unless the verse clearly specifies together. [According to R. Josiah, then, how do we know that the verse concerning oaths refers to optional matters?] — You may say that it will be even in accordance with the view of R. Josiah. He agrees with R. Akiba who expounds [the verse on the principle of] amplification and limitation; so that, granted if you say the verse refers to optional matters, it may exclude a precept; but if you say it refers [also] to precepts, what can it exclude? R. JUDAH B. BATHYRA SAID: NOW, IF FOR AN OPTIONAL MATTER, etc. Well did the Rabbis reply to R. Judah b. Bathyra. And R. Judah b. Bathyra? He may reply to you: Is there not [the case of] doing good to others, which, though it is not applicable [negatively] in doing evil to others, is yet included by the Divine Law? Similarly, therefore, in [the case of] fulfilling a precept, though it is not applicable [negatively] in annulling a precept, it may be included by the Divine Law. And the Rabbis? — There it is applicable [negatively in such a case as], ‘I shall not do good [to others];’ but here, is it applicable [negatively] in, ‘I shall not fulfil [the precept]’? MISHNAH. ‘I SWEAR I SHALL NOT EAT THIS LOAF;’ ‘I SWEAR I SHALL NOT EAT IT;’ ‘I SWEAR I SHALL NOT EAT IT;’ AND HE ATE IT, HE IS LIABLE ONLY ONCE. THIS IS THE OATH OF UTTERANCE, FOR WHICH ONE IS LIABLE, FOR ITS WILFUL TRANSGRESSION, STRIPES; AND FOR ITS UNWITTING TRANSGRESSION, A SLIDING SCALE SACRIFICE. FOR A VAIN OATH ONE IS LIABLE FOR WILFUL TRANSGRESSION, STRIPES; AND FOR UNWITTING TRANSGRESSION ONE IS EXEMPT. GEMARA. Why does he state: I SWEAR I SHALL NOT EAT [THIS LOAF]; I SWEAR I SHALL NOT EAT IT? — This he teaches us: The reason is because he said, ‘[I swear] I shall not eat;’ then he said, ‘[I swear] I shall not eat it,’ therefore he is liable only once; but if he said, ‘[I swear] I shall not eat it;’ and then he said, ‘[I swear] I shall not eat,’ he is liable twice; as is Raba's view, for Raba said: [If he said,] ‘I swear I shall not eat this loaf,’ as soon as he ate a ka-zayith of it, he is liable; [but if he said, ‘I swear] I shall not eat it,’ he is not liable until he eats it all. ‘I SWEAR I SHALL NOT EAT IT,’ AND HE ATE IT, HE IS LIABLE ONLY ONCE, etc. Why is this further [oath] necessary? — This he teaches us: that there is no liability, but the oath remains, so that if room is found, it takes effect. For what practical purpose? — For that which Raba said, for Raba said: If he obtained absolution from the first, the second takes effect in its place. Shall we say that [the following] supports him? [For it has been taught:] He who vowed two vows of naziriteship, and counted the first, and set apart the offering for it, and then obtained absolution from the first — then the second [vow] takes the place of the first! — How now! There the [second vow of] naziriteship is at least in existence, so that when he would have finished counting for the first, he would have had to begin counting for the second, even if there had been no absolution; but here, would the second oath have any existence at all [were it not for the absolution from the first]? Raba said: If he swore concerning a loaf, and was eating it; then, if he left a ka-zayith of it, he may obtain absolution from it; but if he has eaten it all, he cannot obtain absolution from it. Said R. Aha the son of Raba to R. Ashi: How is this? If he said, ‘I shall not eat,’ then from the first ka-zayith he has already transgressed the prohibition? And if he said: ‘I shall not eat it’, then why mention ka-zayith,ᵃᵇᶜᵈᵉᶠᵍʰⁱʲᵏˡᵐⁿᵒᵖᵠʳˢᵗᵘᵛʷˣʸᶻᵃᵃ