1each [oath], whether [uttered] before the Beth Din or not before the Beth Din, yet deals only with a money claim; testimony, where the law does not make women equal to men, relatives equal to non-relatives, those ineligible [to bear testimony] equal to those eligible, and where he is liable only once [if adjured] before the Beth Din, how much more that it should deal only with a money claim! — [No! We may argue:] Deposit [is restricted to money claims] because the law does not make him who is adjured [by others] equal to him who swears [of his own accord], or him who swears wilfully like him who swears unwittingly; but how can you say in [the case of] testimony [that it should be restricted to money claims], since the law makes him who is adjured [by others] equal to him who swears [of his own accord], and him who swears wilfully equal to him who swears unwittingly? — It is said: sin, sin, for deduction by analogy; here it is said: [If any one] sin, and there it is said: [If any one] sin; just as there it deals only with a money claim, so here it deals only with a money claim. Rabbah b. Ulla raised an objection: Or . . . or of [the oath of] utterance will prove [that a money claim is not intended], for they are or . . . or, and are concerned with an oath, and not concerned with a priest, and yet deal not with a money claim! — It is more reasonable to deduce it from deposit, because [we may deduce] ‘sin’ from ‘sin’. — On the contrary, we should deduce it from [the oath of] utterance, for [we may deduce] sin offering from sin offering! — Well, it is more reasonable to deduce it from deposit, because [they are both equal in respect of] sin, wilful, claim and denial, past. On the contrary, we should deduce it from [oath of] utterance, because [they are both equal in respect of] sin offering, sliding scale, fifth! — The others are more. ‘R. Akiba said: And it shall be, when he shall be guilty in one of these things — in some of these things he is liable, and in some of these things he is exempt; how is this? If he claimed from him money, he is liable; if he claimed from him something else, he is exempt.’ Let me reverse it! — R. Akiba relies on the or . . . or of R. Eliezer. — [If so,] what is the difference between R. Eliezer and R. Akiba? — The difference between them is, if he adjures witnesses for land: according to R. Eliezer they are liable, according to R. Akiba they are exempt. — But according to R. Johanan who says there that if he adjures witnesses for land, they are exempt even according to R. Eliezer, what will be the difference here between R. Eliezer and R. Akiba? — The difference between them will be witnesses for a fine. ‘R. Jose the Galilean said: He being a witness, whether he hath seen or known — of such testimony as may be established by seeing without knowing, and by knowing without seeing, the verse deals.’ R. Papa said to Abaye: Shall we say that R. Jose the Galilean does not agree with R. Aha? For it was taught: R. Aha said; If a camel copulates among other camels, and one camel is found killed at his side, it is known that he killed him. Now, if he would agree with R. Aha, it is possible also in capital cases, as [in the incident related by] R. Simeon b. Shetah, for we learnt, R. Simeon b. Shetah said; May I not see the consolation [of Zion] if I did not see a man running after his neighbour into a ruin, and I ran after him, and found him with a sword in his hand with the blood dripping, and the victim writhing in agony. I said to him: ‘Wicked one! Who killed this man? I or you? But what can I do, since your blood is not given into my hand, for Scripture says: At the mouth of two witnesses, or three witnesses, shall he that is to die be put to death. But the Omnipresent will exact retribution from you!’ It is said, they had not yet moved from there, when a serpent bit him, and he died! — You may say, he does agree with R. Aha. Granted, knowing without seeing is possible, but seeing without knowing how is that possible? Does he not need to know if he killed a heathen or a Jew, if he killed a man suffering from a fatal disease or a healthy man? We may deduce that R. Jose the Galilean holds that if he adjures witnesses for a fine, they are exempt, for if you will say they are liable, granted that knowing without seeing is possible, but seeing without knowing — [how is that possible]? Does he not need to know if he cohabited with a heathen woman or a Jewish woman, with a virgin or with a woman who is not a virgin? R. Hamnuna sat before Rab Judah, and Rab Judah sat and enquired; [If one said;] ‘A hundred zuz I counted out to you before So-and-So and So-and-So’;ᵃᵇᶜᵈᵉᶠᵍʰⁱʲᵏˡᵐⁿᵒᵖᵠʳˢᵗᵘᵛʷˣʸᶻᵃᵃᵃᵇᵃᶜᵃᵈᵃᵉᵃᶠᵃᵍᵃʰᵃⁱᵃʲᵃᵏ
2and witnesses had been watching him from outside, what [is the ruling]? — R. Hamnuna said to him: And what does that one plead? If he says, ‘The thing never occurred’, he is proven a liar. If he says, ‘Yes, I took [the money], but it was my own that I took’, if witnesses come, what happens? — He said to him: ‘Hamnuna, you come and go in’. A certain [man] said to his neighbour. ‘A hundred zuz I counted out to you by the side of this pillar’. He replied to him, ‘I did not pass by the side of this pillar’. Two witnesses came and bore testimony that he had urinated by the side of that pillar. Said Resh Lakish, he is proven a liar. R. Nahman raised an objection: This is a Persian judgment! Did he then say ‘never’? In connection with this affair, he meant. Some say: A certain [man] said to his neighbour. ‘A hundred zuz I counted out to you by the side of this pillar’. He replied to him, ‘I never passed by the side of this pillar’. Witnesses came that he had urinated by the side of that pillar. R. Nahman said, he is proven a liar. Said Raba to R. Nahman; Anything which is not imposed upon a man he will do without being conscious of it. ‘R. Simeon said: He is liable here, and he is liable in [the case of] deposit, etc.’ They laughed at it in the West. Why the laughter? — Because he states; ‘Deposit [is restricted to money claims] because the law does not make him who is adjured [by others] like him who swears [of his own accord], nor him who swears wilfully like him who swears unwittingly.’ Now, he who swears of his own accord in [the case of] testimony — how does R. Simeon know [that he is liable]? Because he deduces it from deposit; then let him also in [the case of] deposit deduce adjuration by others from testimony. But why the laughter? Perhaps R. Simeon deduces it by argument from minor to major: if when adjured by others he is liable, when he swears of his own accord he should the more so be liable? — Well then, the laughter is in connection with ‘wilful like unwitting’, for he states: ‘Deposit [is restricted to money claims] because the law does not make him who is adjured [by others] like him who swears [of his own accord], nor him who swears wilfully like him who swears unwittingly.’ Now for swearing wilfully in [the case of] testimony, how do we know [that he is liable]? Because it is not written, and it be hidden. Here also it is not written, and it be hidden. R. Huna said to them: But why the laughter? Perhaps R. Simeon deduces that wilful [transgression] is not like unwitting in [the case of] deposit from [the law of] trespass [in holy things]. — This then is the very reason for the laughter: why does he deduce it from trespass? Let him rather deduce it from testimony! — It is more reasonable that he should deduce it from trespass, because it is ‘trespass’ from ‘trespass’! On the contrary, he should deduce it from testimony, because it is ‘sin’ from ‘sin’. It is more reasonable that he should deduce it from trespass, because [they are both equal in respect of] ‘trespass’, all, enjoyment, fixed offering, fifth, and guilt offering. On the contrary, he should deduce it from testimony, because [they are both equal in respect of] ‘sin’, layman, oath, claim and denial, and ‘or . . . or’! — The others are more. Well then, why the laughter? — When R. Papa and R. Huna the son of R. Joshua came from the Academy, they said this is the reason for the laughter: Behold R. Simeon deduces by analogy [testimony from deposit]. Why then does he argue: ‘Deposit [is restricted to money claims] because the law does not make him who is adjured [by others] like him who swears [of his own accord], nor him who swears wilfully like him who swears unwittingly.’ But why the laughter? Perhaps he argued thus before he established the analogy, but after he established the analogy he does not argue thus. But does he not? Surely Raba b. Ithi said to the Sages: Who is the Tanna who holds that [in the case of] the oath of deposit wilful transgression is not atoned for [by an offering]? It is R. Simeon! — Perhaps he argues that wilful transgression [is not] like unwitting [in the case of deposit], because he deduces it from trespass since [it is equal to it] in more respects; but that adjuration by others [is not] like swearing of his own accord he does not argue. — Well, let testimony now be in turn deduced from deposit that wilful is not like unwitting transgression; just as [in the case of] deposit he is liable for unwitting but not for wilful transgression, so [in the case of] testimony let him be liable for unwitting and not for wilful transgression; just as he deduces deposit from trespass! —ᵃˡᵃᵐᵃⁿᵃᵒᵃᵖᵃᵠᵃʳᵃˢᵃᵗᵃᵘᵃᵛᵃʷᵃˣᵃʸᵃᶻᵇᵃᵇᵇᵇᶜᵇᵈᵇᵉᵇᶠᵇᵍᵇʰᵇⁱᵇʲᵇᵏᵇˡᵇᵐᵇⁿᵇᵒᵇᵖᵇᵠᵇʳᵇˢᵇᵗᵇᵘᵇᵛᵇʷᵇˣᵇʸᵇᶻ