Horayot

MISHNAH. IF THE COURT  RULED THAT 'ANY ONE OF THE [RITUAL] COMMANDMENTS MENTIONED IN THE TORAH MAY BE TRANSGRESSED, AND AN INDIVIDUAL PROCEEDED AND ACTED THROUGH ERROR,  IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR RULING, WHETHER THEY  ACTED [THUS]  AND HE ACTED WITH THEM  OR THEY ACTED  AND HE ACTED AFTER THEM OR EVEN IF THEY DID NOT ACT  AND HE ACTED,  HE IS EXEMPT,  BECAUSE HE RELIED ON [A RULING OF] THE COURT. [IF, HOWEVER, WHEN] THE COURT ISSUED [AN ERRONEOUS] RULING ONE OF THEM,  WHO KNEW THAT THEY HAD ERRED, OR A DISCIPLE WHO WAS HIMSELF CAPABLE OF DECIDING MATTERS OF LAW, PROCEEDED AND ACTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR RULING, WHETHER THEY  ACTED  AND HE  ACTED WITH THEM OR THEY ACTED AND HE ACTED AFTER THEM OR THEY DID NOT ACT AND HE ACTED,  HE IS LIABLE,  SINCE HE  WAS NOT DEPENDENT UPON [THE RULING OF] THE COURT. THIS IS THE GENERAL RULE: HE WHO IS [IN A POSITION] TO RELY UPON HIMSELF IS SUBJECT TO A PENALTY, AND [ONLY] HE WHO MUST DEPEND UPON THE COURT IS EXEMPT. GEMARA. Samuel said: A court is never responsible  unless they ruled.  'You are permitted'.  R. Dimi of Nehardea said: Unless they ruled, 'You are permitted to act'. What is the reason? — Because [otherwise]  the decision is not final. Said Abaye: We also have learned the same: If he  returned to his [home] town and continued to teach as he had taught,  he is exonerated. If, however, he issued instructions [for the public] to act,  he is subject to the penalty. Said R. Abba: We also have learned the same: If the court decided  that she  may be married, and she went and contracted a forbidden union,  she  must bring an offering, because the court permitted her only to marry. Rabina said: We also have learned the same: IF THE COURT RULED THAT ANY ONE OF THE [RITUAL] COMMANDMENTS MENTIONED IN THE TORAH MAY BE TRANSGRESSED.  Nothing more [need be said about it]. Some read as follows:  Samuel said: A court is not responsible unless they' ruled, 'You are permitted to act'.  R. Dimi of Nehardea said.' Even [if the ruling was], 'You are permitted' the decision is [regarded as] final. But surely, said Abaye, we have not so learnt: If he returned to his [home] town and continued to teach as he had taught he is exonerated. If, however, he issued instructions [for the public] to act, he is subject to penalty!  But surely, said R. Abba, we have not so learned: If the court decided that she may be married and she went and committed adultery, she must bring an offering, because the court permitted her only to be married!  But surely, said Rabina, We have not so learned: IF THE COURT RULED THAT ANY ONE OF THE [RITUAL] COMMANDMENTS MENTIONED IN THE TORAH MAY BE TRANSGRESSED!  Nothing more [need be said about it]. AND AN INDIVIDUAL PROCEEDED AND ACTED THROUGH ERROR IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR RULING. Let it be taught, AND HE ACTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR RULING; what need was there for  THROUGH ERROR! — Raba replied: [The addition of] THROUGH ERROR [was meant] to include [the following case]. If the court ruled that suet  was permitted [to be eaten], and a person mistook  suet for fat and ate it,  he is exonerated;  [while] ACCORDING TO THEIR RULING [implies] at their actual ruling. Others read [as follows]. Raba said: Only a person who ACTED THROUGH ERROR [NAMELY] IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR RULING IS EXONERATED, but he who mistook suet for fat  and ate it is liable. That which was obvious to Raha was raised by Rami b. Hama as a question. For Rami b Hima isked.' What [is the law where] the court ruled that suet was permitted and a person mistook it for fat  and ate it?  — Raba replied: Come and hear: AN INDIVIDUAL PROCEEDED AND ACTED THROUGH ERROR IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR RULING etc. Why should it be necessary to state  THROUGH ERROR [and also] IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR RULING.  Obviously  to include [the following case]: Where the court ruled that suet was permitted and a person mistook suet for fat and ate it, he is exonerated!  — Perhaps [it may be retorted, our Mishnah means to] exempt a person only when he ACTED THROUGH ERROR [namely] IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR RULING, but when he mistook suet for fat and ate it he is liable. Others say that Raba said: Come and hear AN INDIVIDUAL PROCEEDED AND ACTED THROUGH ERROR IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR RULING. This surely implies  that only when he acted THROUGH ERROR [namely] IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR RULING he is exonerated, but when he mistook suet for fat and ate it he is liable!  — Perhaps [it was retorted, our Mishnah implies] either THROUGH ERROR or IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR RULING. [The following are] in dispute [on the case mentioned]: If the court ruled that suet was permitted and a person mistook suet for fat and ate it, Rab said: He is exonerated, and R. Johanan said: He is liable. An objection was raised: Of the common people [sin] in doing  excludes  the apostate.  R. Simeon b. Jose said in the name of R. Simeon: This is not necessary; since it is written, [And doeth] through error [any of all the things], which [the Lord hath commanded] not to be done, and is guilty; if [his sin] … be known to him,  [which shows that only] he who repents when it becomes known to him [that he has sinned] brings a sacrifice for a sin he committed through error, but he who does not repent when he becomes aware [of his sin] does not bring a sacrifice for a sin he has committed through error.  Now, if [this view] is tenable, surely [it may be objected], he  would not repent even when he becomes aware [of the facts]!  — R. Papa replied: R. Johanan holds the view that since the court would repent when [the error] became known to them, and he  also would then repent, [such a person] may justly be described as one who repents of his action when he becomes aware [of his sin], and he is, therefore, liable. Raba said: Rab agrees that he is not counted in the making up of the majority of the congregation.  What is the reason? Scripture says, through error, implying [that no sacrifice is to be brought] unless all of them shared  one and the same 'error'. WHETHER THEY ACTED [THUS] AND HE ACTED WITH THEM etc. What need was there  to teach all these?  [In the case of] the former section, this may be justified [as being a climactic arrangement]: 'not only this but also that;'  in the later section, however, where liability is spoken of, the order, surely, should have been reversed! Horayoth 2b — This is a case  [of anti-climax]: 'this, and there is no need to say that.'