שבועות 19 — Soncino English Talmud

¹Scripture wishes to write cattle and beast for the sake of Rabbi's deduction, it writes also creeping thing; as was taught in the School of R. Ishmael: Any Biblical passage that was stated once, and then repeated, was repeated only for the sake of something new that was added to it. And what does R. Eliezer do with the word wherein [he hath sinned]? — To exclude him who occupies himself [with a permitted thing and unintentionally does that which is prohibited]. And R. Johanan said: ‘Inferences of Expounders’ is the difference between them. And so said R. Shesheth: ‘Inferences of Expounders’ is the difference between them, for R. Shesheth was wont to change the words of R. Eliezer for those of R. Akiba, and the words of R. Akiba for those of R. Eliezer, Raba inquired of R. Nahman: If he was unaware of both, what is the ruling? — He said to him: Since there is the unawareness of uncleanness, he is liable. On the contrary, since there is the unawareness of Temple, he should be exempt! — R. Ashi said: we observe, if because of the uncleanness he leaves, then it is a case of unawareness of uncleanness, and he is liable; and if, because it is the Temple, he leaves, then it is a case of unawareness of Temple, and he is exempt: — Said Rabina to R. Ashi: Does he then leave because it is the Temple, unless it be also because of the uncleanness? And does he leave because of the uncleanness, unless it be also because it is the Temple? Well then, there is no difference, Our Rabbis taught: Two [public] paths, one unclean, and one clean; and he walked along one, and did not enter [the Temple afterwards]; then along the other, and entered [the Temple], he is liable [to bring a sliding scale sacrifice]. If he walked along one, and entered [the Temple], and was sprinkled upon [on the third day], and again [on the seventh day], and bathed himself; and then he walked along the other, and entered [the Temple], he is liable. R. Simeon [b. Yohai] exempts him; and R. Simeon b. Judah exempts him in all these cases in the name of R. Simeon [b. Yohai]. ‘In all of them,’^ᵃ^ᵇ^ᶜ^ᵈ^ᵉ^ᶠ^ᵍ^ʰ^ⁱ^ʲ^ᵏ^ˡ^ᵐ^ⁿ^ᵒ^ᵖ^ᵠ^ʳ^ˢ^ᵗ^ᵘ^ᵛ

^ᵃnote:Lev. v, 2: the carcass of an unclean beast, or the carcass of unclean cattle.
^ᵇnote:Supra 7a.
^ᶜnote:Though it is superfluous; but we must not deduce from this particularisation that the unclean person must know the source of his uncleanness in order to be liable for a sacrifice.
^ᵈnote:Here the ‘something new’ is Rabbi's deduction.
^ᵉnote:Lev. IV, 23; the word wherein implies that he must know the actual sin he has committed, yet R. Eliezer holds that if there lay before him heleb and nothar, and he unwittingly ate one of them, not knowing which, he must also bring a sin offering.
^ᶠnote:E.g., on Sabbath he intended (what is permissible) to cut something which was already detached (from the ground or tree), but his knife slipped, and he cut something which was still attached (to the ground or tree). Or, he intended to cohabit with his wife who was clean, and he inadvertently cohabited with his sister who was sleeping near her. In these cases, his intention was quite innocent; and the word wherein (he hath sinned) implies that in such cases he is exempt from a sacrifice, and that he is liable only if his intention was to do something which is actually wrong, though he thought it was right; e.g., he intended to cut a definite thing, which he thought was detached, but which actually was attached; or, he intended to cohabit with a certain person, whom he thought was his wife, but who actually was his sister. In these cases, he brings a sacrifice, because the actual act, though innocently committed, was definitely intended; in the former cases, the actual act which was committed was not intended.
^ᵍnote:He disagrees with Hezekiah who said that R. Eliezer and R. Akiba differ in their interpretation of the law; he holds that they do not differ at all as to the law; they both hold that it is not necessary that the unclean person should know the exact source of his uncleanness; but they merely choose different texts from which to deduce the law; they, therefore, differ as ‘expounders’ merely as to the texts from which they derive their ‘inferences’.
^ʰnote:It matters not, since there is no difference in law between them.
^ⁱnote:According to R. Eliezer and R. Akiba who hold that sin offering is brought only for unawareness of uncleanness and not for unawareness of Temple, what is the ruling of the unclean person was unaware of both uncleanness and Temple?
^ʲnote:If he leaves the Temple, when told he is unclean (the fact that it is the Temple is not mentioned to him), we realise that he regrets his entry because of his uncleanness; and it is, therefore, a case of unawareness of uncleanness. If, however, he leaves the Temple, when told that he is in the Temple (his uncleanness is not mentioned), we realise that he regrets his entry because it is the Temple; and it is, therefore, a case of unawareness of Temple.
^ᵏnote:When he is told one of the facts, either that he is unclean, or that he is in the Temple, he does not leave because of that one fact; for his uncleanness, were it not for the fact that he is in the Temple, would not matter; and the fact that he is in the Temple, were it not for his uncleanness, would also not matter. He leaves, when told one of the facts, because he recollects immediately the other fact also. Since, however, when he entered the Temple while unclean, he was unaware of both facts, what is the ruling?
^ˡnote:And he is exempt, because R. Eliezer and R. Akiba hold that he is liable only for unawareness of uncleanness by itself, while realising that he has entered the Temple.
^ᵐnote:Someone being buried there, and it is impossible to walk along the path without treading on the grave.
^ⁿnote:But does not know whether it was the clean or the unclean path.
^ᵒnote:Having forgotten that he is unclean, since he walked along both.
^ᵖnote:Because he entered the Temple while definitely unclean, and had knowledge at the beginning of definite uncleanness.
^ᵠnote:Having forgotten that he had walked along one path (which possibly was the unclean one, though he is not sure).
^ʳnote:Num. XIX, 19; a person unclean by the dead requires sprinkling with water into which has been put some of the ashes of the burnt red heifer.
^ˢnote:Knowing that it is possibly the unclean one.
^ᵗnote:Having forgotten his possible uncleanness.
^ᵘnote:Because either the first or the second time he entered the Temple while unclean.
^ᵛnote:Because, before he entered the Temple either the first or second time, he had not the knowledge of definite uncleanness, for, before entering the Temple the first time, he certainly had not the knowledge of definite uncleanness (for the first path may have been clean), and even after walking along the second path he had not now the knowledge of definite uncleanness, since he had already purified himself from the first possible uncleanness (and the second path may be clean); and in order to bring a sacrifice we require knowledge at the beginning of definite uncleanness. In the previous instance, where he had not purified himself between the two entries, he has the knowledge of definite uncleanness before entering the Temple the second time.

²even in the first case? At all events he is unclean? — Said Raba: Here we are discussing the case of one who walked along the first [path]; and when he walked along the second [path], forgot that he had already walked along the first, so that he has only an incomplete knowledge [of uncleanness]; and this is in what they differ: The first Tanna holds that we say, an incomplete knowledge is like a complete knowledge; and R. Simeon [b. Judah] holds that we do not say, an incomplete knowledge is like a complete knowledge. ‘If he walked along the first [path], and entered [the Temple], and was sprinkled upon [on the third day], and again [on the seventh day], and bathed himself; and then he walked along the second [path], and entered [the Temple], he is liable; and R. Simeon [b. Yohai] exempts him.’ Why is he liable, since it is a doubtful knowledge? — R. Johanan said: Here they made doubtful knowledge like definite knowledge. And Resh Lakish said: This is in accordance with the view of R. Ishmael, who holds that we do not require knowledge at the beginning. We may point out an incongruity between the words of R. Johanan [here] and the words of R. Johanan [elsewhere]; and we may point out an incongruity between the words of Resh Lakish [here] and the words of Resh Lakish [elsewhere]; for it has been taught: If he ate doubtful prohibited fat, and became aware of it [later; and he ate again] doubtful prohibited fat, and became aware of it [later]; Rabbi said: Just as he would bring a sin offering for each one, so he brings a guilt offering for doubtful sin for each one. R. Simeon b. Judah and R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon said in the name of R. Simeon [b. Yohai]: He brings only one guilt offering for doubtful sin; for it is said: [And he shall bring a ram . . . for a guilt offering . . .] for his error wherein he erred — the Torah includes many errors for one guilt offering. And Resh Lakish said: Here Rabbi taught that the awareness of the doubt separates [the acts] for sin offerings. And R. Johanan said: [Rabbi meant:] Just as, the awareness of definite sin elsewhere separates [the acts] for sin offerings, so the awareness of doubtful sin [here] separates [the acts] for guilt offerings. [Hence, there is incongruity between R. Johanan's statements, and between Resh Lakish's statements.] — Granted that there is no contradiction between one statement of R. Johanan and the other statement of R. Johanan, [for he said:] ‘Here they made [doubtful knowledge like definite knowledge]’, and not everywhere in the whole Torah did they do so; for [only] here, because knowledge [at the beginning] is not explicitly written, but is deduced from and it be hidden, [therefore they made doubtful knowledge like definite knowledge;] ‘but not everywhere in the whole Torah did they do so’, for it is written: [If his sin] be known to him — a definite knowledge we require. But Resh Lakish — why does he establish it as being in accordance with R. Ishmael's view? Let him establish it as being in accordance with Rabbi's view! — This he teaches us: that R. Ishmael does not require knowledge at the beginning. [But] it is obvious that he does not require [knowledge at the beginning], for he has no extra verse [from which to deduce it, since he requires] and it be hidden to make him liable for unawareness of Temple? — Perhaps you might think that he does not infer [that we require knowledge at the beginning] from the verse, but he has it from a tradition; therefore [Resh Lakish] teaches us [that R. Ishmael definitely does not require knowledge at the beginning]. MISHNAH. OATHS ARE TWO, SUBDIVIDED INTO FOUR: ‘I SWEAR I SHALL EAT’, AND ‘[I SWEAR] I SHALL NOT EAT’; ‘[I SWEAR] I HAVE EATEN’, AND ‘[I SWEAR] I HAVE NOT EATEN’. — ‘I SWEAR I SHALL NOT EAT’, AND HE ATE A MINUTE QUANTITY, HE IS LIABLE: THIS IS THE OPINION OF R. AKIBA. THEY [THE SAGES] SAID TO R. AKIBA: WHERE DO WE FIND THAT HE WHO EATS A MINUTE QUANTITY IS LIABLE, THAT THIS ONE SHOULD BE LIABLE! — R. AKIBA SAID TO THEM: BUT WHERE DO WE FIND THAT HE WHO SPEAKS BRINGS AN OFFERING, THAT THIS ONE SHOULD BRING AN OFFERING? GEMARA. Shall We say that okal means ‘I shall eat’? We may question this, [for we learnt:] ‘"I swear I shall not eat of thine", "I swear I shall eat [okal] of thine"; "I do not swear I shall not eat of thine"; he is prohibited [to eat of that man's food]’? — Abaye said: Really [okal] means ‘I shall eat’ [as our Mishnah states], yet there is no difficulty: Here [it is a case where] he is urged to eat; and there [it is a case where] he is not^ʷ^ˣ^ʸ^ᶻ^ᵃᵃ^ᵃᵇ^ᵃᶜ^ᵃᵈ^ᵃᵉ^ᵃᶠ^ᵃᵍ^ᵃʰ^ᵃⁱ^ᵃʲ^ᵃᵏ^ᵃˡ^ᵃᵐ^ᵃⁿ^ᵃᵒ^ᵃᵖ^ᵃᵠ^ᵃʳ^ᵃˢ^ᵃᵗ^ᵃᵘ

^ʷnote:After walking through both paths (without purification in the interval) he has the definite knowledge of uncleanness, and when he enters the Temple later, being unaware of his uncleanness, he should bring a sacrifice.
^ˣnote:Having forgotten that he had walked along the first path, and remembering only the second, he has not the complete knowledge of definite uncleanness.
^ʸnote:The first Tanna and R. Simeon b. Judah disagree as to the view of R. Simeon b. Yohai.
^ᶻnote:The first Tanna who states that R. Simeon b. Yohai exempts him only in the case, where there was purification between the two entries, but not in the first case, holds that in the first case he is liable, because, when entering the Temple after having walked along both paths, he is definitely unclean, and though his knowledge is incomplete, for, when walking in the second path, he had forgotten about the first, nevertheless he is liable, for incomplete knowledge of definite uncleanness is counted as complete knowledge, since he is definitely unclean, and, if he had the complete knowledge, he would have known that he was definitely unclean, whereas in the case where there was purification between, the knowledge he had, though complete, was of doubtful uncleanness. He knew, that is to say, that he had walked in both paths, and yet, despite this knowledge, he is still doubtful, after walking in the second path, whether he is now unclean (for this path may be clean; and if the first was unclean he has already purified himself in any case) and is therefore exempt.
^ᵃᵃnote:And he is, therefore, exempt even in the first case, where there was no purification between the two entries.
^ᵃᵇnote:He questions the view of the Tanna who disagrees with R. Simeon b. Yohai.
^ᵃᶜnote:For when entering the Temple after walking along the first path he did not have the knowledge of definite uncleanness (for this path may have been clean); and when entering the Temple after walking along the second path, he also did not have the knowledge of definite uncleanness (for he had purified himself from the first path, and the second may be clean).
^ᵃᵈnote:Though his knowledge, in the case of each entry, was doubtful, yet, since he had certainly entered the Temple once while definitely unclean, and he had knowledge at the beginning (though of a doubtful nature), he brings an offering.
^ᵃᵉnote:He ate a piece of fat about which there was a doubt whether it was prohibited fat (ckj) or permitted (inua); at the time of eating he thought it was permitted fat, but later became aware that there was a doubt about it. In such a case he brings a suspensive guilt offering, (Lev. V. 17; Rashi). If, after becoming aware of this, he commits this doubtful sin again, he must bring a guilt offering for each separate act, since there was awareness between each act; just as, if he had unwittingly eaten actual (not doubtful) prohibited fat on a number of occasions (with awareness between each act) he would have had to bring a sin offering for each separate act.
^ᵃᶠnote:For all the acts together.
^ᵃᵍnote:Lev. V, 18.
^ᵃʰnote:Because Scripture could have written simply, u,dda kg, for his error; but it adds the words, dda rat, wherein he erred, implying that, however many times he erred, he brings only one suspensive guilt offering.
^ᵃⁱnote:He takes Rabbi's statement to mean this: If, after a time, he became aware that it was definitely prohibited fat, he would have to bring a sin offering for each act, although the awareness between the acts was only the awareness of doubtful prohibited fat, because such awareness is also sufficient to separate the acts. If there were no awareness at all between the acts, he would bring only one sin offering.
^ᵃʲnote:If, after unwittingly committing a definite sin, he became aware of it, and later again unwittingly committed the same definite sin, the awareness of the definite sin between the two acts makes a division between the acts, and he brings a sin offering for each act; so here, the awareness of the doubtful sin between the acts makes a division between the acts, and he brings a guilt offering for each act. But if the awareness between the acts was only the awareness of the doubtful sin, he does not later bring a sin offering for each act when the knowledge comes to him that he has committed a definite sin.
^ᵃᵏnote:For R. Johanan said, with reference to entering the Temple after walking along two paths, one of which was unclean (with purification between the two walks), that doubtful knowledge is counted as definite knowledge; yet here he says that doubtful knowledge is not the same as definite knowledge in making a division between acts for sin offerings.
^ᵃˡnote:For Resh Lakish said above that the Tanna who says he is liable (in the ease of entering the Temple after walking along two paths etc.) agrees with R. Ishmael that there is no need for knowledge at the beginning; Resh Lakish could have said that he agrees with Rabbi (according to Resh Lakish's exposition of his view) that doubtful knowledge is counted as definite knowledge.
^ᵃᵐnote:Lev. V, 3; v. supra 4a.
^ᵃⁿnote:Lev. IV, 28.
^ᵃᵒnote:Why does he say that the Tanna who makes him liable in the case of walking along the two paths agrees with R. Ishmael that we do not require knowledge at the beginning? Let him rather say that he does require knowledge at the beginning, but he makes him liable because he holds with Rabbi that doubtful knowledge is like definite knowledge (in accordance with Resh Lakish's own interpretation of Rabbi's view).
^ᵃᵖnote:Supra 14b.
^ᵃᵠnote:Lev. V, 4: If any one swears, pronouncing with his lips, or to do evil, or to do good. These are the two oaths, positive and negative, in the future. ‘To eat’ and ‘not to eat’ are merely examples of doing good and doing evil.
^ᵃʳnote:These are the two additional oaths, positive and negative, in the past; v. infra 25a.
^ᵃˢnote:On eating prohibited food there is liability only when a certain minimum (the size of an olive) is consumed; v. Yoma 81a.
^ᵃᵗnote:An oath is merely the utterance of the lips; yet he brings an offering for transgressing his utterance; therefore he brings an offering also even if he eats a minute quantity, since thereby he has also transgressed his utterance.
^ᵃᵘnote:Ned. 16a; If he used any of these three forms of oath, he must not partake of the other's food. Hence, ‘I swear that okal (I shall eat) of thine’ apparently implies that he takes an oath not to eat; yet in our Mishnah it is taken as a positive oath. The explanation why lk kfuta vguca may be taken negatively is this: vguca — it shall be prohibited to me by oath; lk kfuta — that which I eat of thine; i.e., I swear I shall not eat. The third form of oath means this: vguca tk — it shall not be prohibited to me by oath; kfut tk — that which I shall not eat; the implications being, but that which I shall eat shall be prohibited to me by oath.