Horayot

R. Jonathan said: Where a hundred [judges] sat down to consider a decision they are not liable  unless all of them arrived at the same [erroneous] decision; for it is said, and if the whole congregation of Israel shall err  [which implies] that they must all  err.  Said R. Huna son of Hoshaiah: Logical deduction leads to the same conclusion.  For throughout the Torah there is an established rule that a majority is like the whole and yet it was written here, 'the whole congregation'; and since such is the case  [it must be concluded that] even if there were a hundred. We learned, [WHEN] THE COURT ISSUED [AN ERRONEOUS] RULING AND ONE OF THEM, WHO KNEW THAT THEY HAD ERRED OR A DISCIPLE WHO WAS HIMSELF CAPABLE OF DECIDING MATTERS OF LAW PROCEEDED AND ACTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR RULING, WHETHER THEY ACTED AND HE ACTED WITH THEM OR THEY ACTED AND HE ACTED AFTER THEM, OR THEY DID NOT ACT AND HE ACTED, HE IS LIABLE, SINCE HE WAS NOT DEPENDENT UPON [THE RULING OF THE COURT]. [From this it follows that only] that person  is liable, but another  is exempt; but why? The decision, surely, was not unanimous!  — Here it is a case where that person  nodded with his head. Come and hear: If the court issued a ruling, and one of them knew that they erred and said to them, 'You are mistaken', they are exempt.  The reason, then, why they are exempt is because he said to them, 'You are mistaken', had he however remained silent they would have been liable and their decision would have been regarded as unanimous;  but why? Surely, they did not all arrive at the same decision? — It may be answered that here also it is a case where he nodded with his head. R. Mesharsheya raised an objection: Our Rabbis relied upon the words of R. Simeon b. Gamaliel and upon the words of R. Eleazar the son of R. Zadok who said, 'No law may be imposed upon the public unless a majority of the people can endure it'; and R. Adda b. Abba said: What Scriptural proof is there for this view? Ye are cursed with a curse, yet ye rob me, even this whole nation.  Now, surely, it is written here, 'This whole nation,' and yet a majority is regarded as the whole.  [Is not this] a refutation of the view of R. Jonathan?  — This is a refutation. Why then did the All-Merciful say, 'the whole congregation'? — It is this that was meant: Where they are all present  the decision is valid; but if not, their decision is invalid. R. Joshua said: When ten sit in judgment, the responsibility rests upon  all of them. Is not this obvious? It teaches us that even a disciple in the presence of his Master [must share the responsibility]. When R. Huna went to court he took with him ten students of the college, 'in order that', he said, 'each of us  might receive only a chip of the beam',  When an animal suffering from an organic disease was brought before R. Ashi  he used to bring together ten ritual slaughterers  of Matha Mehasia  and made them sit down before him, saying, 'In order that each of us might receive only a chip of the beam'. MISHNAH. WHERE A COURT ISSUED A DECISION,  AND LATER DISCOVERED THAT THEY HAD ERRED AND WITHDREW THEIR DECISION, WHETHER THEY BROUGHT THEIR OFFERING  OR WHETHER THEY DID NOT BRING THEIR OFFERING, IF AN INDIVIDUAL  PROCEEDED AND ACTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR [ERRONEOUS] DECISION, R. SIMEON EXONERATES HIM AND R. ELEAZAR DECLARES [HIS CASE] DOUBTFUL.  WHICH CASE MAY BE REGARDED DOUBTFUL? IF HE  WAS  AT HOME, HE IS LIABLE.  IF, HOWEVER, HE WENT TO A COUNTRY BEYOND THE SEA HE IS EXEMPT. SAID R. AKIBA: I AGREE THAT A PERSON IN SUCH A CASE  IS NEARER TO EXONERATION THAN TO CULPABILITY. SAID BEN 'AZZAI TO HIM: HOW DOES SUCH A PERSON DIFFER FROM ONE WHO REMAINS AT HOME? HE WHO REMAINS AT HOME IS IN A POSITION TO ASCERTAIN THE FACTS  BUT THE OTHER WAS NOT IN SUCH A POSITION.  IF THE COURT RULED THAT AN ENTIRE PRINCIPLE HAS TO BE UPROOTED; IF THEY SAID, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT [THE LAW CONCERNING THE] MENSTRUANT  IS NOT FOUND IN THE TORAH OR THE [LAW CONCERNING THE] SABBATH IS NOT FOUND IN THE TORAH OR [THE LAW CONCERNING] IDOLATRY IS NOT FOUND IN THE TORAH, THEY ARE EXEMPT. IF, HOWEVER, THEY RULED THAT A PART [OF A COMMANDMENT] WAS TO BE ANNULLED AND A PART RETAINED, THEY ARE LIABLE. HOW IS THIS SO? — IF THEY SAID: [THE LAW CONCERNING THE] MENSTRUANT OCCURS IN THE TORAH BUT IF A MAN HAS INTERCOURSE WITH A WOMAN THAT AWAITS A DAY CORRESPONDING TO A DAY  HE IS EXEMPT, [OR THAT THE LAW CONCERNING THE] SABBATH OCCURS IN THE TORAH BUT IF A MAN CARRIES ANYTHING FROM A PRIVATE DOMAIN TO A PUBLIC DOMAIN HE IS EXEMPT, [OR THAT THE LAW OF] IDOLATRY OCCURS IN THE TORAH, BUT IF A MAN ONLY BOWS DOWN TO AN IDOL HE IS EXEMPT, THEY ARE LIABLE; FOR SCRIPTURE SAYS, AND IF SOME THING BE HID,  'SOMETHING BUT NOT THE ENTIRE PRINCIPLE. GEMARA. Rab Judah said in the name of Rab: What is R. Simeon's reason? Because he acted on the authority of the court. Others say that Rab Judah said in the name of Rab: R. Simeon used to say that [in the case of] any ruling [of the court], which has spread  to a majority of the congregation, if an individual acted according to it he is exempt;  for [he ruling was given for the purpose  of distinguishing between one who acts in error  and one acting presumptuously. An objection was raised: The bullock required  when a matter was hid from the congregation,  and the goats [of atonement] for idolatry  are to be purchased from a collection made for the purpose:  these are the words of R. Simeon. R. Judah said: They are taken  from the funds of the Temple treasury.  Now, why?  Since a collection is made for the purchase of the sacrifices, the facts became known!  — If you wish I might say: It is a case, for instance, where the object of the collection was not stated.  And if you prefer I might say: In the case, for instance, where he was not in town.  And if you prefer I might say: Rab holds the same view as the other Tanna,  [in whose name] the reverse was taught: 'A collection is made for the occasion;  these are the words of R. Judah. R. Simeon said: They are taken from the funds of the Temple treasury.' It was taught: R. Meir declares him  liable and R. Simeon exonerates him; R. Eleazar said, 'doubtful'; in the name of Symmachus it was said, 'suspended'. Said R. Johanan: The difference between them  is the obligation to bring an asham talui. Said R. Zera: [As to an] analogy [in respect of the view] of R. Eleazar — to what may the thing be compared? To the case of a man who ate something about which it is doubtful whether it was suet or fat,  who, when it becomes known to him  brings a guilt offering.