Horayot

R. Nahman, however, said in the name of Samuel: This  is the view of R. Meir, but the Sages maintain that an individual who acted in accordance with [an erroneous] ruling of the court is liable. Which [statement of] R. Meir and which of the Rabbis? — It was taught, 'If they had ruled and acted accordingly, R. Meir exonerates them and the Sages consider them liable'. Now, who are 'those that acted'? If the court be suggested, what [it may be retorted] is the reason of the Rabbis who consider them liable? Surely it was taught, 'Since it might have been assumed that a court who issued [an erroneous] ruling and acted accordingly are liable, it was expressly taught. The assembly, and do,  indicate that] action depends on the assembly  and ruling depends on the court.'  If, again,  [it be suggested that the meaning  is that] the court ruled and the majority of the congregation acted accordingly, the question arises] what is the reason why R. Meir exonerates them? Must it not then be concluded  [that the meaning  is that] the court ruled and a minority of the congregation acted accordingly, and that the principle underlying their  dispute is the following: The Master  holds that an individual who acted under the authority of the ruling of the court is exonerated, and the Masters hold that an individual who acted under the authority of the ruling of the court is liable! R. Papa. however, said: All agree  that an individual who acted under the authority of the court's ruling is exonerated, but they differ [on the question] whether the court is counted in the making up of a majority of the congregation.  The Masters hold that the court is counted in the making of a majority of the congregation  and the Master holds that the court is not to be counted in making up a majority of the congregation. And if preferred I might say [that the meaning  is that] the court ruled and a majority of the congregation acted accordingly: and  by 'Sages' was meant  R. Simeon who stated that both the congregation and the court bring [a sin offering].  And if you prefer I might say [that they differ in the case where] one tribe acted in accordance with the ruling of its own court: and by 'Sages' R. Judah was meant; for it was taught,'A tribe that acted on the authority of [an erroneous] ruling of its court, that tribe is liable.  And if you prefer I might say [that the dispute relates to] such a case as where the sin was committed by six [tribes] who formed a majority of the congregation or by seven [tribes] although they did not form a majority of the congregation, and [the anonymous author of] our Baraitha  is  R. Simeon b. Eleazar; for it was taught: R. Simeon b. Eleazar said in his  name. 'Six [tribes] who form a majority of the congregation or seven [tribes] although they do not form a majority of the congregation, who have committed a sin are liable [to bring a sin offering]. R. Assi said: In [the case of an erroneous] ruling [of a court]  the majority of the inhabitants of the Land of Israel are to be taken into account,  for it is said, So Solomon held the feast at that time, and all Israel with him, a great congregation, from the entrance of Hamath unto the Brook of Egypt, before the Lord our God, seven days and seven days, even fourteen days.  Now, consider, it is written, and all Israel with him a great congregation, what need was there for,  from the entrance of Hamath unto the Brook of Egypt? From this it may be inferred that only these  are included in the  'congregation' but those are not. It is obvious [that the case where] a majority  has been reduced  to a minority [is a matter of] dispute between R. Simeon and the Rabbis.  What, [however, is the law where] a minority  has become  the majority?  Do R. Simeon and the Rabbis differ [in this case also]. R. Simeon, who is guided by  [the status of the person at the time of the] discovery [of the sin], holding them liable,  and the Rabbis who are guided by [the status of the person at the time of the] commission of the sin, exonerating them,  or not? — How could [such a thing]  be imagined! It might well be said that R. Simeon was heard to be guided by  [the time of the] discovery [of the sin] also:  was he heard, however, [to be guided by the time of the] discovery alone!  For had that been the case  they  should have brought [their offering] according to their present status.  Consequently [it must be concluded that] R. Simeon requires both commission of the sin and its discovery. The question was raised: What [is the law where] the court ruled that suet was permitted and a minority of the congregation acted accordingly, and, after the court had withdrawn their decision and again issued a similar ruling, another minority acted accordingly? [Are we to say,] since this is a case of two distinct spells of awareness,  they do not combine,  or perhaps, since both  [are concerned with] suet they combine? And if some ground could be found for the decision  that, since both  [are concerned with] suet, they combine, [the question arises,] what [is the law where one] minority [was involved] in the forbidden fat of  the maw and [another] minority in the forbidden fat of  the small bowels? Is it certain that in these cases,  since [the prohibitions] are derived  from  two [distinct] texts, they  do not combine, or, perhaps, since both  [are concerned with] forbidden fat, they  combine. And if some ground should be for the decision  that, [since the two kinds bear] the name of 'forbidden fat', they  combine, [the question may be asked,] what [is the law where one] minority [was involved] in the [eating of] suet and [another] minority in that of blood? Is it certain that in this case,  since these are two [distinct] prohibitions they  do not combine, or perhaps, since the same kind of sacrifice has to be brought in both cases,  they combine? And if some ground could be found for the decision  that, since the same kind of sacrifice has to be brought in both cases, they  combine, [the question might be asked,] What is the law [where one] minority [was involved] in [the eating of] suet and [another] minority in idolatry? Is it certain that in this case,  [since] neither the prohibitions nor the sacrifices are alike [they  are not to be combined] or, perhaps, since [the punishment] in both cases  is that of kareth  they are to be combined. — These questions remain undecided. The question was raised: [What is the law where] a court ruled that suet was permitted and a minority of the congregation acted accordingly, and the members of that court died and another court that was appointed also issued a similar ruling and another minority acted [in accordance with that ruling]? According to him who stated that the court brings [the sacrifice] no question arises, for, surely, they are no more in existence. The question, however, arises what [is the law] according to him who stated that the congregation bring [the sacrifice]? The congregation, surely, exists: