כריתות 19 — Soncino English Talmud

¹R. Simeon holds he is exempt in the latter instance. R. Simeon b. Judah maintains in the name of R. Simeon that he is exempt in all instances. Even in the former? — Said Raba: Here we are dealing with the case of one who passed through one road, and when passing through the other he forgot that he had passed through the first. And they differ in this: The first Tanna holds, A partial knowledge is like a complete knowledge; while R. Simeon maintains, A partial knowledge is not like a complete knowledge. The Master said: ‘If he passed through one and entered [the Temple precincts], and was sprinkled upon once and also a second time, and immersed himself; and then he passed through the other and entered [the Temple precincts], he is liable’. Why should he be liable? There had at no time been [definite] knowledge [of uncleanness]! — Answered Resh Lakish: This statement follows R. Ishmael's view that knowledge at the beginning is not essential. R. Johanan answered: It may conform to the view of the Sages, but here they made doubtful knowledge [of uncleanness] like [definite] knowledge. Now it is assumed that ‘here they made’, and the same holds good in all the laws of the Torah. There is thus a contradiction between the two expositions of R. Johanan, and also a contradiction between the two expositions of Resh Lakish. It will be granted that there is no contradiction between the two expositions of R. Johanan, for [we may say that he meant] only here they made [doubtful knowledge like definite knowledge] but not everywhere in the whole Torah did they do so, the reason being that in the case of uncleanness it is written: It being hidden from him that he is unclean, [indicating that] even [if there is some] uncertainty in connection with his knowledge, Scripture still renders him liable; but regarding the other laws of the Torah,it is written: If his sin be known to him; that is to say, only if he has definite knowledge is he liable. But with Resh Lakish there is a difficulty; why does he establish [the Baraitha] in accordance with R. Ishmael's view? Let him establish it as being in accordance with Rabbi's view! — He wished to let us know that R. Ishmael, too, does not require knowledge at the beginning. But is this not already the contents of a Mishnah? As we have learnt: R. Ishmael said, Scripture mentions twice ‘and it be hidden’, to teach us that one is liable both for forgetfulness of the uncleanness and for forgetfulness of the Temple. — It is necessary, for I might have thought that although he [R. Ishmael] does not derive the rule from the text, he yet accepts it as a tradition. Therefore he [Resh Lakish] informs us [that this is not the case]. MISHNAH. [IF BOTH] HELEB AND NOTHAR LAY BEFORE A PERSON AND HE ATE ONE OF THEM BUT DOES NOT KNOW WHICH, OR IF HIS MENSTRUANT WIFE AND HIS SISTER WERE WITH HIM IN HIS HOUSE AND HE UNITED, IN ERROR, WITH ONE OF THEM AND DOES NOT KNOW WITH WHICH, OR IF SABBATH AND THE DAY OF ATONEMENT [FOLLOWED EACH OTHER] AND HE DID FORBIDDEN WORK AT TWILIGHT AND DOES NOT KNOW ON WHICH DAY: R. ELIEZER DECLARES HIM LIABLE TO A SIN-OFFERING, BUT R. JOSHUA DECLARES HIM EXEMPT. REMARKED R. JOSE: THEY DID NOT DISPUTE ABOUT WHETHER HE THAT DID WORK AT TWILIGHT WAS EXEMPT, FOR I MAY ASSUME THAT PART OF THE WORK WAS DONE ON THE ONE DAY AND PART ON THE FOLLOWING DAY. ABOUT WHAT DID THEY DISPUTE? ABOUT ONE WHO DID WORK DURING THE DAY ITSELF BUT HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER HE DID IT ON THE SABBATH OR ON THE DAY OF ATONEMENT, OR IF HE DID WORK AND DID NOT KNOW WHAT MANNER OF WORK HE DID: R. ELIEZER DECLARES HIM LIABLE TO A SIN-OFFERING, AND R. JOSHUA DECLARES HIM EXEMPT. SAID R. JUDAH: R. JOSHUA EXEMPTS HIM EVEN FROM A SUSPENSIVE GUILT-OFFERING. R. SIMEON AND R. SIMEON SHEZURI SAID: THEY DID NOT DISPUTE REGARDING TRANSGRESSION OF THE SAME DENOMINATION WHEN [IT IS AGREED THAT] HE IS LIABLE. ABOUT WHAT DID THEY DISPUTE? ABOUT TRANSGRESSIONS OF DIFFERENT DENOMINATIONS: R. ELIEZER DECLARES HIM LIABLE TO A SIN-OFFERING, AND R. JOSHUA DECLARES HIM EXEMPT. SAID R. JUDAH: EVEN IF HE INTENDED TO PICK FIGS AND HE PICKED GRAPES, OR GRAPES AND HE PICKED FIGS, WHITE [GRAPES] AND HE PICKED BLACK ONES, OR BLACK AND HE PICKED WHITE ONES, R. ELIEZER DECLARES HIM LIABLE AND R. JOSHUA DECLARES HIM EXEMPT. SAID R. SIMEON: I WONDER WHETHER R. JOSHUA INDEED DECLARED HIM EXEMPT IN SUCH A CASE. BUT THEN WHY IS IT WRITTEN, WHEREIN HE HATH SINNED? TO EXCLUDE UNPURPOSED ACTION. GEMARA. It has been taught: R. Eliezer argued, In any event [he has transgressed]; if it was the heleb he ate he is liable, if the nothar he is liable; if it was his menstruant wife with whom he united he is liable, if his sister he is liable; if it was Sabbath when he did the work he is liable, if the Day of Atonement he is liable! Replied to him R. Joshua: It says, ‘wherein he hath sinned’: it must be known to him wherein he sinned. And for what purpose does R.Eliezer employ the word ‘wherein’? — To exclude unpurposed action.^ᵃ^ᵇ^ᶜ^ᵈ^ᵉ^ᶠ^ᵍ^ʰ^ⁱ^ʲ^ᵏ^ˡ^ᵐ^ⁿ^ᵒ^ᵖ^ᵠ

^ᵃnote:Tosef. Toh. VI, 5.
^ᵇnote:I.e., in the first and third instances, where there is no reason whatsoever to exempt him from a sacrifice.
^ᶜnote:Since he passed through both roads he is definitely unclean, but his knowledge is incomplete, for when walking in the second road he had forgotten about the first. Yet he is liable, for incomplete knowledge is like complete knowledge.
^ᵈnote:For R. Johanan maintains above that consciousness of doubtful sins is not valid and here he states that the Sages, i.e., the accepted authority hold it is of avail with regard to all the laws of the Torah. And Resh Lakish maintains above that Rabbi, the author of the Mishnah, holds that consciousness of doubtful sins is of no avail, whilst he feels compelled to quote R. Ishmael as the author of this view.
^ᵉnote:Lev. V, 2.
^ᶠnote:Ibid. IV, 28.
^ᵍnote:Heb. okgbu ibid. V, 2 and 3.
^ʰnote:Shebu. 14b. The term ‘hidden’ is the source of the rule that knowledge at one time of the uncleanness is essential, cf. Shebu. 4a. As R. Ishmael uses this expression to derive another law, it may be assumed that he disagrees with that rule, and does not require knowledge in the beginning.
^ⁱnote:I.e., thinking it was his wife and that she was clean. In all these instances the fact that he committed a trespass is afterwards established beyond doubt, though the transgressor was unaware of it at the time of action, but it is unknown which law was broken.
^ʲnote:I.e., when the Day of Atonement fell upon Friday or Sunday.
^ᵏnote:Viz., each time less than the requisite standard.
^ˡnote:I.e., he is sure that his work was a forbidden act, but does not remember, e.g., whether he ploughed or sowed.
^ᵐnote:I.e., of the same category, e.g., if he picked a certain fruit but did not know from which tree.
^ⁿnote:I.e., if R. Joshua indeed agrees that he is liable in the last instance, even though his intention had not been realised, because he was after all set upon a forbidden act.
^ᵒnote:Lev. IV, 23. The word ‘wherein’ is considered superfluous, to imply that in that particular act lay his intention.
^ᵖnote:Heb. exg,n, lit. ‘occupy oneself’; the transgression resulting from his act was not purposed, for his intention was to do what was permitted. V. Gemara.
^ᵠnote:V. p. 148, n. 5.

²To what kind of unpurposed action does he refer? If concerning heleb or incestuous intercourse, surely he is liable! For Rab Nahman said in the name of Samuel: Unpurposed eating of heleb or unpurposed incestuous intercourse is subject [to an offering] because [the offender] has after all derived a benefit thereby! — It rather refers to unpurposed labour on Sabbath, when he is exempt, because the Torah has forbidden [on the Sabbath] only purposive work. According to Raba the case would arise when one intended, e.g., to cut something detached from the ground and he cut something that was attached; and according to Abaye, when one intended to lift up something detached from the ground and he cut something that was attached. For it has been stated: If one intended to lift up something detached from the ground and he cut something that was attached, he is exempt, because no cutting was at all intended. If he intended to cut something detached from the ground and he cut something that was attached, Abaye says: He is liable because the act of cutting was intended; Raba says: He is exempt for it was not his intention to cut what was forbidden [to be cut]. REMARKED R. JOSE: THEY DID NOT DISPUTE etc. It has been taught: R. Jose said to them, ‘You are most particular with me’. What did they say to him that he remarked, ‘You are most particular with me’? — Thus they said to him: What if one, e.g., lifted up an article at twilight? Thereupon he said: You are most particular with me. But why did he not retort: part of the lifting up might have been done on the one day and the rest on the following day? — This is indeed what he meant by saying: ‘You are most particular with me’, but ‘you could not get the best of me’. But would R. Jose hold that for the conclusion of an act one is, according to R. Eliezer, exempt? Surely we know that he declares him liable! For we have learnt: R. Eliezer says: If a person wove three threads at the start [of the web] or added one thread on to a woven piece, he is liable. — Said Rab Joseph: R. Jose in his exposition of R. Eliezer's view reads [that Mishnah] as follows: ‘R. Eliezer says: If a person wove three threads at the start or added two threads to a woven piece he is liable’. SAID R. JUDAH: R. JOSHUA EXEMPTS HIM EVEN FROM A SUSPENSIVE GUILT-OFFERING. It has been taught: Said R. Judah: R. Joshua exempts him even from a suspensive guilt-offering, because it says, If [anyone] sin . . . though he know it not; excluded is this case, where he knew that the sinned. Said to him R. Simeon: It is just such a case when a suspensive guilt-offering should be brought, for it reads: And do . . . though he know it not; and in this instance he in fact did not know wherein he did [the wrong]. As to [the case of one being in] doubt whether he did eat heleb or not, go forth and enquire whether he is then liable to a suspensive guilt-offering or not. What was the decision? — Come and hear: [It has been stated:] If one committed a sin and does not know wherein, or if he is in doubt whether he did sin or not, he is liable to a suspensive guilt-offering. Now, who is it that maintains that if one committed a sin and does not know wherein, he is liable to a suspensive guilt-offering? Obviously R. Simeon; and yet it is stated, ‘If he is in doubt whether he did sin or not, he is liable to a suspensive guilt-offering’. This proves that R. Simeon holds that if one is in doubt whether he did sin or not, he is liable to a suspensive guilt-offering. R. SIMEON SHEZURI AND R. SIMEON SAID: THEY DID NOT DISPUTE . . . BUT THEN WHY IS IT WRITTEN, WHEREIN HE HATH SINNED? TO EXCLUDE UNPURPOSED ACTION. Said Rab Nahman in the name of Samuel: Unpurposed eating of heleb or [unpurposed] Incestuous intercourse Is subject [to an offering], because the offender has after all derived a benefit thereby; unpurposed labour on the Sabbath is exempt, because the Torah has forbidden only purposive work. Said Raba to Rab Nahman: Surely the case concerning [the circumcision of] boys is comparable to unpurposed action, and yet we have learnt regarding it: If there were two boys, one who was due to be circumcised on the Sabbath and another who was due to be circumcised after the Sabbath, and a person in error circumcised on the Sabbath the one who was due to be circumcised after the Sabbath, R. Eliezer declares him liable to a sin-offering; R. Joshua holds: He is exempt. Now R. Joshua declares him exempt only because he maintains that for [a transgression committed in] error in the course of the [intended] performance of a commandment, even though the commandment was not in fact performed, one is exempt; if, however, one performed an unpurposed act which was not in the course of the performance of a commandment he would be liable even according to R. Joshua. — He replied to him: Leave the case concerning the [circumcision of] boys alone. Since [it is exceptional in that] one is liable although the wound is an act of damage; so too, for unpurposed wounding one is also liable. Rab Judah raised an objection to Samuel: [We have learnt:] SAID R. JUDAH: EVEN IF HE INTENDED TO PICK FIGS AND HE PICKED GRAPES, OR GRAPES AND HE PICKED FIGS, WHITE GRAPES AND HE PICKED BLACK ONES, OR BLACK AND HE PICKED WHITE ONES, R. ELIEZER DECLARES HIM LIABLE AND R. JOSHUA DECLARES HIM EXEMPT. Now, is not this a case of unpurposed action, and yet [it seems that] R. Joshua declared him exempt solely because different kinds [of fruit are involved]; but if one kind only [was involved], even R. Joshua would declare him liable? — He replied: Thou keen thinker, leave this Mishnah and follow me, for here it refers to a gatherer whose intention escaped his mind! He set out to gather grapes and forgot about it, and thinking that he wanted figs, his hand unwittingly reached for the grapes. R. Eliezer argues: His purpose was after all achieved. R. Joshua argues: His purpose and design were not realized.18^ʳ^ˢ^ᵗ^ᵘ^ᵛ^ʷ^ˣ^ʸ^ᶻ^ᵃᵃ^ᵃᵇ^ᵃᶜ^ᵃᵈ^ᵃᵉ^ᵃᶠ^ᵃᵍ^ᵃʰ^ᵃⁱ

^ʳnote:E.g., if heleb and permitted fat lay before a person and he intended to eat the latter, but his hand unconsciously took hold of the heleb and he ate it. Similarly in the case of incest, if through carelessness he united with the forbidden relation whilst his intention was directed to his wife.
^ˢnote:The cutting or plucking of plants from the ground on the Sabbath is a forbidden work, falling within the category of harvesting.
^ᵗnote:Now this is understood to mean that ‘You got the better of me’.
^ᵘnote:I.e., to transport it from one domain to another on the Sabbath. This might be done very simply by the man standing in one domain and stretching out his hand and depositing an article in the other domain. Such work is of very little duration, and R. Jose's assumption that invariably in the case of work at twilight one part of the action is performed on the one day and another on the following day seems untenable.
^ᵛnote:For after all the change from one day to another is instantaneous.
^ʷnote:Lit. ‘you did not bring up in your hand anything’. V. p. 149, n. 4.
^ˣnote:Shab. 105a. Although the minimum number of threads required for the labour of weaving is two, here one is sufficient, because it is interwoven with a ready-made cloth. The addition of the one thread to the web is like the conclusion of an act.
^ʸnote:Lev. V. 17, in connection with the suspensive guilt-offering.
^ᶻnote:What he did not know was which particular transgression he violated.
^ᵃᵃnote:I.e., search for statements by R. Simeon which will intimate his view on this point.
^ᵃᵇnote:Circumcision in its proper time, i.e., the eighth day, supersedes the law of Sabbath; if not in its proper time its performance on the Sabbath is forbidden. The circumcision of the second boy on the assumption that it was the first, is an unpurposed action.
^ᵃᶜnote:This is in contradiction to the second clause of Rab Nahman's dictum.
^ᵃᵈnote:The rule regarding Sabbath is that for an act of damage one is not liable except for wounding and burning.
^ᵃᵉnote:The fruit that he intended to pick was of a different kind from that which he actually picked.
^ᵃᶠnote:Whilst according to Samuel one is always exempt in the case of unpurposed work on the Sabbath, whatever the circumstances.
^ᵃᵍnote:Shinena; lit. ‘sharp one’. Alit. (a) ‘long-toothed’, denoting a facial characteristic. (b) ‘translator’, V. B.K. (Sonc. ed.) p. 60. n. 2.
^ᵃʰnote:I.e., the case of the Mishnah is not one of unpurposed action where the intention of the doer is in the end unrealized, but is of a different class.
^ᵃⁱnote:His purpose was indeed realized in that he gathered grapes, but at the time of gathering his design was for figs, and this was not realized.