Horayot

ONE OF THEM WHO KNEW THAT THEY HAD ERRED, OR A DISCIPLE WHO WAS HIMSELF CAPABLE OF DECIDING MATTERS OF LAW. What need was there for the two? — Raba replied: Both are required, since, otherwise, it might have been assumed that the reference was only to  one who possesses learning and is also capable of logical reasoning and deduction but not to one possessing learning and no capacity for logical reasoning. Said Abaye to him: Surely, CAPABLE OF DECIDING MATTERS OF LAW implies the possession of knowledge and also capacity for logical reasoning! What I mean, the other replied, is this: If [the inference had to be derived] from that,  it might have been assumed that the reference is only to  one who possesses learning and is also capable of logical reasoning and deduction, but not to one possessing learning and no capacity for logical reasoning and deduction; hence it was taught, CAPABLE OF DECIDING MATTERS OF LAW [so that] from the superfluous Mishnah [it may be inferred that the reference includes] even him who possesses learning only, though incapable of logical reasoning and deduction, [as well as] him who is only capable of logical reasoning and deduction though he possesses no learning. CAPABLE OF DECIDING MATTERS OF LAW etc. Like whom, for instance? — Raba replied: For instance, like Simeon b. Azzai and Simeon b. Zoma.  Said Abaye to him: In the case of such [scholars] it would be a wilful transgression!  And according to your argument, [the other replied, how will you explain] the following wherein it was taught: 'In doing one,  [implies that if] an individual acts on his own authority he is liable; if under the authority of the ruling of the court, he is exonerated. How is this so? [In the case where] the court ruled that suet was permitted and it was known to one of then, or to a disciple sitting before them and capable of deciding matters of law, such for instance as Simeon b. 'Azzai, that they erred, it might have been assumed that he is exonerated, hence it was expressly taught, in doing one,  [implying that if] an individual acts on his own authority he is liable: if under the authority of the ruling of the court he is exonerated'?  How then could this  be possible? [Obviously] in such a case as where [the scholar] knew that it  was prohibited, but erred in the [interpretation of the] precept of obeying the words of the Sages;  according to my view also  it is a case where they erred in the [interpretation of the] precept of obeying the words of the Sages. THIS IS THE GENERAL RULE: HE WHO IS [IN A POSITION] TO RELY UPON HIMSELF IS SUBJECT TO A PENALTY. What does this include? It includes one who usually disregards  the decisions of the court.  'HE WHO MUST DEPEND UPON THE COURT includes [the case where] the court issued a decision and when they discovered that they erred they retracted.  But this, surely, is explicitly stated!  — It was first stated here and later it was amplified. Rab Judah said in the name of Samuel: This  is the view of R. Judah, but the Sages maintain that an individual who acted in accordance with [an erroneous] ruling of the court is liable. Which [statement of] R. Judah [is referred to]? — It was taught: If any one person … sin through error in doing,  behold there are three limitations  [to indicate that only] he who acts on his own authority is liable; [but he who acts] on the authority of the ruling of the court is exonerated. Which [statement of the] Rabbis?  — It was taught: Lest it be said  that a minority of the congregation who committed a sin are subject to the obligation of a sacrifice because the court does not bring a bullock on their account,  but a majority of the congregation who had committed a sin should be exempt because the court brings a bullock on their account,  Scripture expressly stated, Of the common people  [to indicate that] even if a majority of them  or all of them. Now, in what [circumstances was the sin spoken of committed]? If it be suggested through error in action,  how [it may be asked] does the court enter at all into the question  when [the commission of the sin] was not on the authority of the ruling of the court? Does then a court bring [a sacrifice] when [the commission of the sin] was not under the authority of their ruling!  If, however, [it be suggested that the sin had been committed] under the authority of the ruling of the court, surely [it may be pointed out] the text, Of the common people,  was written in reference to error in action!  Consequently  [it must be concluded that] it is this that was meant: A minority of the congregation who committed a sin through error in action  are liable, because the court does not bring a bullock on their account in [the case where a sin was committed] on the authority of the ruling of the court, and yet they  are liable.  [Since, however,] one might assume that a majority of the congregation who committed [a sin] through error in action  should be exempt because the court brings a bullock on their account when [the sin was committed] under the authority of the ruling of the court, it was expressly taught, 'Of the common people'  [to include] even a majority of them. Said R. Papa: Whence [is this proved]? Is it not possible that neither they nor the court [bring any sacrifice]!  — If so,  why should it be sought to prove that a majority is liable?  Must it not then be concluded that [in the case of] a minority acting under a court's ruling it had been definitely established that they were liable, though they had acted under the authority of the ruling of a court;  for [otherwise] it should have been sought first to prove that a minority is liable, when sinning through error of action, and then should have come the attempt to prove that a majority also is liable when sinning through error of action. Consequently, since  the attempt has not been made [first] to prove that a minority is liable, when sinning through error of action, and only finally to prove that a majority [also] is liable when sinning through error of action, it must be concluded that a minority [committing a sin] under the ruling of the court are liable [to bring] a lamb or a goat, and likewise when they committed the sin under no authority from the ruling of a court, through error of action, they are also liable. Consider, however, this: Both [Baraithas]  have been taught  anonymously, whence then [is it proved] that the first one [represents the view of] R. Judah and the last [that of] the Rabbis? Might not the reverse be suggested! — Who has been heard to make an exposition on limitations in such a manner?  Surely it was R. Judah: for it has been taught: R. Judah said: