כריתות 18 — Soncino English Talmud

¹He raised [another] objection: [We have learnt:] ‘If it is doubtful whether [what is born] is a nine-months’ child of the first husband or a seven-months’ child of the second, he must put her away and the child is [deemed] legitimate, but each is liable to a suspensive guilt-offering!’ — This, too, is according to R. Eliezer. He raised a [further] objection: [We have learnt:] ‘If [the stain] was found upon her cloth and immediately [after the coition], they are unclean and liable to sin-offerings; if upon hers some time after, they must regard themselves unclean by reason of the doubt, but are exempt from offerings. And upon this it was taught: They are nevertheless liable to suspensive guilt-offerings!’ — This, too, is according to R. Eliezer. Rab Nahman said in the name of Rabbah b. Abbuha, who delivered it in the name of Rab: If there were before a person two pieces, one heleb and the other permitted fat, and he ate of one of them and does not know of which he ate, he is liable; if there was only one piece about which there was a doubt whether it was heleb or permitted fat, and he ate it, he is exempt. Said Rab Nahman: Rab's reason is that in the case of two pieces [the presence of] the forbidden substance is established, in the case of one piece [the presence of] the forbidden substance is not established. What is the practical difference between this reason that the forbidden substance is established and the one stated above that it is possible to determine the transgression? — A difference will arise in the case of two pieces, one heleb and the other permitted fat, and a gentile first ate one piece and then an Israelite the other. According to Raba [he is exempt, for] there were not two pieces at the time when the Israelite ate his. According to R. Zera, too, [he is exempt, for] it is not possible to determine the transgression. But according to Rab Nahman [he is liable, for] the presence of the forbidden substance was established. Raba raised an objection to Rab Nahman: ‘R. Eliezer says, [If one eats of the heleb of] a koy, he is liable to a suspensive guilt-offering!’ — R. Eliezer does not hold that [the presence of] the forbidden substance must be established. He raised [another] objection: [We have learnt:] ‘If it is doubtful whether [what is born] is a nine-months’ child of the first husband or a seven-months’ child of the second, he must put her away and the child is [deemed] legitimate, but each is liable to a suspensive guilt-offering!’ — This, too, is according to R. Eliezer. He raised a [further] objection: [We have learnt:] ‘If [the stain] was found on his cloth, they are both unclean and liable to offerings; if upon hers and immediately [after the coition], they are unclean and liable to offerings, but if upon hers some time after, they must regard themselves as unclean by reason of the doubt, but are exempt from offerings’. And upon this it was taught: They are nevertheless liable to suspensive guilt-offerings!’ [To this objection] he remained silent. When the former had left, he said to himself: Why did I not reply that this law represents the view of R. Meir, who holds that the presence of the forbidden substance need not be established? As has been taught: If one slaughtered a suspensive guilt-offering outside [the Temple precincts], R. Meir holds him liable [to a sin-offering]. The Sages declare him exempt! But why did he not say: I might have retorted that that teaching represented R. Eliezer's view? — To indicate at the same time that R. Meir follows R. Eliezer regarding this law. Said Rabbah b. Abbuha in the name of Rab: The case where one ate a piece of fat about which there was a doubt whether it was heleb or permitted fat forms the subject of a dispute between R. Eliezer and the Sages. But why assume [the case] that he ate it, even If he did not eat it he may offer such a guilt-offering according to R. Eliezer, as we have learnt: R. Eliezer says, A man may freely offer every day a suspensive guilt-offering! — Said R. Ashi: R. Eliezer follows here the view of Baba b. Buta, of whom we have learnt: But they said unto him, Wait until you come into a state of doubt. Our Rabbis taught: If a person had before him two pieces, one permitted fat and the other heleb, and an Israelite first came and ate one piece and then a gentile came and ate the second piece, he is liable; this holds good also if the second piece was eaten by a dog or by a raven. If a gentile first came and ate one piece and then an Israelite came and ate the second, he is exempt; but Rabbi declares him liable. If he ate the first unwittingly and the second deliberately, he is liable; if the first deliberately and the second unwittingly, he is exempt; but Rabbi declares him liable. If he ate both pieces deliberately, he is altogether exempt. If two ate the two pieces, both unwittingly, they are both liable [to suspensive guilt-offerings], though the second is not liable by law, but rather because if you said that he was exempt, you would thereby establish a sin-offering for the first. Now whose view does the last clause follow? If Rabbi's, then the second should surely be liable by law. If that of the Sages, then [the question arises] how can we order the second [to bring a sacrifice], thereby causing a secular animal to be brought into the Temple precincts, merely on the ground that otherwise a sin-offering would be established for the first? Said Rab Ashi:^ᵃ^ᵇ^ᶜ^ᵈ^ᵉ^ᶠ^ᵍ^ʰ^ⁱ^ʲ^ᵏ^ˡ^ᵐ^ⁿ^ᵒ^ᵖ^ᵠ^ʳ^ˢ^ᵗ

^ᵃnote:V. supra p. 136.
^ᵇnote:Although the presence of a prohibited thing is not certain.
^ᶜnote:V. p. 136.
^ᵈnote:Viz., Raba.
^ᵉnote:The Sages differentiate between this class of guilt-offerings and all other sacrifices. For it may be that this sacrifice was offered unnecessarily, i.e., that no law had in fact been transgressed, and the animal therefore bore a secular character, so that its slaughtering outside the Temple precincts would involve no guilt. R. Meir, on the other hand, holds that in order to be liable to an offering it is not necessary to establish with certainty the trespass of a law, or even the certain presence of a prohibited thing. This guilt-offering is therefore at all events sacred, and he who slaughters it outside the Temple precincts is liable to a sin-offering.
^ᶠnote:For R. Eliezer, in agreement with R. Meir, holds that one brings a suspensive guilt-offering even when the presence of something forbidden is not established.
^ᵍnote:Infra 25a.
^ʰnote:For sins that he might have committed unwittingly, even though he knows of no act of his that might have given rise even to a transgression in doubt.
^ⁱnote:Baba b. Buta used to offer a suspensive guilt-offering every day. On the day following the Day of Atonement, however, it was not accepted, because it was thought unlikely that he needed expiation immediately after the atonement of his sins on that Holy Day. We thus see that there must be a probability of trespass before a suspensive guilt-offering may be brought. On account of this view the case stated above assumes that he ate something.
^ʲnote:Infra 25a.
^ᵏnote:The Israelite is liable, for at the time of his eating there were two pieces.
^ˡnote:In Rabbi's view there is no need for the presence of two pieces to establish doubt.
^ᵐnote:Deliberate transgression is not expiated by a sacrifice. For the first piece, however, he is liable to a suspensive guilt-offering, for at that time there were two pieces before him.
^ⁿnote:For the first he is exempt because it was consumed deliberately, and for the second because there was but one piece at the time of eating.
^ᵒnote:Because there is no sacrifice for deliberate transgression.
^ᵖnote:The text seems to be in disorder; read: ‘if both of them unwittingly, he is liable (i.e. to a sin-offering); if two ate etc’. See Emden's glosses.
^ᵠnote:The exemption of the second may be taken to imply that the first definitely ate the heleb, who should therefore be liable to a sin-offering.
^ʳnote:For Rabbi does not require the certain presence of something forbidden at the time of eating.
^ˢnote:If the offering is brought needlessly it retains its secular nature.
^ᵗnote:I.e., how can we impose an offering which may result in a grave sin solely in order to avoid a possible misrepresentation?

²It follows R. Eliezer's opinion, who holds that a man may freely offer every day a suspensive guilt-offering. We therefore advise the second to bring a suspensive guilt-offering and to stipulate thus: if the first ate the permitted fat, and therefore he the heleb, let it be an expiatory offering, otherwise let it be a freewill-offering. Our Rabbis taught: If one ate doubtful heleb and came to know of it, then again ate doubtful heleb and came to know of it, Rabbi says: I hold, just as he would be liable to bring separate sin-offerings, so is he also liable to bring separate suspensive guilt-offerings. R. Jose son of R. Judah, R. Eliezer and R. Simeon hold: He is only liable to one suspensive guilt-offering, for it says, For his error which he erred; even in the case of many errors, he is liable to only one [offering]. Said R. Zera: Rabbi has here taught that the awareness of the doubt separates [the acts] for sin-offerings. Raba said: Awareness of the doubt does not separate [the acts] for sin-offerings; but this is what he [Rabbi] meant to teach: Just as he would be liable to separate sin-offerings if he became aware [after each act] that the transgression was certain, so he is also liable to separate suspensive guilt-offerings, if he became each time aware of the doubt. Said Abaye to him [Raba]: And are you not of the opinion that awareness of the doubt separates [the acts] for sin-offerings? But surely if you were to assume that awareness of the doubt does not separate [the acts] for sin-offerings, so that he brings only one sin-offering, then why should he bring a [separate] suspensive guilt-offering for each? Has it not been taught: This is the general rule. Wherever a separation is effected with regard to sin-offerings there also a separation is effected with regard to suspensive guilt-offerings! Said Raba b. Hanan to Abaye: Also according to you, who hold that the awareness of the doubt separates the acts for sin-offerings, it should follow that if one ate an olive's bulk of heleb before the Day of Atonement and again an olive's bulk of heleb after the Day of Atonement — since the Day of Atonement is equivalent to a suspensive guilt-offering — he should have to bring two sin-offerings; but this cannot be, for he ate [at both times] in one spell of unawareness! — Abaye replied: Who says that the Day of Atonement atones even when the sin remained unknown, perhaps only when he is aware of it? — Said Raba to him: We have explicitly learnt: [The Day of Atonement atones . . .] both for known and unknown sins. According to another version, Raba b. Hanan said thus to Abaye: What if one ate an olive's bulk of heleb in the morning of the Day of Atonement and another in the afternoon of the Day of Atonement, would he also be liable to two sin-offerings? — Retorted Abaye: Who says that every moment of the Day of Atonement atones, perhaps only the day as a whole atones, from the evening? — Said to him Raba b. Hanan: Simpleton have we not learnt: If one committed a doubtful sin on the Day of Atonement, even if it was already twilight, he is exempt for the whole day effects atonement? R. Idi son of Abin raised an objection: [We have learnt:] If one ate and drank [on the Day of Atonement] in one spell of unawareness, he is liable to one sin-offering only. Now, it is hardly possible that between the eating and the drinking there was not an interval, during which he might become aware [that it was the Day of Atonement], so that [that interval of the Day of Atonement] effected atonement for him, [in accordance with the rule that] the Day of Atonement has the same effect as a suspensive guilt-offering. Yet it states that he is liable to one sin-offering only. Now, if it is true that the awareness of the doubt separates [the acts] for sin-offerings, he should be liable to two sin-offerings! — Say: R. Zera only interpreted Rabbi's view, whilst this follows that of the Rabbis. But is not the latter clause [in the cited Mishnah] in pursuance of Rabbi's opinion? For it teaches: If he drank brine or pickle-juice, he is exempt; from which it may be inferred that if vinegar he is liable, and this is in accordance with Rabbi, for it has been taught: Vinegar is not a refreshing drink; Rabbi says, It is. Now, as the latter clause follows Rabbi, have we not to assume that also the first is in accordance with his view? — Say: the latter clause follows Rabbi, but the former follows the Rabbis. Raba raised an objection [to R. Zera]: If one ate [of holy things] on one day and then again on the following day, or made use thereof on one day and again on the following day, or ate thereof on one day and made use thereof on the following day, or made use thereof on one day and ate thereof on the following day, or even when a period of three years intervened, whence do we know that they combine one with the other? The text tells us: If anyone trespasses a trespass, to include [every trespass]. Now, why should he be liable? Has not the intervening Day of Atonement atoned for it? — Say: The Day of Atonement effects atonement for the transgression of a prohibition, but not for [the misappropriation of] money. Or you could say: The Day of Atonement effects atonement for transgressions involving full standard measure, but not for half-measures. Resh Lakish also said: Rabbi has here taught that the awareness of the doubt separates [the acts] for sin-offerings. But R. Johanan said: The awareness of the doubt does not separate [the acts] for sin-offerings; and what he [Rabbi] meant to teach is this: Just as he would be liable to separate sin-offerings if he became aware [in between the acts of the transgression] of a definite sin, so he is also liable to separate suspensive guilt-offerings if he became each time aware of the doubtful sin. Now according to R. Johanan it is right that the guilt-offering is dependent upon the sin-offering, but according to Resh Lakish the sin-offering should be made dependent upon the guilt-offering! This is indeed a difficulty. Now one can point out a contradiction between the statements of R. Johanan and also a contradiction between the statements of Resh Lakish. For it was taught: If there were two roads, one unclean and the other clean, and a person passed through one of them and did not enter [the Temple precincts], and then through the other and entered [the Temple precincts], he is liable; if he passed through one and entered [the Temple precincts], he is exempt; if he then passed through the other and entered [the Temple precincts], he is liable; if he passed through one and entered [the Temple precincts], and was sprinkled upon once and also a second time and immersed himself, and then he passed through the other and entered [the Temple precincts], he is liable. 33^ᵘ^ᵛ^ʷ^ˣ^ʸ^ᶻ^ᵃᵃ^ᵃᵇ^ᵃᶜ^ᵃᵈ^ᵃᵉ^ᵃᶠ^ᵃᵍ^ᵃʰ^ᵃⁱ^ᵃʲ^ᵃᵏ^ᵃˡ^ᵃᵐ^ᵃⁿ^ᵃᵒ^ᵃᵖ^ᵃᵠ^ᵃʳ^ᵃˢ^ᵃᵗ^ᵃᵘ^ᵃᵛ^ᵃʷ^ᵃˣ^ᵃʸ^ᵃᶻ^ᵇᵃ

^ᵘnote:The offering of the second cannot therefore be said to be needless.
^ᵛnote:Viz., a suspensive guilt-offering; for a sin-offering can be brought only when the transgression is established.
^ʷnote:At the time of eating he assumed it was permitted fat, but later learnt that there was some doubt about it.
^ˣnote:I.e. if he learnt ultimately that what he ate was undoubtedly heleb, he would be liable to sin-offerings for each offence.
^ʸnote:In Shebu. 19b this second view is delivered in the name of other Sages.
^ᶻnote:Lev. V, 18. The text is redundant for ‘which he erred’ is superfluous. The repetition of dda rat serves to indicate that several errors may be covered by one guilt-offering.
^ᵃᵃnote:R. Zera understands Rabbi's exposition above thus, that the offender would be liable to separate sin-offerings if he learnt untimately, i.e., after all the meals, that the food was certainly heleb, although the intervening spells of awareness which separated the acts, acquainted him each time only of the fact that there was reason to doubt the permissibility of the food he had taken. Raba, on the other hand, understands Rabbi's ruling, that the offender is liable to separate sin-offerings, as applying only to the case where the inter vening spells of awareness related each time to the certainty of having eaten forbidden food.
^ᵃᵇnote:Supra 15b. This rule is assumed to work both ways, i.e. that the negative proposition is also true; thus in conflict with Rabbi.
^ᵃᶜnote:Viz., that sin-offerings and suspensive guilt-offerings follow the same rules with regard to division.
^ᵃᵈnote:The Day of Atonement atones for doubtful trespasses (v. infra 25a), and one is exempt from a suspensive guilt-offering for transgressions committed before that day. If each olive's bulk in our instance was of doubtful heleb, he is only liable but once, viz., for the second; yet taking into consideration the intervening Day of Atonement, which has the effect of a suspensive guilt-offering, it is as if he offered two such guilt-offerings. According to the quoted rule he should in the corresponding case of certain heleb be liable to two sin-offerings, which is untenable, because both sins were committed in one spell of unawareness. The rule is thus proved to be incorrect. V. Tosaf. s.v. tkt.
^ᵃᵉnote:In the corresponding case of certain heleb, he will then rightly be liable to two sin-offerings, because of the interruption in the unawareness of sin.
^ᵃᶠnote:Shebu. 2b. Abaye's proposition is thus refuted.
^ᵃᵍnote:For had it been doubtful heleb, the Day of Atonement would twice have effected atonement, as if two suspensive guilt-offerings were brought. In the corresponding case of certain heleb it would follow that he would be liable to two sin-offerings, which is, of course, absurd.
^ᵃʰnote:A sin committed during the day would accordingly not he atoned for.
^ᵃⁱnote:From a suspensive guilt-offering.
^ᵃʲnote:Infra 25a.
^ᵃᵏnote:That it was the Day of Atonement.
^ᵃˡnote:Yoma 81a.
^ᵃᵐnote:See Rashi. Since there was an interval in between eating and drinking during which he could become aware of his sin, that length of time of the Day of Atonement would have atoned for his first act before the second was committed.
^ᵃⁿnote:The interval which atones for the first act in the case of doubtful transgression is, in effect, comparable to an act of awareness of doubtful sins; it should, according to Abaye, separate the acts for sin-offerings, i.e., even in the case of certain heleb.
^ᵃᵒnote:R. Jose and R. Eliezer.
^ᵃᵖnote:Because these liquids are unpalatable beverages; Yoma, ibid.
^ᵃᵠnote:One is therefore exempt when one drinks it on the Day of Atonement.
^ᵃʳnote:V. Yoma 81a.
^ᵃˢnote:Viz., each time only a portion of the requisite value of a perutah.
^ᵃᵗnote:The several acts were committed in one spell of unawareness.
^ᵃᵘnote:Viz., to make up the required value to involve a guilt-offering for sacrilege.
^ᵃᵛnote:Lev. V, 15. ‘A trespass’ is regarded as redundant.
^ᵃʷnote:The fact that awareness of certain sins effects a division with regard to sin-offerings may rightly be taken for granted, and a similar law regarding guilt-offerings is derived therefrom.
^ᵃˣnote:For the awareness is that of doubtful sins, as must be assumed according to Resh Lakish, and its effectiveness with regard to suspensive guilt-offerings is established in the Torah. By analogy it is extended to apply also to sin-offerings. The sin-offering should therefore be dependent upon the guilt-offering.
^ᵃʸnote:It is not established which is the unclean road. The uncleanness was so situated in the road that a person passing through it perforce became unclean and therefore unfit to enter the sacred precincts of the Temple. In the first and third instances he is liable, because after the second act there is no doubt that he entered the Temple precincts in a state of uncleanness. In connection with the law concerning the defilement of Temple precincts it is an essential condition that the offender had at one time been aware of his uncleanness, though unconscious of it at the time of entering the Temple precincts. In these two cases there was a moment when he was in no doubt as to his state of certain uncleanness. He is therefore liable to an offering.
^ᵃᶻnote:An unclean person is sprinkled upon with the water of purification on the third and seventh day of his uncleanness, and then has to immerse himself in order to become clean.
^ᵇᵃnote:In this instance, too, the person most certainly entered the Temple precincts in a state of uncleanness. Although the offender had at no time been certain that he was unclean, for the first possible uncleanness was annulled before passing through the second road, nevertheless he had been aware of doubtful uncleanness, and this is regarded as sufficient by the Sages, who therefore declare him liable. R. Simeon, on the other hand, holds that awareness of doubtful uncleanness is not sufficient.