Keritot

; the comparison, should be in the reverse direction! Said the former: Shall I cancel the dictum? — He replied: No, this is meant: A consummated perverse connection with a designated bondmaid equals a natural sexual contact, when one is exempted because it is written, ‘carnally’; intentional perverse connection with a bondmaid equals unintentional connection, when one is exempted, because it is written, ‘carnally’; perverse connection with a bondmaid while awake equals connection while asleep, when one is exempted because it is written, ‘carnally’. We thus find that intentional sexual contact in the case of a bondmaid equals unintentional connection in the case of other forbidden relations; that natural contact in sleep in the case of the bondmaid equals connection in sleep in the case of other forbidden relations; that perverse connection with the bondmaid while awake1 equals connection in sleep in the case of other forbidden relations. MISHNAH. IF THEY2 SAY TO A PERSON, THOU HAST EATEN3 HELEB,4 HE IS LIABLE TO A SIN-OFFERING;5 IF ONE WITNESS SAYS, HE HAS EATEN, AND ANOTHER SAYS, HE HAS NOT EATEN, OR IF ONE WOMAN6 SAYS, HE HAS EATEN, AND ANOTHER SAYS, HE HAS NOT EATEN, HE IS LIABLE TO A SUSPENSIVE GUILT-OFFERING; IF ONE WITNESS SAYS, HE HAS EATEN, AND HE HIMSELF SAYS, I HAVE NOT EATEN, HE IS EXEMPTED; IF TWO [WITNESSES] SAY, HE HAS EATEN, AND HE HIMSELF SAYS, I HAVE NOT EATEN, R. MEIR DECLARES HIM LIABLE [TO AN OFFERING]. SAID R. MEIR: IF TWO WITNESSES ARE CAPABLE OF INFLICTING THE SEVERE PENALTY OF DEATH,7 SHOULD THEY NOT IMPOSE THE LESS SEVERE PUNISHMENT OF A SACRIFICE? THEY8 REPLIED: SUPPOSE HE SAID, I WAS A WILFUL TRANSGRESSOR, WOULD HE NOT BE EXEMPTED?9 IF ONE ATE TWICE HELEB IN ONE SPELL OF UNAWARENESS, HE IS LIABLE TO BUT ONE OFFERING; IF ONE ATE HELEB, BLOOD, PIGGUL4 AND NOTHAR4 IN ONE SPELL OF UNAWARENESS, HE IS LIABLE FOR EACH KIND OF FOOD. THIS IS AN INSTANCE WHERE DIFFERENT KINDS [OF FOOD] ARE MORE STRINGENT THAN ONE KIND; IN THE FOLLOWING INSTANCE, HOWEVER, ONE KIND [OF FOOD] IS MORE STRINGENT THAN SEVERAL KINDS: IF ONE ATE HALF AN OLIVE-SIZE10 AND THEN AGAIN HALF AN OLIVE-SIZE, BOTH IN ONE SPELL OF UNAWARENESS, IF OF ONE KIND HE IS LIABLE, IF OF TWO KINDS, HE IS EXEMPTED. GEMARA. It is stated, IF THEY SAY TO A PERSON, THOU HAST EATEN HELEB, HE IS LIABLE TO A SIN-OFFERING. ‘THEY SAY’ implies [at least] two; and what does he maintain? If you assume that he was silent and did not contradict them, it would then follow that only silence in response to two witnesses evokes a sin-offering, but not in response to one. Now read the middle clause: IF ONE WITNESS SAYS, HE HAS EATEN AND HE HIMSELF SAYS, I HAVE NOT EATEN [HE IS EXEMPTED]. Now the reason [that he is exempted] is because he contradicts them, but if he did not deny the charge he would be guilty; and how much more so if there were two witnesses! Rather you must assume that he contradicts the witness, and the law is in accordance with R. Meir, who holds a contradiction of two witnesses is of no avail; but according to the Rabbis, he would indeed be exempted. But, then, why has this clause at all been mentioned, we know the law from the concluding clause?11 — This is what he lets us know, that this is a point of dispute between R. Meir and the Rabbis.12 Some there are who say: ‘THEY SAY’ may well refer to a single person, as we have learnt: If a man has gone overseas and they come and tell his wife that he is dead, whereupon she marries again. if the husband returns alive she has to leave both men.13 And it has been established that this law refers also to one witness. Whence do we infer this? From that which has been stated in the latter clause: If she has married again without authority, she may return to her husband. Now, what does ‘without authority’ mean? Without the authority of the court but upon the evidence of witnesses;14 from this we infer that in the former clause it was done with the authority of the court, but upon the evidence of one witness. We thus find that ‘they say’ is used of one witness; similarly, when it states ‘THEY SAY’ it refers to one witness. And what does he [the offender] say? If he contradicts, he should be exempted; for we have learnt in the middle clause: IF ONE WITNESS SAYS, HE HAS EATEN AND HE HIMSELF SAYS, I HAVE NOT EATEN, HE IS EXEMPTED! Again if you say, he is silent; surely we know this law already from the middle clause, IF ONE WITNESS SAYS etc., from which is inferred that he is exempted only when he contradicts, but when he is silent he is indeed liable to an offering! Indeed, he does not contradict, and understand the Mishnah thus: IF THEY SAY TO A PERSON, THOU HAST EATEN HELEB. HE IS LIABLE TO A SIN-OFFERING, namely if he is silent, but . . . when HE HIMSELF SAYS, I HAVE NOT EATEN, HE IS EXEMPTED.15 Where do we find in the Torah that a person is liable to an offering if he does not contradict the evidence of others? — Our Rabbis taught: If his sin be known to him . . . . he shall bring his offering];16 but not if others make it known to him.17 I might then think he is exempted even if he does not contradict,it is therefore written, ‘if it be known to him’: in whatever manner.18 Now to which case does this refer? Shall I say to one in which two witnesses gave evidence? Do we in such a case need a text?19 sin-offering is in fact the opinion of R. Meir only, while the Rabbis disagree. give their consent, she is not to be penalised and may therefore return to her first husband. The former clause, where it states that she is punished and has to leave both men, must therefore refer to a case where there were not two witnesses but one only. The court has accepted the evidence of the one witness but with the understanding that she continues her inquiries as to her husband's fate. The fact that her husband has returned alive proves that her inquiries were not satisfactory, and she is therefore penalised. taken as consent — is provoked from outside.