כריתות 18:2 — Soncino English Talmud

It follows R. Eliezer's opinion, who holds that a man may freely offer every day a suspensive guilt-offering. We therefore advise the second to bring a suspensive guilt-offering and to stipulate thus: if the first ate the permitted fat, and therefore he the heleb, let it be an expiatory offering, otherwise let it be a freewill-offering. Our Rabbis taught: If one ate doubtful heleb and came to know of it, then again ate doubtful heleb and came to know of it, Rabbi says: I hold, just as he would be liable to bring separate sin-offerings, so is he also liable to bring separate suspensive guilt-offerings. R. Jose son of R. Judah, R. Eliezer and R. Simeon hold: He is only liable to one suspensive guilt-offering, for it says, For his error which he erred; even in the case of many errors, he is liable to only one [offering]. Said R. Zera: Rabbi has here taught that the awareness of the doubt separates [the acts] for sin-offerings. Raba said: Awareness of the doubt does not separate [the acts] for sin-offerings; but this is what he [Rabbi] meant to teach: Just as he would be liable to separate sin-offerings if he became aware [after each act] that the transgression was certain, so he is also liable to separate suspensive guilt-offerings, if he became each time aware of the doubt. Said Abaye to him [Raba]: And are you not of the opinion that awareness of the doubt separates [the acts] for sin-offerings? But surely if you were to assume that awareness of the doubt does not separate [the acts] for sin-offerings, so that he brings only one sin-offering, then why should he bring a [separate] suspensive guilt-offering for each? Has it not been taught: This is the general rule. Wherever a separation is effected with regard to sin-offerings there also a separation is effected with regard to suspensive guilt-offerings! Said Raba b. Hanan to Abaye: Also according to you, who hold that the awareness of the doubt separates the acts for sin-offerings, it should follow that if one ate an olive's bulk of heleb before the Day of Atonement and again an olive's bulk of heleb after the Day of Atonement — since the Day of Atonement is equivalent to a suspensive guilt-offering — he should have to bring two sin-offerings; but this cannot be, for he ate [at both times] in one spell of unawareness! — Abaye replied: Who says that the Day of Atonement atones even when the sin remained unknown, perhaps only when he is aware of it? — Said Raba to him: We have explicitly learnt: [The Day of Atonement atones . . .] both for known and unknown sins. According to another version, Raba b. Hanan said thus to Abaye: What if one ate an olive's bulk of heleb in the morning of the Day of Atonement and another in the afternoon of the Day of Atonement, would he also be liable to two sin-offerings? — Retorted Abaye: Who says that every moment of the Day of Atonement atones, perhaps only the day as a whole atones, from the evening? — Said to him Raba b. Hanan: Simpleton have we not learnt: If one committed a doubtful sin on the Day of Atonement, even if it was already twilight, he is exempt for the whole day effects atonement? R. Idi son of Abin raised an objection: [We have learnt:] If one ate and drank [on the Day of Atonement] in one spell of unawareness, he is liable to one sin-offering only. Now, it is hardly possible that between the eating and the drinking there was not an interval, during which he might become aware [that it was the Day of Atonement], so that [that interval of the Day of Atonement] effected atonement for him, [in accordance with the rule that] the Day of Atonement has the same effect as a suspensive guilt-offering. Yet it states that he is liable to one sin-offering only. Now, if it is true that the awareness of the doubt separates [the acts] for sin-offerings, he should be liable to two sin-offerings! — Say: R. Zera only interpreted Rabbi's view, whilst this follows that of the Rabbis. But is not the latter clause [in the cited Mishnah] in pursuance of Rabbi's opinion? For it teaches: If he drank brine or pickle-juice, he is exempt; from which it may be inferred that if vinegar he is liable, and this is in accordance with Rabbi, for it has been taught: Vinegar is not a refreshing drink; Rabbi says, It is. Now, as the latter clause follows Rabbi, have we not to assume that also the first is in accordance with his view? — Say: the latter clause follows Rabbi, but the former follows the Rabbis. Raba raised an objection [to R. Zera]: If one ate [of holy things] on one day and then again on the following day, or made use thereof on one day and again on the following day, or ate thereof on one day and made use thereof on the following day, or made use thereof on one day and ate thereof on the following day, or even when a period of three years intervened, whence do we know that they combine one with the other? The text tells us: If anyone trespasses a trespass, to include [every trespass]. Now, why should he be liable? Has not the intervening Day of Atonement atoned for it? — Say: The Day of Atonement effects atonement for the transgression of a prohibition, but not for [the misappropriation of] money. Or you could say: The Day of Atonement effects atonement for transgressions involving full standard measure, but not for half-measures. Resh Lakish also said: Rabbi has here taught that the awareness of the doubt separates [the acts] for sin-offerings. But R. Johanan said: The awareness of the doubt does not separate [the acts] for sin-offerings; and what he [Rabbi] meant to teach is this: Just as he would be liable to separate sin-offerings if he became aware [in between the acts of the transgression] of a definite sin, so he is also liable to separate suspensive guilt-offerings if he became each time aware of the doubtful sin. Now according to R. Johanan it is right that the guilt-offering is dependent upon the sin-offering, but according to Resh Lakish the sin-offering should be made dependent upon the guilt-offering! This is indeed a difficulty. Now one can point out a contradiction between the statements of R. Johanan and also a contradiction between the statements of Resh Lakish. For it was taught: If there were two roads, one unclean and the other clean, and a person passed through one of them and did not enter [the Temple precincts], and then through the other and entered [the Temple precincts], he is liable; if he passed through one and entered [the Temple precincts], he is exempt; if he then passed through the other and entered [the Temple precincts], he is liable; if he passed through one and entered [the Temple precincts], and was sprinkled upon once and also a second time and immersed himself, and then he passed through the other and entered [the Temple precincts], he is liable. 33^ᵃ^ᵇ^ᶜ^ᵈ^ᵉ^ᶠ^ᵍ^ʰ^ⁱ^ʲ^ᵏ^ˡ^ᵐ^ⁿ^ᵒ^ᵖ^ᵠ^ʳ^ˢ^ᵗ^ᵘ^ᵛ^ʷ^ˣ^ʸ^ᶻ^ᵃᵃ^ᵃᵇ^ᵃᶜ^ᵃᵈ^ᵃᵉ^ᵃᶠ^ᵃᵍ

^ᵃnote:The offering of the second cannot therefore be said to be needless.
^ᵇnote:Viz., a suspensive guilt-offering; for a sin-offering can be brought only when the transgression is established.
^ᶜnote:At the time of eating he assumed it was permitted fat, but later learnt that there was some doubt about it.
^ᵈnote:I.e. if he learnt ultimately that what he ate was undoubtedly heleb, he would be liable to sin-offerings for each offence.
^ᵉnote:In Shebu. 19b this second view is delivered in the name of other Sages.
^ᶠnote:Lev. V, 18. The text is redundant for ‘which he erred’ is superfluous. The repetition of dda rat serves to indicate that several errors may be covered by one guilt-offering.
^ᵍnote:R. Zera understands Rabbi's exposition above thus, that the offender would be liable to separate sin-offerings if he learnt untimately, i.e., after all the meals, that the food was certainly heleb, although the intervening spells of awareness which separated the acts, acquainted him each time only of the fact that there was reason to doubt the permissibility of the food he had taken. Raba, on the other hand, understands Rabbi's ruling, that the offender is liable to separate sin-offerings, as applying only to the case where the inter vening spells of awareness related each time to the certainty of having eaten forbidden food.
^ʰnote:Supra 15b. This rule is assumed to work both ways, i.e. that the negative proposition is also true; thus in conflict with Rabbi.
^ⁱnote:Viz., that sin-offerings and suspensive guilt-offerings follow the same rules with regard to division.
^ʲnote:The Day of Atonement atones for doubtful trespasses (v. infra 25a), and one is exempt from a suspensive guilt-offering for transgressions committed before that day. If each olive's bulk in our instance was of doubtful heleb, he is only liable but once, viz., for the second; yet taking into consideration the intervening Day of Atonement, which has the effect of a suspensive guilt-offering, it is as if he offered two such guilt-offerings. According to the quoted rule he should in the corresponding case of certain heleb be liable to two sin-offerings, which is untenable, because both sins were committed in one spell of unawareness. The rule is thus proved to be incorrect. V. Tosaf. s.v. tkt.
^ᵏnote:In the corresponding case of certain heleb, he will then rightly be liable to two sin-offerings, because of the interruption in the unawareness of sin.
^ˡnote:Shebu. 2b. Abaye's proposition is thus refuted.
^ᵐnote:For had it been doubtful heleb, the Day of Atonement would twice have effected atonement, as if two suspensive guilt-offerings were brought. In the corresponding case of certain heleb it would follow that he would be liable to two sin-offerings, which is, of course, absurd.
^ⁿnote:A sin committed during the day would accordingly not he atoned for.
^ᵒnote:From a suspensive guilt-offering.
^ᵖnote:Infra 25a.
^ᵠnote:That it was the Day of Atonement.
^ʳnote:Yoma 81a.
^ˢnote:See Rashi. Since there was an interval in between eating and drinking during which he could become aware of his sin, that length of time of the Day of Atonement would have atoned for his first act before the second was committed.
^ᵗnote:The interval which atones for the first act in the case of doubtful transgression is, in effect, comparable to an act of awareness of doubtful sins; it should, according to Abaye, separate the acts for sin-offerings, i.e., even in the case of certain heleb.
^ᵘnote:R. Jose and R. Eliezer.
^ᵛnote:Because these liquids are unpalatable beverages; Yoma, ibid.
^ʷnote:One is therefore exempt when one drinks it on the Day of Atonement.
^ˣnote:V. Yoma 81a.
^ʸnote:Viz., each time only a portion of the requisite value of a perutah.
^ᶻnote:The several acts were committed in one spell of unawareness.
^ᵃᵃnote:Viz., to make up the required value to involve a guilt-offering for sacrilege.
^ᵃᵇnote:Lev. V, 15. ‘A trespass’ is regarded as redundant.
^ᵃᶜnote:The fact that awareness of certain sins effects a division with regard to sin-offerings may rightly be taken for granted, and a similar law regarding guilt-offerings is derived therefrom.
^ᵃᵈnote:For the awareness is that of doubtful sins, as must be assumed according to Resh Lakish, and its effectiveness with regard to suspensive guilt-offerings is established in the Torah. By analogy it is extended to apply also to sin-offerings. The sin-offering should therefore be dependent upon the guilt-offering.
^ᵃᵉnote:It is not established which is the unclean road. The uncleanness was so situated in the road that a person passing through it perforce became unclean and therefore unfit to enter the sacred precincts of the Temple. In the first and third instances he is liable, because after the second act there is no doubt that he entered the Temple precincts in a state of uncleanness. In connection with the law concerning the defilement of Temple precincts it is an essential condition that the offender had at one time been aware of his uncleanness, though unconscious of it at the time of entering the Temple precincts. In these two cases there was a moment when he was in no doubt as to his state of certain uncleanness. He is therefore liable to an offering.
^ᵃᶠnote:An unclean person is sprinkled upon with the water of purification on the third and seventh day of his uncleanness, and then has to immerse himself in order to become clean.
^ᵃᵍnote:In this instance, too, the person most certainly entered the Temple precincts in a state of uncleanness. Although the offender had at no time been certain that he was unclean, for the first possible uncleanness was annulled before passing through the second road, nevertheless he had been aware of doubtful uncleanness, and this is regarded as sufficient by the Sages, who therefore declare him liable. R. Simeon, on the other hand, holds that awareness of doubtful uncleanness is not sufficient.