שבועות 19:2 — Soncino English Talmud

even in the first case? At all events he is unclean? — Said Raba: Here we are discussing the case of one who walked along the first [path]; and when he walked along the second [path], forgot that he had already walked along the first, so that he has only an incomplete knowledge [of uncleanness]; and this is in what they differ: The first Tanna holds that we say, an incomplete knowledge is like a complete knowledge; and R. Simeon [b. Judah] holds that we do not say, an incomplete knowledge is like a complete knowledge. ‘If he walked along the first [path], and entered [the Temple], and was sprinkled upon [on the third day], and again [on the seventh day], and bathed himself; and then he walked along the second [path], and entered [the Temple], he is liable; and R. Simeon [b. Yohai] exempts him.’ Why is he liable, since it is a doubtful knowledge? — R. Johanan said: Here they made doubtful knowledge like definite knowledge. And Resh Lakish said: This is in accordance with the view of R. Ishmael, who holds that we do not require knowledge at the beginning. We may point out an incongruity between the words of R. Johanan [here] and the words of R. Johanan [elsewhere]; and we may point out an incongruity between the words of Resh Lakish [here] and the words of Resh Lakish [elsewhere]; for it has been taught: If he ate doubtful prohibited fat, and became aware of it [later; and he ate again] doubtful prohibited fat, and became aware of it [later]; Rabbi said: Just as he would bring a sin offering for each one, so he brings a guilt offering for doubtful sin for each one. R. Simeon b. Judah and R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon said in the name of R. Simeon [b. Yohai]: He brings only one guilt offering for doubtful sin; for it is said: [And he shall bring a ram . . . for a guilt offering . . .] for his error wherein he erred — the Torah includes many errors for one guilt offering. And Resh Lakish said: Here Rabbi taught that the awareness of the doubt separates [the acts] for sin offerings. And R. Johanan said: [Rabbi meant:] Just as, the awareness of definite sin elsewhere separates [the acts] for sin offerings, so the awareness of doubtful sin [here] separates [the acts] for guilt offerings. [Hence, there is incongruity between R. Johanan's statements, and between Resh Lakish's statements.] — Granted that there is no contradiction between one statement of R. Johanan and the other statement of R. Johanan, [for he said:] ‘Here they made [doubtful knowledge like definite knowledge]’, and not everywhere in the whole Torah did they do so; for [only] here, because knowledge [at the beginning] is not explicitly written, but is deduced from and it be hidden, [therefore they made doubtful knowledge like definite knowledge;] ‘but not everywhere in the whole Torah did they do so’, for it is written: [If his sin] be known to him — a definite knowledge we require. But Resh Lakish — why does he establish it as being in accordance with R. Ishmael's view? Let him establish it as being in accordance with Rabbi's view! — This he teaches us: that R. Ishmael does not require knowledge at the beginning. [But] it is obvious that he does not require [knowledge at the beginning], for he has no extra verse [from which to deduce it, since he requires] and it be hidden to make him liable for unawareness of Temple? — Perhaps you might think that he does not infer [that we require knowledge at the beginning] from the verse, but he has it from a tradition; therefore [Resh Lakish] teaches us [that R. Ishmael definitely does not require knowledge at the beginning]. MISHNAH. OATHS ARE TWO, SUBDIVIDED INTO FOUR: ‘I SWEAR I SHALL EAT’, AND ‘[I SWEAR] I SHALL NOT EAT’; ‘[I SWEAR] I HAVE EATEN’, AND ‘[I SWEAR] I HAVE NOT EATEN’. — ‘I SWEAR I SHALL NOT EAT’, AND HE ATE A MINUTE QUANTITY, HE IS LIABLE: THIS IS THE OPINION OF R. AKIBA. THEY [THE SAGES] SAID TO R. AKIBA: WHERE DO WE FIND THAT HE WHO EATS A MINUTE QUANTITY IS LIABLE, THAT THIS ONE SHOULD BE LIABLE! — R. AKIBA SAID TO THEM: BUT WHERE DO WE FIND THAT HE WHO SPEAKS BRINGS AN OFFERING, THAT THIS ONE SHOULD BRING AN OFFERING? GEMARA. Shall We say that okal means ‘I shall eat’? We may question this, [for we learnt:] ‘"I swear I shall not eat of thine", "I swear I shall eat [okal] of thine"; "I do not swear I shall not eat of thine"; he is prohibited [to eat of that man's food]’? — Abaye said: Really [okal] means ‘I shall eat’ [as our Mishnah states], yet there is no difficulty: Here [it is a case where] he is urged to eat; and there [it is a case where] he is not^ᵃ^ᵇ^ᶜ^ᵈ^ᵉ^ᶠ^ᵍ^ʰ^ⁱ^ʲ^ᵏ^ˡ^ᵐ^ⁿ^ᵒ^ᵖ^ᵠ^ʳ^ˢ^ᵗ^ᵘ^ᵛ^ʷ^ˣ^ʸ

^ᵃnote:After walking through both paths (without purification in the interval) he has the definite knowledge of uncleanness, and when he enters the Temple later, being unaware of his uncleanness, he should bring a sacrifice.
^ᵇnote:Having forgotten that he had walked along the first path, and remembering only the second, he has not the complete knowledge of definite uncleanness.
^ᶜnote:The first Tanna and R. Simeon b. Judah disagree as to the view of R. Simeon b. Yohai.
^ᵈnote:The first Tanna who states that R. Simeon b. Yohai exempts him only in the case, where there was purification between the two entries, but not in the first case, holds that in the first case he is liable, because, when entering the Temple after having walked along both paths, he is definitely unclean, and though his knowledge is incomplete, for, when walking in the second path, he had forgotten about the first, nevertheless he is liable, for incomplete knowledge of definite uncleanness is counted as complete knowledge, since he is definitely unclean, and, if he had the complete knowledge, he would have known that he was definitely unclean, whereas in the case where there was purification between, the knowledge he had, though complete, was of doubtful uncleanness. He knew, that is to say, that he had walked in both paths, and yet, despite this knowledge, he is still doubtful, after walking in the second path, whether he is now unclean (for this path may be clean; and if the first was unclean he has already purified himself in any case) and is therefore exempt.
^ᵉnote:And he is, therefore, exempt even in the first case, where there was no purification between the two entries.
^ᶠnote:He questions the view of the Tanna who disagrees with R. Simeon b. Yohai.
^ᵍnote:For when entering the Temple after walking along the first path he did not have the knowledge of definite uncleanness (for this path may have been clean); and when entering the Temple after walking along the second path, he also did not have the knowledge of definite uncleanness (for he had purified himself from the first path, and the second may be clean).
^ʰnote:Though his knowledge, in the case of each entry, was doubtful, yet, since he had certainly entered the Temple once while definitely unclean, and he had knowledge at the beginning (though of a doubtful nature), he brings an offering.
^ⁱnote:He ate a piece of fat about which there was a doubt whether it was prohibited fat (ckj) or permitted (inua); at the time of eating he thought it was permitted fat, but later became aware that there was a doubt about it. In such a case he brings a suspensive guilt offering, (Lev. V. 17; Rashi). If, after becoming aware of this, he commits this doubtful sin again, he must bring a guilt offering for each separate act, since there was awareness between each act; just as, if he had unwittingly eaten actual (not doubtful) prohibited fat on a number of occasions (with awareness between each act) he would have had to bring a sin offering for each separate act.
^ʲnote:For all the acts together.
^ᵏnote:Lev. V, 18.
^ˡnote:Because Scripture could have written simply, u,dda kg, for his error; but it adds the words, dda rat, wherein he erred, implying that, however many times he erred, he brings only one suspensive guilt offering.
^ᵐnote:He takes Rabbi's statement to mean this: If, after a time, he became aware that it was definitely prohibited fat, he would have to bring a sin offering for each act, although the awareness between the acts was only the awareness of doubtful prohibited fat, because such awareness is also sufficient to separate the acts. If there were no awareness at all between the acts, he would bring only one sin offering.
^ⁿnote:If, after unwittingly committing a definite sin, he became aware of it, and later again unwittingly committed the same definite sin, the awareness of the definite sin between the two acts makes a division between the acts, and he brings a sin offering for each act; so here, the awareness of the doubtful sin between the acts makes a division between the acts, and he brings a guilt offering for each act. But if the awareness between the acts was only the awareness of the doubtful sin, he does not later bring a sin offering for each act when the knowledge comes to him that he has committed a definite sin.
^ᵒnote:For R. Johanan said, with reference to entering the Temple after walking along two paths, one of which was unclean (with purification between the two walks), that doubtful knowledge is counted as definite knowledge; yet here he says that doubtful knowledge is not the same as definite knowledge in making a division between acts for sin offerings.
^ᵖnote:For Resh Lakish said above that the Tanna who says he is liable (in the ease of entering the Temple after walking along two paths etc.) agrees with R. Ishmael that there is no need for knowledge at the beginning; Resh Lakish could have said that he agrees with Rabbi (according to Resh Lakish's exposition of his view) that doubtful knowledge is counted as definite knowledge.
^ᵠnote:Lev. V, 3; v. supra 4a.
^ʳnote:Lev. IV, 28.
^ˢnote:Why does he say that the Tanna who makes him liable in the case of walking along the two paths agrees with R. Ishmael that we do not require knowledge at the beginning? Let him rather say that he does require knowledge at the beginning, but he makes him liable because he holds with Rabbi that doubtful knowledge is like definite knowledge (in accordance with Resh Lakish's own interpretation of Rabbi's view).
^ᵗnote:Supra 14b.
^ᵘnote:Lev. V, 4: If any one swears, pronouncing with his lips, or to do evil, or to do good. These are the two oaths, positive and negative, in the future. ‘To eat’ and ‘not to eat’ are merely examples of doing good and doing evil.
^ᵛnote:These are the two additional oaths, positive and negative, in the past; v. infra 25a.
^ʷnote:On eating prohibited food there is liability only when a certain minimum (the size of an olive) is consumed; v. Yoma 81a.
^ˣnote:An oath is merely the utterance of the lips; yet he brings an offering for transgressing his utterance; therefore he brings an offering also even if he eats a minute quantity, since thereby he has also transgressed his utterance.
^ʸnote:Ned. 16a; If he used any of these three forms of oath, he must not partake of the other's food. Hence, ‘I swear that okal (I shall eat) of thine’ apparently implies that he takes an oath not to eat; yet in our Mishnah it is taken as a positive oath. The explanation why lk kfuta vguca may be taken negatively is this: vguca — it shall be prohibited to me by oath; lk kfuta — that which I eat of thine; i.e., I swear I shall not eat. The third form of oath means this: vguca tk — it shall not be prohibited to me by oath; kfut tk — that which I shall not eat; the implications being, but that which I shall eat shall be prohibited to me by oath.