1MISHNAH. IF HE SWORE TO ANNUL A PRECEPT, AND DID NOT ANNUL IT, HE IS EXEMPT; TO FULFIL [A PRECEPT], AND DID NOT FULFIL IT, HE IS EXEMPT; THOUGH LOGICALLY [IN THE SECOND INSTANCE] HE SHOULD HAVE BEEN LIABLE, AS IS THE OPINION OF R. JUDAH B. BATHYRA: [FOR] R. JUDAH B. BATHYRA SAID: NOW, IF FOR AN OPTIONAL MATTER, FOR WHICH HE IS NOT ADJURED FROM MOUNT SINAI, HE IS LIABLE; FOR A PRECEPT, FOR WHICH HE IS ADJURED FROM MOUNT SINAI, HE SHOULD MOST CERTAINLY BE LIABLE! THEY REPLIED TO HIM: NO! IF YOU SAY THAT FOR AN OATH IN AN OPTIONAL MATTER [HE IS LIABLE]. IT IS BECAUSE [SCRIPTURE] HAS IN THAT CASE MADE NEGATIVE EQUAL TO POSITIVE [FOR LIABILITY]; BUT HOW CAN YOU SAY THAT FOR AN OATH [TO FULFIL] A PRECEPT [HE IS LIABLE], SINCE [SCRIPTURE] HAS NOT IN THAT CASE MADE NEGATIVE EQUAL TO POSITIVE, FOR IF HE SWORE TO ANNUL [A PRECEPT], AND DID NOT ANNUL IT, HE IS EXEMPT! GEMARA. Our Rabbis taught: I might think that if he swore to annul a precept, and did not annul it, he should be liable, therefore it is said: to do evil, or to do good; just as doing good is optional, so doing evil must be optional; I must therefore exclude: if he swore to annul a precept, and did not annul it; for which he is exempt. I might think that if he swore to fulfil a precept, and did not fulfil it, he should be liable, therefore it is said: to do evil, or to do good; just as doing evil is optional, so doing good must be optional; I must therefore exclude: if he swore to fulfil a precept, and did not fulfil it; for which he is exempt. I might think that if he swore to do evil to himself, and did not do so, that he should be exempt, therefore it is said: to do evil, or to do good; just as doing good is optional, so doing evil must be optional; I will therefore include: if he swore to do evil to himself, and did not do so, [that he is liable,] for the option is in his own hands. I might think that if he swore to do evil to others, and did not do so, that he should be liable, therefore it is said: to do evil, or to do good; just as doing good is optional, so doing evil must be optional. I will therefore exclude: if he swore to do evil to others, and did not do so, [that he is exempt], for the option is not in his hands. Whence do we know to include [an oath] to do good to others? Because it is said: or to do good. And what is doing evil to others? ‘I shall smite So-and-so, and crack his brain.’ But how do we know that the verses refer to optional matters, perhaps they refer [also] to matters relating to precepts? — That cannot enter our minds, for we require that doing good shall be similar to doing evil, and that doing evil shall be similar to doing good; for [the verse] likens doing evil to doing good: just as doing good cannot refer to the annulling of a precept, so doing evil cannot refer to the annulling of a precept; [so that this] doing evil is actually doing good! And it likens doing good to doing evil; just as doing evil cannot refer to the fulfilling of a precept, so doing good cannot refer to the fulfilling of a precept; [so that this] doing good is actually doing evil! If so, even in an optional matter it is not possible! — Well then since [the word] ‘or’ is necessary in order to include doing good to others, we deduce that the verses refer to optional matters, for if it should enter your mind that they refer to matters relating to precepts [we would not require the word ‘or’ to include doing good to others for], since doing evil to others is included, doing good is certainly [included]! But this [word] ‘or’ is necessary to separate [the phrases]? — To separate them the word is not necessary. That is so, according to R. Jonathan, but according to R. Josiah, what is to be said? For it has been taught: A man who curseth his father or his mother [shall surely be put to death]; from this we know only [if he curses] his father and his mother; [if he curses] his father and not his mother, or his mother and not his father, how do we know [that he is liable]? Because it is [also] said: His father or his mother he hath cursed; his father he hath cursed, his mother he hath cursed. This is the opinion of R. Josiah. R. Jonathan said: It may imply both together, and it may also imply each one aloneᵃᵇᶜᵈᵉᶠᵍʰⁱʲᵏˡᵐⁿᵒᵖᵠʳˢᵗᵘᵛʷˣʸᶻᵃᵃ
2unless the verse clearly specifies together. [According to R. Josiah, then, how do we know that the verse concerning oaths refers to optional matters?] — You may say that it will be even in accordance with the view of R. Josiah. He agrees with R. Akiba who expounds [the verse on the principle of] amplification and limitation; so that, granted if you say the verse refers to optional matters, it may exclude a precept; but if you say it refers [also] to precepts, what can it exclude? R. JUDAH B. BATHYRA SAID: NOW, IF FOR AN OPTIONAL MATTER, etc. Well did the Rabbis reply to R. Judah b. Bathyra. And R. Judah b. Bathyra? He may reply to you: Is there not [the case of] doing good to others, which, though it is not applicable [negatively] in doing evil to others, is yet included by the Divine Law? Similarly, therefore, in [the case of] fulfilling a precept, though it is not applicable [negatively] in annulling a precept, it may be included by the Divine Law. And the Rabbis? — There it is applicable [negatively in such a case as], ‘I shall not do good [to others];’ but here, is it applicable [negatively] in, ‘I shall not fulfil [the precept]’? MISHNAH. ‘I SWEAR I SHALL NOT EAT THIS LOAF;’ ‘I SWEAR I SHALL NOT EAT IT;’ ‘I SWEAR I SHALL NOT EAT IT;’ AND HE ATE IT, HE IS LIABLE ONLY ONCE. THIS IS THE OATH OF UTTERANCE, FOR WHICH ONE IS LIABLE, FOR ITS WILFUL TRANSGRESSION, STRIPES; AND FOR ITS UNWITTING TRANSGRESSION, A SLIDING SCALE SACRIFICE. FOR A VAIN OATH ONE IS LIABLE FOR WILFUL TRANSGRESSION, STRIPES; AND FOR UNWITTING TRANSGRESSION ONE IS EXEMPT. GEMARA. Why does he state: I SWEAR I SHALL NOT EAT [THIS LOAF]; I SWEAR I SHALL NOT EAT IT? — This he teaches us: The reason is because he said, ‘[I swear] I shall not eat;’ then he said, ‘[I swear] I shall not eat it,’ therefore he is liable only once; but if he said, ‘[I swear] I shall not eat it;’ and then he said, ‘[I swear] I shall not eat,’ he is liable twice; as is Raba's view, for Raba said: [If he said,] ‘I swear I shall not eat this loaf,’ as soon as he ate a ka-zayith of it, he is liable; [but if he said, ‘I swear] I shall not eat it,’ he is not liable until he eats it all. ‘I SWEAR I SHALL NOT EAT IT,’ AND HE ATE IT, HE IS LIABLE ONLY ONCE, etc. Why is this further [oath] necessary? — This he teaches us: that there is no liability, but the oath remains, so that if room is found, it takes effect. For what practical purpose? — For that which Raba said, for Raba said: If he obtained absolution from the first, the second takes effect in its place. Shall we say that [the following] supports him? [For it has been taught:] He who vowed two vows of naziriteship, and counted the first, and set apart the offering for it, and then obtained absolution from the first — then the second [vow] takes the place of the first! — How now! There the [second vow of] naziriteship is at least in existence, so that when he would have finished counting for the first, he would have had to begin counting for the second, even if there had been no absolution; but here, would the second oath have any existence at all [were it not for the absolution from the first]? Raba said: If he swore concerning a loaf, and was eating it; then, if he left a ka-zayith of it, he may obtain absolution from it; but if he has eaten it all, he cannot obtain absolution from it. Said R. Aha the son of Raba to R. Ashi: How is this? If he said, ‘I shall not eat,’ then from the first ka-zayith he has already transgressed the prohibition? And if he said: ‘I shall not eat it’, then why mention ka-zayith,ᵃᵇᵃᶜᵃᵈᵃᵉᵃᶠᵃᵍᵃʰᵃⁱᵃʲᵃᵏᵃˡᵃᵐᵃⁿᵃᵒᵃᵖᵃᵠᵃʳᵃˢᵃᵗᵃᵘᵃᵛᵃʷᵃˣᵃʸᵃᶻᵇᵃᵇᵇ