שבועות 31 — Soncino English Talmud

¹the chain [of guilt] will hang round the neck of the witnesses? — Because it is said: From a false matter keep far. (Mnemonic: Three [of] disciples, Three [of] creditors, Rags, Hearing, Explaining.) How do we know that a disciple sitting before his master, who sees that the poor man is right and the wealthy man wrong, should not remain silent? Because it is said: From a false matter keep far. And how do we know that a disciple, who sees his master making a mistake in the law, should not say, I will wait until he finishes, and then upset his decision, and build up [another decision] according to my own judgment, so that the decision will be called by my name? Because it is said: From a false matter keep far. And how do we know that a disciple to whom his master says, ‘You know that if I were given a hundred manehs, I would not tell a lie; now, So-and-so owes me one maneh, and I have only one witness against him;’ how do we know that the disciple should not join with him? — Because it is said: From a false matter keep far. — Is this, then, deduced from: From a false matter keep far? Surely this is definitely lying, and the Divine Law said: Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour! — Well, then, for example, if he said to him, ‘I have definitely one witness; and you come and stand there, and you need not say anything, so that you will not be uttering a lie from your mouth;’ even so it is prohibited, because It is said: From a false matter keep far. How do we know that he who has a claim of a hundred zuzim against his neighbour should not say, ‘I will claim two hundred, so that he will admit a hundred, and be liable for an oath, then I will be able to impose an oath upon him from another place’? — Because it is said: From a false matter keep far. And how do we know that, if one has a claim of a hundred zuzim against his neighbour, and sues for two hundred, the debtor should not say, ‘I will deny it totally in court, but admit it outside the court, so that I should not be liable for an oath, and he may not impose on me an oath from another place’? Because it is said: From a false matter keep far. And how do we know that, if three persons have a claim of a hundred zuzim against one person, one should not be the litigant, and the other two, the witnesses, in order that they may extract the hundred zuzim and divide it? Because it is said: From a false matter keep far. How do we know that, if two come to court, one clothed in rags and the other in fine raiment worth a hundred manehs, they should say to him, ‘Either dress like him, or dress him like you’? — Because it is said: From a false matter keep far. When they would come before Raba son of R. Huna, he would say to them, ‘Remove your fine shoes, and come down for your case.’ How do we know that a judge should not hear the words of one litigant before the other litigant arrives? — Because it is said: From a false matter keep far. And how do we know that a litigant should not explain his case to the judge before the other litigant arrives? — Because it is said: From a false matter keep far. R. Kahana learnt [these deductions] from: Thou shalt not utter [a false report]: thou shalt not cause to be uttered. And did that which is not good among his people: Rab said this refers to one who comes with power of attorney; and Samuel said it refers to one who buys a field about which there are disputes. AND IT APPLIES ONLY TO THOSE LIABLE TO BEAR WITNESS, etc. What does this exclude? — R. Papa said, it excludes a king; and R. Aha b. Jacob said, it excludes a dice player. He who says [it excludes] a dice player certainly [holds it excludes] a king; but he who says [it excludes] a king [holds it does not exclude] a dice player, for he is fit [to be a witness] according to Holy Writ, and it is the Rabbis who have disqualified him. BEFORE THE BETH DIN OR NOT BEFORE THE BETH DIN, etc. In what do they disagree? — Said the Scholars to R. Papa: They disagree [as to whether we say,] ‘deduce from it, and [entirely] from it’; or, ‘deduce from it, and establish it in its own place’. R. Meir holds, ‘deduce from it, and [entirely] from it’. ‘Deduce from it’: just as [in the case of] a deposit, if he swears of his own accord, he is liable, so [in the case of] testimony, if he swears of his own accord, he is liable; ‘and [entirely] from it’ — just as [in the case of] a deposit [he is liable] whether [he utters the oath] before the Beth Din or not before the Beth Din, so [in the case of] testimony [he is liable] whether [he utters the oath] before the Beth Din or not before the Beth Din. And the Rabbis hold, ‘deduce from it, and establish it in its own place’: ‘Deduce from it:’ just as [in the case of] a deposit, if he swears of his own accord, he is liable, so [in the case of] testimony, if he swears of his own accord, he is liable; ‘and establish it in its own place’: just as when adjured by others, [he is liable only if he swears] before the Beth Din, but not [if he swears] not before the Beth Din, so if he swears of his own accord, before the Beth Din he is liable, but if not before the Beth Din he is not liable.^ᵃ^ᵇ^ᶜ^ᵈ^ᵉ^ᶠ^ᵍ^ʰ^ⁱ^ʲ^ᵏ^ˡ^ᵐ^ⁿ^ᵒ^ᵖ^ᵠ^ʳ^ˢ^ᵗ^ᵘ^ᵛ^ʷ^ˣ^ʸ^ᶻ^ᵃᵃ^ᵃᵇ^ᵃᶜ^ᵃᵈ^ᵃᵉ

^ᵃnote:The guilt will be on their heads.
^ᵇnote:If his master has come to the opposite conclusion.
^ᶜnote:With the witness to give evidence, in order that there should be two witnesses.
^ᵈnote:Ex. XX, 13.
^ᵉnote:In the court.
^ᶠnote:But the debtor will think you have come to give evidence, and will perhaps admit the debt of his own accord.
^ᵍnote:He who admits a portion of a claim (,menc vsun) takes an oath that he owes no more, and is exempt.
^ʰnote:I.e., in connection with another claim which he totally denied (kfv rpuf), and for which no oath could be imposed; but since he has to take an oath in this case, the court can at the same time include the previous claim in the oath.
^ⁱnote:And have no witnesses.
^ʲnote:The court.
^ᵏnote:The well dressed man.
^ˡnote:In order that the judges be not biassed in your favour, and the poorly dressed man be not intimidated.
^ᵐnote:Litigants.
^ⁿnote:Ex. XXIII, 1, lit., ‘thou shalt not take up, or accept’; a warning to the judge not to hear one litigant before the arrival of the other, because the litigant, in his opponent's absence, may be tempted to lie.
^ᵒnote:Reading the same Hebrew word, ta,, with different vowels (the Hiphil): ‘thou shalt not cause to be accepted’; a warning to the litigant not to explain his case to the judge in his opponent's absence, because he may be tempted to lie, and will thereby cause the judge to accept a false report, v. Sanh. 7b.
^ᵖnote:Ezek. XVIII, 18.
^ᵠnote:He is authorised by one of the litigants to take his place; he is doing ‘that which is not good among his people’, if he undertakes it merely our of love of contention and litigation, for the litigant himself might have been willing to compromise, whereas he presses for the full amount of the claim. If, however, the litigant himself is not able to appear for some reason, and he is acting on his behalf, in order to obtain his money for him, he is doing a meritorious act; v. Tosaf. a.l.
^ʳnote:The title of which is disputed; this man buys it, relying on his strength to resist other claimants.
^ˢnote:‘Thou shalt set a king over thee (Deut. XVII, 15); he must be respected, and it is therefore not seemly that he should stand as a witness before the Judge; and since he cannot be a witness (Sanh. 18a), the oath of testimony does not apply.
^ᵗnote:A gambler, since he is willing to retain money won by him which is not really his, is disqualified by the Sages from being a witness. The Torah disqualifies only xnj sg (Ex. XXIII, 1). ‘a witness of violence’, i.e., who has been guilty of robbery by violence.
^ᵘnote:For a dice player is disqualified only by the Sages, whereas a king is disqualified by the Torah.
^ᵛnote:And, therefore, though we do not accept him as a witness owing to the Sages’ disqualification, the oath of testimony applies in his case, for, according to the Torah, he may be a witness.
^ʷnote:R. Meir and the Sages, in the Mishnah; i.e., on what principle do they differ?
^ˣnote:Where Holy Writ does not explicitly state the law concerning a certain subject, and it is necessary to deduce it by vua vrzd from another subject concerning which Holy Writ states the law explicitly, we may either deduce one from the other entirely (i.e liken the unexplained subject to the explained subject in every respect), or deduce only one point, and, as for the rest, leave the unexplained subject in its own place, i.e., leave it to be governed by the rules which govern other aspects of it.
^ʸnote:[Adopting reading of MS.M.] By vua vrzd: in the case of a deposit it is said tyj, if any one sin (Lev. V, 21), and in the case of the oath of testimony it is also said tyj, (Lev. V, 1).
^ᶻnote:Lev. V, 24: about which he hath sworn falsely (i.e., of his own accord).
^ᵃᵃnote:Though Holy Writ does not specifically say so, but we deduce it by vua vrzd from the case of a deposit.
^ᵃᵇnote:For Holy Writ says: and sweareth falsely (Lev. V, 22) — wherever he swears falsely, not necessarily before the Beth Din.
^ᵃᶜnote:The Sages.
^ᵃᵈnote:V. p. 173, n. 8.
^ᵃᵉnote:Lev. V, 1: he heareth the voice of adjuration . . . if he tell it not, then he shall bear his iniquity — in the place where, if he had told it (i.e., given his testimony), it would have been effective, i.e., before the Beth Din.

²Said R. Papa to them: If the Rabbis deduce it from [the law of] deposit, none disagrees that we ‘deduce from it, and [entirely] from it’; but this is the reason of the Rabbis; they deduce it by inference from minor to major: since, if [adjured] by others, he is liable; if [he swears] of his own accord, how much more so should he be liable; and because they deduce it by inference from minor to major, [they hold] it is sufficient for that which is deduced by this inference to be similar to that from which it is deduced: just as, if adjured by others, he is liable before the Beth Din only, but not outside the Beth Din; so, if he swears of his own accord, he is liable before the Beth Din only, but not outside the Beth Din. Said the Scholars to R. Papa: How can you say that they do not disagree on [the principle of] ‘deduce from it, and [entirely] from it’? Surely we learnt concerning a deposit: The oath of deposit applies to men and women, to non-relatives and relatives, to those qualified [to bear witness] and those unqualified, before the Beth Din and not before the Beth Din, if [uttered] from his own mouth; but if [adjured] by the mouth of others, he is not liable unless he denies it before the Beth Din: this is the opinion of R. Meir. And the Sages say, whether [uttered] by his own mouth or [adjured] by the mouth of others, since he denied it, he is liable. [Now,] if adjured by the mouth of others, in [the case of] a deposit, how do the Sages know that he is liable? Is it not because they deduce it from [the case of] testimony? Hence, you must infer from this that they disagree on [the principle of] ‘deduce from it, and [entirely] from it’! — [R. Papa replied:] From this, yes; but from the other it is not possible to infer it. AND THEY ARE LIABLE FOR THE WILFUL TRANSGRESSION OF THE OATH. How do we know this? — For our Rabbis taught: In all of them it is said, and it be hid [from him]; but here it is not said, and it be hid, in order to make him liable for wilful as for unwitting transgression. AND FOR ITS UNWITTING TRANSGRESSION COUPLED WITH WILFUL [DENIAL OF KNOWLEDGE OF] TESTIMONY. How is unwitting transgression possible coupled with wilful [denial of knowledge of] testimony? — Said Rab Judah that Rab said: If one says, ‘I know that this oath is prohibited, but I do not know if one is liable to bring an offering for it or not.’ BUT THEY ARE NOT LIABLE FOR ITS UNWITTING TRANSGRESSION ONLY. Shall we say that we are here taught [a confirmation of] that which R. Kahana and R. Assi [were told]? — No! Although we learnt it [here], it was necessary, for I might have thought, here, because it is not written and it be hid, we require unwitting to be like wilful transgression; but there, since it is written and it be hid, even unwitting transgression in a slight degree [makes him liable], therefore he teaches us [that this is not so]. MISHNAH. WHAT KIND IS THE OATH OF TESTIMONY? HE SAID TO TWO [PERSONS]: ‘COME AND BEAR TESTIMONY FOR ME’; [AND THEY REPLIED:] ‘WE SWEAR WE KNOW NO TESTIMONY FOR YOU’; OR THEY SAID TO HIM: ‘WE KNOW NO TESTIMONY FOR YOU’, [AND HE SAID:] ‘I ADJURE YOU’, AND THEY SAID, ‘AMEN!’, THEY ARE LIABLE. IF HE ADJURED THEM FIVE TIMES OUTSIDE THE BETH DIN, AND THEY CAME TO THE BETH DIN, AND ADMITTED [KNOWLEDGE OF TESTIMONY], THEY ARE EXEMPT; BUT IF THEY DENIED, THEY ARE LIABLE FOR EACH [OATH]. IF HE ADJURED THEM FIVE TIMES BEFORE THE BETH DIN, AND THEY DENIED [KNOWLEDGE OF TESTIMONY], THEY ARE LIABLE ONLY ONCE. SAID R. SIMEON: WHAT IS THE REASON? BECAUSE THEY CANNOT AFTERWARDS ADMIT [KNOWLEDGE]. IF BOTH [PERSONS] DENIED [KNOWLEDGE] TOGETHER, THEY ARE BOTH LIABLE; IF ONE AFTER ANOTHER, THE FIRST IS LIABLE, AND THE SECOND EXEMPT. IF ONE DENIED, AND THE OTHER ADMITTED, THE ONE WHO DENIED IS LIABLE. IF THERE WERE TWO SETS OF WITNESSES, AND THE FIRST DENIED, AND THEN THE SECOND DENIED, THEY ARE BOTH LIABLE, BECAUSE THE TESTIMONY COULD BE UPHELD BY [EITHER OF] THE TWO. GEMARA. Samuel said: If they saw him running after them, and they said to him, ‘Why are you running after us? We swear we know no testimony for you’, they are exempt, [being liable only] when they hear from his mouth. — What does he teach us? We have learnt it: If he sent [the adjuration] by his slave, or if the defendant said to them: ‘I adjure you that, if you know any testimony for him, you should come and bear testimony for him’, they are exempt32^ᵃᶠ^ᵃᵍ^ᵃʰ^ᵃⁱ^ᵃʲ^ᵃᵏ^ᵃˡ^ᵃᵐ^ᵃⁿ^ᵃᵒ^ᵃᵖ^ᵃᵠ^ᵃʳ^ᵃˢ^ᵃᵗ^ᵃᵘ^ᵃᵛ^ᵃʷ^ᵃˣ^ᵃʸ^ᵃᶻ^ᵇᵃ^ᵇᵇ^ᵇᶜ^ᵇᵈ^ᵇᵉ^ᵇᶠ^ᵇᵍ^ᵇʰ^ᵇⁱ^ᵇʲ^ᵇᵏ

^ᵃᶠnote:And the Sages would therefore hold that if he swore of his own accord even outside the Beth Din he would be liable.
^ᵃᵍnote:From oath of testimony itself, and not from deposit at all.
^ᵃʰnote:The principle of dayyo (v. B.K. 25a) is that the derived law cannot logically be stricter than the original law.
^ᵃⁱnote:Even if he denied it outside the Beth Din.
^ᵃʲnote:For Holy Writ says: he hath sworn falsely (Lev. V, 24), implying of his own accord.
^ᵃᵏnote:By vua vrzd, v. p. 173, n. 8.
^ᵃˡnote:Since they bold that, in the case of deposit, even where adjured by others, he is liable even outside the Beth Din, obviously they deduce liability for adjuration by others from the case of testimony, though they do not make the case of deposit entirely like the case of testimony; for in the latter they hold the denial must always be before the Beth Din; whereas in the case of deposit, once they have deduced that there is liability for adjuration by others, they say, ‘establish it in its own place’, i.e., make the law of adjuration by others equal to the law of swearing of his own accord, which (in the case of a deposit) does not need to be before the Beth Din.
^ᵃᵐnote:We certainly infer that the Sages hold ‘deduce from it, and establish it in its own place’; but from our Mishnah it is not possible to draw this inference, for it may be that the Sages deduce their ruling by inference from minor to major, as explained above.
^ᵃⁿnote:Laws of uncleanness and oath of utterance; Lev. V, 2-4.
^ᵃᵒnote:V. supra p. 136, for notes.
^ᵃᵖnote:Supra 26a; Rab re-assured the one who bad sworn falsely by telling him he had committed no offence, since be had made a genuine mistake. Why was it necessary for Rab to re-assure him? Does not this mishnah teach us that one is not liable for absolutely unwitting transgression?
^ᵃᵠnote:For Rab to re-assure them in the case of oath of utterance.
^ᵃʳnote:In the case of oath of testimony.
^ᵃˢnote:But for a genuine mistake he is not liable.
^ᵃᵗnote:In the case of oath of utterance.
^ᵃᵘnote:For Holy Writ says he must bring an offering even if ‘it be hid from him’, i.e., even if he made a mistake.
^ᵃᵛnote:Rab, in re-assuring R. Kahana and R. Assi.
^ᵃʷnote:But that even in the case of oath of utterance there is no liability for a genuine mistake.
^ᵃˣnote:If they really knew testimony, and thus swore falsely.
^ᵃʸnote:And they denied knowledge of testimony.
^ᵃᶻnote:Because denial outside the Beth Din does not make them liable.
^ᵇᵃnote:Before the Beth Din.
^ᵇᵇnote:Sworn outside.
^ᵇᶜnote:Why are they not liable for all the oaths?
^ᵇᵈnote:If they denied knowledge of testimony immediately after the first adjuration before the Beth Din, they are no longer able to bear testimony (for the principle that one cannot testify again after having testified once, v. Sanh. 44b). Hence, even if they denied it at the end, all the adjurations except the first are in vain; for, if silence at the beginning implies denial, they cannot be adjured again; and if silence at the beginning implies acquiescence (that they do know testimony), why the further oaths? But adjurations outside the Beth Din are all counted, because denial outside does not impose liability, and they can still bear testimony, and can therefore be adjured again and again; then, when they deny the knowledge at the Beth Din they are liable for all the adjurations.
^ᵇᵉnote:Or, within a short time of each other's denial; v. infra 32a.
^ᵇᶠnote:For since the first denied knowledge, there is only one witness left, and one witness is not liable to bear testimony.
^ᵇᵍnote:The witnesses.
^ᵇʰnote:‘Come and bear testimony for me.’
^ᵇⁱnote:He sent his slave to adjure them to bear testimony for him.
^ᵇʲnote:The plaintiff.
^ᵇᵏnote:If they falsely deny knowledge of testimony.