שבועות 26 — Soncino English Talmud

¹one of them was stated by R. Papa. R. ISHMAEL SAYS, HE IS LIABLE ONLY FOR [AN OATH IN] THE FUTURE. Our Rabbis taught: To do evil, or to do good. [From this] we know only such cases where doing evil and doing good are applicable; but how do we know such cases where doing evil and doing good are not applicable? Because it is said, Or if anyone swear clearly with his lips. [From this] we know only [oaths in] the future; how do we know [oaths in] the past? Because it is said: Whatsoever it be that a man shall utter clearly, with an oath. This is the opinion of R. Akiba. R. Ishmael says: To do evil, or to do good implies the future. R. Akiba said to him: If so, we know only such cases where doing evil and doing good are applicable; how do we know such cases where doing evil and doing good are not applicable? He replied to him: From the amplification of the verse. Whereupon he said to him: If the verse amplified for that, it amplified for this also. Well did R. Akiba reply to R. Ishmael! — R. Johanan said: R. Ishmael who ministered to R. Nehunia b. Hakanah, who expounded the whole Torah on the principle of generalisation and specification, also expounded it on the principle of generalisation and specification; R. Akiba who ministered to Nahum of Gamzu, who expounded the whole Torah on the principle of amplification and limitation, also expounded it on the principle of amplification and limitation. How does R. Akiba expound it on the principle of amplifications and limitations? It has been taught: Or if any one swear [clearly with his lips — this amplifies; to do evil, or to do good — this limits; whatsoever it be that a man shall utter clearly [with an oath] — this again amplifies: because it amplifies, limits, and amplifies, it includes all; what does it include? It includes all things. What does it exclude? It excludes a precept. And R. Ishmael expounds it on the principle of generalisation and specification: or if any one swear clearly with his lips — this generalises; to do evil or to do good this specifies; whatsoever it be that a man shall utter clearly [with an oath] — this again generalises: because it generalises, specifies, and generalises, you may include in the generalisation only [those oaths which are] similar to the specification: just as the specification is clearly in the future, so all [oaths] in the future [may be included]; the generalisation helping to include even cases where doing evil and doing good are not applicable [as long as they are oaths] in the future; and the specification helping to exclude even cases where doing evil and doing good are applicable [if they are oaths] in the past. Let me reverse it! — R. Isaac said: [We include only oaths] similar to [the oath] to do evil, or to do good, where the prohibition is on account of he shall not break his word, but exclude this [oath] where the prohibition is not on account of he shall not break his word, but on account of ye shall not lie. R. Isaac b. Abin said: Scripture says, Or if any one swear clearly with his lips: the oath must precede the utterance, and not the utterance precede the oath; this excludes ‘I ate’, or, ‘I did not eat,’ where the action precedes the oath. Our Rabbis taught: [Whatsoever it be that] a man [shall utter clearly] with an oath — this excludes [a false oath by] accident; and it be hid — this excludes wilful [transgression of oath]; from him — [this implies that] the oath was hidden from him. I might think that [even] if the thing be hidden from him [he should be liable], therefore it is said: . . . with an oath, and it be hid . . . for the unawareness of the oath he is liable, and he is not liable for the unawareness of the thing. The Master said: ‘. . . a man . . . with an oath — this excludes [a false oath by] accident’. How is this? As the case of R. Kahana and R. Assi: when they rose from [the lecture of] Rab, one said, ‘I swear that thus said Rab,’ and the other said, ‘I swear that thus said Rab.’ When they came [again] before Rab, he would agree with one of them; then the other would say to him, ‘Did I, then, swear falsely?’ He would reply to him, ‘Your heart deceived you.’ ‘And it be hid from him — [this implies that] the oath was hidden from him. I might think that [even] if the thing be hidden from him [he should be liable], therefore it is said: . . . with an oath, and it be hid . . . for the unawareness of the oath he is liable, and he is not liable for the unawareness of the thing.’ They laughed at this in the West. Granted, [unawareness of] oath is possible without [unawareness of] thing; for example, if he said, ‘I swear I shall not eat wheat bread,’ and he thought he had said, ‘I shall eat,’ his oath he forgot, and the thing he remembered. But [unawareness of] thing without [unawareness of] oath — how is that possible? If for example, he said, ‘I swear I shall not eat wheat bread,’ and he thought he had said ‘barley [bread],’ his oath he remembered, and the thing he forgot. — Since he forgot the thing, it is [automatically] unawareness of oath! — Well then, said R. Eleazar, this and that are one. R. Joseph demurred: This means that [unawareness of] thing without [unawareness of] oath is by no means possible? But surely it is possible; for example, if he said, ‘I swear I shall not eat wheat bread,’ and he stretched out his hand to the basket to take barley bread, but wheat [bread] came to his hand, and he, thinking it was barley [bread], ate it: now, his oath he remembered, but it was the thing that he did not know! — Abaye said to him: But do you not make him liable for an offering for that which he holds in his hand? It is, therefore, unawareness of oath. Another version: Abaye said to R. Joseph: In any case, he should bring an offering for this bread, for it is unawareness of oath. And R. Joseph? — He may reply to you: Since, if he had known that this was wheat, he would have refrained from [eating] it, it is unawareness of thing. Raba enquired of R. Nahman: If there was unawareness of both, what is the ruling? — He said to him: Since there is unawareness of oath, he is liable. On the contrary, since there is unawareness of thing, he should be exempt! — R. Ashi said: We observe, if because of the oath he refrains, it is [a case of] unawareness of oath, and he is liable; and if because of the thing he refrains, it is [a case of] unawareness of thing, and he is exempt. Said Rabina to R. Ashi: Does he then refrain because of the oath unless it be also because of the thing, and does he refrain because of the thing unless it be also because of the oath? There is really no difference. Raba enquired of R. Nahman:^ᵃ^ᵇ^ᶜ^ᵈ^ᵉ^ᶠ^ᵍ^ʰ^ⁱ^ʲ^ᵏ^ˡ^ᵐ^ⁿ^ᵒ^ᵖ^ᵠ^ʳ^ˢ^ᵗ^ᵘ^ᵛ^ʷ^ˣ^ʸ^ᶻ^ᵃᵃ^ᵃᵇ^ᵃᶜ^ᵃᵈ^ᵃᵉ^ᵃᶠ^ᵃᵍ

^ᵃnote:Who was a disciple of Abaye and Raba. His disciples, in turn, were sometimes not sure whether a statement of his was intended to be his own view or the view of Abaye (or Raba). One of the two statements (which cannot be reconciled with each other) attributed here to Abaye is, in reality, the opinion of R. Papa, his successor.
^ᵇnote:Lev. V, 4.
^ᶜnote:Ibid.; apparently any oath.
^ᵈnote:If any one swear . . . to do evil, or to do good, implies swearing to do something in the future.
^ᵉnote:Lev. V, 4, whatsoever it be, i.e., even an oath in the past.
^ᶠnote:Whatsoever it be, etc.
^ᵍnote:Cases where doing evil and doing good are not applicable.
^ʰnote:Oaths in the past.
^ⁱnote:Why does not R. Ishmael agree with him?
^ʲnote:Was a disciple of.
^ᵏnote:A village in south-western Judea; v. Ta'an. 21a; he was called uz od aht, because, whatever evil befell him, he said, vcuyk uz od ‘this also is for the best’.
^ˡnote:All kinds of oaths.
^ᵐnote:Only oaths where doing evil or good are applicable.
^ⁿnote:V. p. 12, n. 3.
^ᵒnote:Swearing to fulfil or annul a precept; infra 27a.
^ᵖnote:Since the generalisation tends to include, and the specifications to exclude, let us include even oaths in the past which are similar to the specification in that doing evil and doing good are applicable; and exclude even oaths in the future where doing evil and doing good are not applicable.
^ᵠnote:Num. XXX, 3; this implies that he may keep his word if he wishes, which is possible only in an oath in the future.
^ʳnote:Lev. XIX, 11, this implies that at the moment of utterance the oath must not be a lie; this can refer only to an oath in the past.
^ˢnote:Lit., ‘if any one swear to utter with the lips:’ the swearing must precede the utterance, i.e., the action to which the utterance refers; but if the action to which the utterance refers has already preceded the swearing (= oath in the past), the oath is excluded.
^ᵗnote:Lev. V, 4; vgucac ostv; at the time of the oath he must be a man, i.e., have all his faculties, but if he swears falsely by accident (thinking it is the truth), he is exempt.
^ᵘnote:Whatsoever . . . a man shall utter with an oath, and it be hid from him; i.e., the oath be hid from him; he forgot, when doing the action, that he had sworn not to do it.
^ᵛnote:E.g., ‘I swear I shall not eat wheat bread,’ and he took a loaf which he thought was of barley (but which was really of wheat), and ate it, he is not liable to bring an offering, because it is a case of unawareness of thing (and awareness of oath).
^ʷnote:You thought you were swearing the truth; it is a false oath by accident.
^ˣnote:In Palestine; v. Sanh. 17b.
^ʸnote:He remembered that it was: ‘I shall not eat,’ but forgot which thing it was he was not to eat.
^ᶻnote:For the oath was: ‘I shall not eat wheat bread,’ and if he forgot ‘wheat bread,’ he forgot an integral part of the oath.
^ᵃᵃnote:Unawareness of oath and unawareness of thing are the same; unawareness of thing is not possible without unawareness of oath.
^ᵃᵇnote:He remembered the oath completely, but mistook the object: this then might be the unawareness of thing by itself which is excluded in the Baraitha.
^ᵃᶜnote:He thought that what he held in his hand was barley bread, and therefore he thought that he had not sworn for what he held in his hand; but, in reality, he had sworn not to eat it, for it was wheat bread; he was, therefore, unaware of the oath with reference to this loaf: hence, it is unawareness of oath.
^ᵃᵈnote:He is reminded, for example, that he has sworn not to eat wheat bread (and the fact that this loaf is wheat bread is not mentioned to him), and he immediately refrains from eating this loaf; he thus refrains because of the oath. He had already, however, eaten a ka-zayith, before he was reminded, and he is therefore liable to bring an offering, because it is a case of unawareness of oath.
^ᵃᵉnote:He is reminded that this is wheat bread (and the fact that he has sworn is not mentioned to him), and he refrains from continuing to eat it.
^ᵃᶠnote:When he is reminded of one of the facts (that he has sworn, or that this is wheat bread), he refrains from eating, because he immediately recollects the other fact. If he did not recollect the other fact, he would not refrain, for the fact that he had sworn not to eat wheat bread would not matter if this loaf were not wheat, and the fact that this loaf is wheat would not matter if he had not sworn not to eat it.
^ᵃᵍnote:And he is exempt; for he is liable only for unawareness of oath by itself; v. supra 19a for similar discussion.

²What is unwitting transgression of oath of utterance in the past? If he knew, it is wilful transgression; if he did not know, it is accidental transgression? — He replied to him: [It is possible in the case of] one who says, ‘I know that this oath is prohibited, but I do not know whether one is liable to bring an offering for it or not.’ According to whom will this be? According to Monobaz, who holds that ignorance of [liability for] an offering is termed ignorance! — You may [however] say that it will be even in accordance with the view of the Rabbis; for the Rabbis disagree with Monobaz only in the rest of the Torah where there is no innovation, but here where there is an innovation — for in the whole Torah we do not find that [the unwitting transgression of] a negative precept [for the wilful transgression of which kareth is not inflicted] should make him liable for an offering, for we deduce it from the ruling concerning idolatry; yet here, it does make him liable to bring [an offering] even the Sages admit. Rabina enquired of Raba: If he swore concerning a loaf [not to eat it], and he was dangerously ill on account of [not being able to eat] it, what is the ruling? — If he is dangerously ill, [of course] you may permit it to him! Well then, if he is distressed, and he ate it, unwittingly transgressing the oath, what is the ruling? — He said to him, it has been taught: He who would turn back if he knew brings an offering for his unwitting transgression; he who would not turn back if he knew, does not bring an offering for his unwitting transgression. Samuel said: If he decided in his mind, he must utter it with his lips, for it is said: to utter with the lips. An objection was raised: with the lips, but not in the mind. If he decided in his mind, how do we know [that he is liable]? Because it is said: whatsoever it be that a man shall utter clearly with an oath. This itself is contradictory! You say, with the lips, but not in the mind; and then you say, if he decided in his mind, how do we know [that he is liable]? — R. Shesheth said: This is no question; thus he means: with the lips, but not if he decided in his mind to utter it with his lips, and did not utter it. If he decided in his mind, simply, how do we know [that he is liable]? Because it is said: whatsoever it be that a man shall utter clearly. But against Samuel the question remains! — R. Shesheth said: Answer it thus: with the lips, but not if he decided in his mind to utter ‘wheat bread’, and he uttered ‘barley bread’. If he decided in his mind to utter ‘wheat bread’, and he uttered ‘bread’ simply, how do we know [that he is liable]? Because it is said: whatsoever it be that a man shall utter clearly. An objection was raised: That which is gone out of thy lips thou shalt observe and do; from this we know only, if he uttered it with his lips; if he decided in his mind, how do we know [that he must keep his promise]? Because it is said: all who were willing-hearted [brought . . . an offering of gold unto the Lord]. — There it is different, because it is written: all who were willing-hearted. But let us deduce from it. — [No!] because [tabernacle] offerings and holy things are ‘two verses which come as one’; and all [cases of] ‘two verses which come as one’ do not teach [for other cases]. — That is well, according to the one who holds that ‘they do not teach’; but according to the one who holds that ‘they do teach’, what shall we say? — This is hullin, and [the others are] holy things; and hullin we cannot deduce from holy things.30^ᵃʰ^ᵃⁱ^ᵃʲ^ᵃᵏ^ᵃˡ^ᵃᵐ^ᵃⁿ^ᵃᵒ^ᵃᵖ^ᵃᵠ^ᵃʳ^ᵃˢ^ᵃᵗ^ᵃᵘ^ᵃᵛ^ᵃʷ^ᵃˣ^ᵃʸ^ᵃᶻ^ᵇᵃ^ᵇᵇ^ᵇᶜ^ᵇᵈ^ᵇᵉ^ᵇᶠ^ᵇᵍ^ᵇʰ^ᵇⁱ^ᵇʲ^ᵇᵏ

^ᵃʰnote:Since it has been deduced (from vgucac ostv, supra) that if he swears falsely, thinking it is the truth, it is termed accidental transgression, and he is exempt; how is unwittingly transgression (for which he is liable) possible?
^ᵃⁱnote:At the time of the oath that he was swearing falsely.
^ᵃʲnote:Although it is wilful transgression, it is counted as unwitting, because he did not know that he was liable for an offering.
^ᵃᵏnote:Shab. 69a; and because of this his wilful transgression of the oath is counted as unwitting transgression.
^ᵃˡnote:Who hold that ignorance of liability for an offering does not make the transgression unwitting.
^ᵃᵐnote:Normally, when kareth is inflicted for wilful transgression, an offering is brought for unwitting transgression; it is an innovation in the Torah, in the case of oaths, to make him liable for an offering for unwitting transgression, when for wilful transgression the punishment is merely stripes.
^ᵃⁿnote:Shab. 68b, 69a; Scripture says: And if ye err, and do not observe all these commandments . . . (Num. XV, 22); this refers to idolatry (Hor. 8a); an offering is brought for unwitting transgression (verse 27); ye shall have one law for him that doeth aught in error (verse 29): this implies that one law, the same law, applies both to idolatry and to other sins; in idolatry, wilful transgression is punished by kareth: but the soul that doeth aught with a high hand (i.e., wilfully) . . . shall be cut off (verse 30); therefore all sins, for the wilful transgression of which kareth is inflicted, are punished by the bringing of an offering for unwitting transgression.
^ᵃᵒnote:That ignorance of liability for an offering is counted as ignorance, and he brings an offering.
^ᵃᵖnote:In the case of dangerous illness (vbfx) a commandment may be transgressed; even the Sabbath may be desecrated; v. Bez. 22a.
^ᵃᵠnote:Not dangerously ill, but sufficiently distressed to have eaten it, even if he had remembered his oath.
^ᵃʳnote:Does he bring an offering, since he transgressed the oath unwittingly: or, since he was prepared to transgress it wilfully, does he not bring an offering?
^ᵃˢnote:I.e., he would not transgress wilfully.
^ᵃᵗnote:V. Hor. 20a; in the present instance, since he would have eaten the loaf, even if he had remembered his oath, he does not bring an offering for eating it when he forgot the oath, for it is not absolutely unwitting transgression; it is almost (though not quite) like wilful transgression; and though stripes are not inflicted, for it is not actually wilful transgression, yet he is not allowed to bring an offering (which would serve to cleanse him from his sin): it is not a sufficiently heavy punishment for his sin.
^ᵃᵘnote:To swear a certain oath.
^ᵃᵛnote:Otherwise it is no oath, and he is not liable.
^ᵃʷnote:Lev. V, 4.
^ᵃˣnote:He decided it should not be an oath unless he uttered it.
^ᵃʸnote:That it should be an oath without uttering it.
^ᵃᶻnote:For Samuel said: If he decided in his mind, he must utter it with his lips; apparently it is not counted an oath unless it is uttered. Samuel's statement cannot be explained in the same way as R. Shesheth explains the Baraitha, because Samuel, being an amora, should have explained it clearly himself, had he intended it thus; v. Tosaf. a.l.
^ᵇᵃnote:It is no oath; and he is exempt if he eats wheat bread, because he did not utter it; and he is exempt if he eats barley bread, because he had not intended it in his mind; v. R. Han. a.l.
^ᵇᵇnote:If he eats wheat bread, since his uttered oath does not at least conflict with his intended oath.
^ᵇᶜnote:Even if he does not utter his complete intention. And Samuel also means this: If he decided in his mind, he must utter it with his lips, i.e., he must utter at least the main portion of his oath (e.g., ‘bread’, and not necessarily ‘wheat bread’); but if he does not utter it with his lips, it is no oath: an oath in the mind is not an oath.
^ᵇᵈnote:Deut. XXIII, 24; promising to bring free-will offering.
^ᵇᵉnote:Ex. XXXV, 22; hence, the willing-hearted (those who had only made up their hearts or minds to bring) fulfilled their promise. Why then, does Samuel say, in the case of an oath, that it must be uttered with the lips in order to make him liable?
^ᵇᶠnote:But in the case of oaths the expression willing-hearted is not used.
^ᵇᵍnote:That in the case of an oath also the intention of the mind should be sufficient.
^ᵇʰnote:i.e., teach the same thing. In the case of the Tabernacle offerings the phrase willing-hearted is used, and in the case of holy things (when Hezekiah re-consecrated the Temple, and the people brought free-will offerings: 2 Chron. XXIX, 31) the phrase willing-hearted is used. When the same phrase (or, rule) is used in the case of two things, the implications is that only in these two things is this phrase (or, rule) applicable, and in no other, for, if Holy Writ had desired other cases to be the same, then the phrase would have been used only in one case, and all others could have been deduced from it: the fact that it is used in two cases implies that it is limited to these two, and that no others are to be deduced from them.
^ᵇⁱnote:I.e., we cannot deduce other cases from them.
^ᵇʲnote:One authority (R. Judah; v, Kid. 35a) holds that from two similar cases we can deduce for others; and that only when there are three similar cases we cannot deduce others from them. According to him, let us deduce from these two cases the case of oaths that intention should suffice.
^ᵇᵏnote:Tabernacle offerings and Temple offerings are holy things; and we cannot deduce the case of oaths (which are hullin, dealing with ordinary, unconsecrated objects) from that which obtains in connection with holy things: the law with reference to holy things may be stricter.