Keritot

It must thus refer to one witness giving evidence; and yet it says that if there is no contradiction his evidence is valid.1 We have thus proved it. SAID R. MEIR, etc. The question was asked: What is the reason of the Rabbis? Is it that they hold that regarding oneself2 a man is believed more than a hundred witnesses, or perhaps that we adopt the argument of miggo:3 for if he said, I transgressed willfully, he would certainly have been exempted, so if he says, I did not eat at all, he is to be believed, and is therefore exempted? And in which way is this question of avail? With reference to the application of the law to uncleanness.4 If you say the reason of the Rabbis is that regarding oneself a man is believed more than a hundred witnesses, there will be no difference between the old and fresh uncleanness;5 but if you say the reason of the Rabbis is that we adopt the argument of miggo, they would exempt him in the case of old uncleanness but declare him liable in the case of new uncleanness.6 For what reason? For in the case of old uncleanness, if he wanted, he could have said,I have already immersed ,’and be exempt; he is therefore exempt also when he says, I have not become unclean,7 since it can be said that what he meant [when he said,] ‘I have not become unclean’ is ‘I did not remain unclean, for I have immersed’. In the case of fresh uncleanness, however, he is liable. For what reason? For even if he asserted, I have immersed, he would be guilty,8 since the witnesses maintain that he has just become unclean. How is it? — Come and hear: If one witness says to a person. Thou art unclean, and he himself says, I am not unclean, he is exempted.9 I might assume [this holds good] also in the case of two witnesses, but, says R. Meir, against this there is an a fortiori argument: since two witnesses are capable of inflicting the severe penalty of death, how much more can they impose the less severe punishment of a sacrifice! The Rabbis say: Regarding oneself a man is believed more than a hundred witnesses. It thus seems that the argument of the Rabbis is that regarding oneself a man is believed more than a hundred witnesses! — Said R. Ammi: Indeed the argument of the Rabbis is the conclusion of miggo; and understand their reasoning thus: As he could, if he wanted, have said, I did not remain unclean,10 and would then be exempted, therefore regarding himself he is to be believed more than a hundred witnesses. If so, is not this instance identical with that concerning heleb?11 — I might have thought, in the case of heleb I may assume that he explains his words:12 I did not eat in error, but wilfully. But [when he is told], Thou art unclean, and he replies, I am not unclean, I might think his words are not capable of explanation; therefore he lets us know that also in this instance we interpret his words as conveying, I have not remained unclean for I have immersed. Come and hear: And he shall confess,13 [implies that] if he confesses he is liable to an offering, if he does not confess he is exempted. If, therefore, a witness says to him, Thou art unclean, and he says, I am not unclean, he is exempted. I might think this holds good even in the case where he contradicts two witnesses, but says R. Meir, since two witnesses are capable of inflicting the severe penalty of death, how much more can they impose the less severe punishment of a sacrifice! R. Judah says: Regarding oneself a man is believed more than a hundred witnesses. The Rabbis, however, agree with R. Judah in regard to heleb and the entering of the Temple precincts.14 but not in regard to uncleanness.15 Now, to which [uncleanness] does this refer? Shall I say with the Lord. assertion could have been made; for it is argued, that had he intended to lie he would have invented the more advantageous statement. instance the witnesses say the contraction of the uncleanness and the entering of the Temple precincts were both on the same day, in the latter on different days. is not sufficient; one has to wait till sunset to be clean. In the instance of old uncleanness one may well assert one's cleanness by saying, I have immersed. he could have made. these two instances the argument is that he might have said the transgression was wilful, and the assertions actually made, viz., ‘I did not eat heleb’ and ‘I did not enter the Temple’, may be interpreted as being in harmony with the assertion he could have made thus: ‘I did not eat heleb and I did not enter the Temple in a manner which would make me liable to an offering’. is no longer valid.