluous!
^ᵇʲnote:And the Mishnah does not wish to teach us that the one who denies is liable (for this we know from the previous clause), but that the one who admits is exempt, although he first denied, his admission within the brief interval being accepted, and exempting him.
^ᵇᵏnote:Where both denied together.
^ᵇˡnote:V. supra 32a.
^ᵇᵐnote:One denied, and the other admitted.
^ᵇⁿnote:As in the first clause.
^ᵇᵒnote:And the second is liable like the first.
^ᵇᵖnote:The second clause, where the same person first denies, and then admits.
^ᵇᵠnote:Hence, only the second set were left to bear testimony, and by withholding testimony, they make the claimant incur a loss.