Keritot

[it refers] to old uncleanness, why do the Rabbis agree with R. Judah only with regard to heleb and the entering of the Temple precincts because he might have said, I did it wilfully? Also in the instance of old uncleanness he could have interpreted his words and say, if he wanted, I did not remain unclean but immersed!1 — Said Rabina: It refers in fact to old uncleanness,2 but to a case where the witnesses said to him, Thou hast eaten sacred food while thy body was unclean,3 and his reply was, I was not unclean; his words are then not open to an explanation, for we cannot say he meant, I did not remain unclean but immersed, for this would convey, I immersed and indeed did eat, which statement would contradict the first assertion4 at least in respect of the uncleanness through contact.5 Said R. Nahman: The halachah is according to R. Judah. Said R. Joseph: He holds [that he is clean] only in private6 and when appertaining to himself.7 Said Resh Lakish: R. Meir agrees with the Rabbis that if two witnesses say to a person, Thou hast had intercourse with a designated bondmaid,8 and he maintains that he has had no intercourse, he is to be trusted, for he could, if he wishes, have answered them, I did not complete the act of cohabitation.9 Said R. Shesheth: R. Meir agrees with the Rabbis with regard to the uncleanness of a nazirite, that if two witnesses say to him, Thou art unclean, and he replies, I am not unclean, he is exempted,10 because he could, if he wanted, have replied, I am absolved from the vow of naziriteship.11 Said Abaye: R. Meir agrees with the Rabbis that if two witnesses say to a person, Thou knowest evidence against a certain man,12 and he says, I do not know, he is exempted, because he could, if he wanted, have said, I was not intent upon giving evidence. IF ONE ATE TWICE HELEB IN ONE SPELL OF UNAWARENESS etc. To this R. Zera demurred: Why is he liable to only one sin-offering? Has he not eaten two olive-sizes of heleb? — Replied to him Abaye: It is the different spells of unawareness that effect separate offerings, but in our instance there was but one spell of unawareness. Some raise the difficulty in the following version: The reason [that he is liable only to one offering], is that there was only one spell of unawareness; if, however, there were two spells of unawareness he would indeed be liable to two offerings; but why? Were not both meals of the same denomination of heleb? — Replied to him Abaye: Different spells of unawareness effect separate offerings. IF ONE ATE HELEB, BLOOD, PIGGUL AND NOTHAR etc. [It is stated,] IF OF ONE KIND HE IS LIABLE; is this not obvious? — Said Resh Lakish in the name of Bar Tutini:13 We suppose it was eaten in two different dishes, and this law is in conformity with the view of R. Joshua who [generally] holds that different dishes do not combine with one another.14 Now I might have thought that R. Joshua upholds his opinion no matter whether greater leniency or greater stringency result from it; therefore we are taught that he is liable [to an offering], implying that he upholds his view only when it leads to greater stringency, but not when it leads to greater leniency. Some refer the discussion to the latter part of the passage: IF OF TWO KINDS, HE IS EXEMPTED; is this not obvious? — Said Resh Lakish in the name of Bar Tutini: We suppose they were eaten in two different dishes and this law is in accordance with R. Joshua who holds different dishes do not combine with one another. Now I might have thought that R. Joshua upholds his rule only if it leads to greater stringency but not if greater leniency results from it; therefore we are taught: IF OF TWO KINDS, HE IS EXEMPTED: ‘Two kinds’ means in fact ‘one kind’;15 it is called ‘two kinds’ because the eating was in two different dishes; and as it is stated that he is then exempted, hence we may conclude that R. Joshua upholds his rule both if it leads to greater leniency and if it results in greater stringency. Now, since the latter part of the passage16 deals with one kind consumed in two dishes, the former part must, as its contrast, refer to one kind consumed in one dish. Is not the law then obvious? — Said Rabina: It refers to a case where he became aware [of his sin] in between,17 and the law is in accordance with Rabban Gamaliel, who holds awareness is of no avail with regard to half-sizes;18 as we have learnt:19 If one writes two letters in two different spells of unawareness, one in the morning and the other in the evening, Rabban Gamaliel holds he is guilty, but the Rabbis exempt him. Rabban Gamaliel holds awareness is of no avail with regard to half-sizes, whereas the Rabbis maintain it is of avail. MISHNAH. WITHIN WHAT TIME MUST HE EAT THEM?20 [THE TIME HE WOULD NEED] IF HE ATE A LIKE BULK OF PARCHED GRAINS OF CORN.21 THUS THE VIEW OF R. MEIR; BUT THE RABBIS SAY, HE MUST TAKE FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE END NO MORE TIME THAN IS REQUIRED FOR THE EATING OF A PERAS,22 TO BECOME LIABLE. IF ONE EATS UNCLEAN EDIBLES OR DRINKS UNCLEAN DRINKS,23 OR IF [A PRIEST] DRINKS A QUARTER [OF A LOG] OF WINE AND THEN ENTERS THE TEMPLE,24 IF NO MORE TIME HAS ELAPSED THAN IS REQUIRED FOR THE EATING OF A PERAS, HE IS LIABLE. R. ELEAZAR SAYS: IF THE DRINKING WAS INTERRUPTED OR THE WINE DILUTED WITH WATER OF THE SMALLEST QUANTITY, HE IS EXEMPTED.25 GEMARA. They asked: Is R. Meir's statement in the direction of stringency or of leniency? Is it in the direction of stringency, and this is what he means: [THE TIME HE WOULD NEED] IF HE ATE OF PARCHED GRAINS OF CORN, though lasting the whole day.26 Thus even though the time that elapsed between the beginning and the end of the meal was longer than is required for the eating of a peras, yet since it was one protracted meal, he is liable; while the Rabbis retorted: If no more time has elapsed than is required for the eating of a peras, he is guilty, if more he is exempted? Or is it in the direction of leniency, and this is what he means: [THE TIME HE WOULD NEED] IF HE ATE OF PARCHED GRAINS OF CORN, provided it was without interruption,27 but if with interruption he is exempted even though the time that elapsed between the beginning and the end of the meal is within that required for the eating of a peras; while the Rabbis retorted: Since the time elapsed between the beginning and the end of the meal was within that required for the eating of a peras, he is guilty? — Come and hear: BUT THE SAGES SAY, HE MUST TAKE FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE END NO MORE TIME THAN IS REQUIRED FOR THE EATING OF A PERAS. all events to be implicitly accepted that the reason of the Sages’ view is based upon the conclusion of miggo, while R. Judah who holds that even in the case of fresh uncleanness he is exempted, bases his view obviously upon the rule that regarding oneself a man is at all events believed more than a hundred witnesses. The query set forth at the outset of the discussion is thus resolved: R. Judah, who as the opponent of R. Meir is often quoted anonymously, bases his view upon the first argument of the query, the Sages upon the second. case is such that the Sages hold miggo is not applicable to it. contradiction, I did not eat, we might have understood it in the sense, I did not transgress for I had immersed before. His reply, I am not unclean, is taken to imply, I did not come into contact with an unclean object, and this is in open contradiction to the evidence of the witnesses, wherefore his statement is not accepted and he is liable to an offering. treatment of the laws of purity. unclean for others. The trust put in him when he says he is not unclean is subjective, because we believe him in matters appertaining to his own conscience and salvation. vow were not foreseen. exemption from an offering. If on the other hand one has, e.g., eaten two full quantities in two dishes the non-combination leads to greater stringency of the law, for he is then liable to two offerings. two meals combine to make up the requisite size. What time may pass between the two meals to be still considered as one? after the other. is regarded as unfit to eat sacred food until he has taken an immersion. the eating of a peras.