חולין 13 — Soncino English Talmud

¹hut not [the mere expression of] his intention. — He replied. He certainly did not put the question in regard to the mere [expression of the] intention [of a minor]. What he asked was whether his intention could be inferred from his act. For example: there stood [an animal intended for] a burnt-offering on the south side [of the altar], and the minor brought it to the north side and slaughtered it there. Should we say that since he brought it to the north side and slaughtered it there [it is clear that] he had the proper intention, or should we rather say that he did not find a convenient place [in the south]? But has not R. Johanan already expressed his view in such a case? For we have learnt: If [a man] took his fruit up to the roof in order to keep it free from maggots and dew fell upon it, it does not come within the rule of ‘if water be put’. If, however, he had the Intention [that the dew should fall upon it] it comes within the rule of ‘if water be put’. If it was taken up by a deaf-mute, an imbecile or a minor, it does not come within the rule of ‘if water be put’, even though they had the intention [that the dew should fall upon it], because the law recognizes the act of a minor but not [mere] intention. And R. Johanan explained that this rule only applies where they did not turn the fruit over, but if they did turn the fruit over it comes within the rule of ‘if water be put’. The question [R. Johanan] put was this: Was this rule laid down by the Torah or only by the Rabbis? R. Nahman b. Isaac gives this version [of the foregoing argument]. R. Hiyya b. Abba said that R. Johanan put this question: Does the law recognize the act of a minor [as sufficient evidence of his expressed intention] or not? Said R. Ammi to R. Hiyya. He might as well have put the question in regard to the [expression of the] intention [of a minor]. Why did he not put the question in regard to the [expression of the] intention [of a minor]? Because we have learnt that the law does not recognize the [expression of the] intention of a minor [as sufficient evidence of his intention]; for the same reason he need not have put the question in regard to the act of a minor because we have learnt that the law recognizes the act of a minor [as sufficient evidence of his expressed intention]! — The question [R. Johanan] put was this: Is this rule laid down by the Torah or only by the Rabbis? — And [R. Johanan himself] solved [it]: The act of a minor [as sufficient evidence of his unexpressed intention] is recognized even by the Torah; [the mere expression of] his intention is not recognized even by the Rabbis; the [unexpressed] intention of the minor evidenced from his act is not recognized by the Torah but only by the Rabbis. Samuel put the following question to R. Huna: Whence do we know that an act performed incidentally in connection with sacrifices is invalid? — [He replied,] Because it is written: And he shall slaughter the bullock, thus teaching that the slaughtering should be intended for a bullock. Thereupon Samuel said: This we already know; but whence do we know that this rule is indispensable? — He replied: It is written: Ye shall slaughter it at your will, that is to say, slaughter it intentionally. MISHNAH. THAT WHICH IS SLAUGHTERED BY A GENTlle IS NEBELAH AND DEFILES BY CARRYING. GEMARA. It is nebelah only but it is not prohibited for all other purposes. Who is the authority for this view? — R. Hiyya b. Abba in the name of R. Johanan replied: It cannot be R. Eliezer, for were it R. Eliezer [it should also be prohibited for all other purposes] since he maintains that the thoughts of a gentile are usually directed towards idolatry. R. Ammi said that the Mishnah is to be interpreted thus: THAT WHICH IS SLAUGHTERED BY A GENTILE IS NEBELAH, but [that which is slaughtered] by a min is presumed to be intended for idolatry. We thus learnt here what our Rabbis have taught: That which is slaughtered by a min [is regarded as] intended for idolatry, his bread as the bread of Cutheans, his wine as wine used for idolatrous purposes, his scrolls of the Law as books of soothsayers, his fruit as tebel. Some add, even^ᵃ^ᵇ^ᶜ^ᵈ^ᵉ^ᶠ^ᵍ^ʰ^ⁱ^ʲ^ᵏ^ˡ^ᵐ^ⁿ^ᵒ^ᵖ^ᵠ^ʳ^ˢ^ᵗ^ᵘ^ᵛ^ʷ^ˣ^ʸ

^ᵃnote:I.e., where he did not express it.
^ᵇnote:In cases where the intention was unexpressed but the act was evidence thereof.
^ᶜnote:Sacrifices of the highest grade had to be slaughtered on the north side of the altar; v. Zeb, chap. V. Furthermore, every act in connection with any sacrifice had to be intended for the particular sacrifice.
^ᵈnote:So that the slaughtering of the animal may have been performed on the north side not because he knew that it was necessary to slaughter a burnt-offering there but because he found the place more convenient.
^ᵉnote:Maksh, VI, 1.
^ᶠnote:Lev. XI, 38. From this verse the law is derived that produce becomes susceptible to uncleanness only after it has been made wet by water or other liquids specified in Maksh. VI, 4. It is provided, however, that the owner must have applied the water to the produce intentionally, or, at least, that the presence of the water on the produce was acceptable to him. V. Maksh. I, 1.
^ᵍnote:I.e., the deaf-mute, the imbecile or the minor.
^ʰnote:Their turning over the fruit shows that they intended the dew to fall on the other side of the fruit too. It must be assumed, however, that they did not expressly state their Specific purpose, for if they did, it would not be necessary for R. Johanan to teach this, for it is obvious that their act is conclusive evidence of their expressed intention. Here is a clear case of an act which, though not conclusive, might well serve to indicate the minor's intention; yet R. Johanan ruled that the law was satisfied with such evidence of intention.
^ⁱnote:Viz., that the law recognizes the unexpressed intention of a minor where it can be inferred from his act.
^ʲnote:If the rule is Biblical then it would be applied in all cases, even where the effect of such application would produce a more lenient result; e.g., in the case of the burnt-offering mentioned above, the result of applying the rule would be to declare the sacrifice valid. If, however, the rule was only laid down by the Rabbis, it would only be applied in such cases where the effect of such application would produce a more stringent result; e.g, in the case of the fruit on the roof, the result of applying the rule would be to regard the fruit as susceptible to uncleanness.
^ᵏnote:And therefore the expression of his intention is ignored in all cases, even where the effect would produce a more stringent result.
^ˡnote:E.g., a person while handling a knife unintentionally slaughters a consecrated animal.
^ᵐnote:Lev. I, 5.
^ⁿnote:Lit., ‘that is in our hand’.
^ᵒnote:I.e., that if the proper intention was absent 1he sacrifice is invalid even after the act.
^ᵖnote:Lev. XIX, 5.
^ᵠnote:Since we have two verses each directing that the slaughtering of a consecrated animal must he accompanied by the proper intention the rule becomes indispensable, in accordance with the Rabbinic dictum: wherever Scripture repeats an injunction it is meant to be indispensable.
^ʳnote:Even though the slaughtering was performed according to ritual and in the presence of an Israelite, the animal is regarded as nebelah and may not he eaten; but also, like nebelah, it may be used for any other purpose.
^ˢnote:V. Glos.
^ᵗnote:V. Lev. XI, 40.
^ᵘnote:And it is established law that no use or benefit may he derived from anything connected with idolatrous worship.
^ᵛnote:Heb. ihn pl. ohbhn. A Jew or a gentile who is devoted to the worship of idols, or who acts as priest unto idols, V. Glos.
^ʷnote:The bread of Cutheans (i.e., Samaritans) was forbidden to be eaten. V. Sheb. VIII, 10: He who eats the bread of a Cuthean is as one who eats the flesh of swine.
^ˣnote:Which serve for idolatrous purposes. V. Git. 45b: A scroll of the Law written by a min must be destroyed by fire.
^ʸnote:Produce from which there have not yet been separated the tithes and the priestly dues, and which may not he eaten on penalty of death at the hands of Heaven.

²his children as bastards. And the first Tanna? — He holds that he would not allow his wife to prostitute herself. The Master stated above: ‘THAT WHICH IS SLAUGHTERED BY A GENTILE IS NEBELAH’. But perhaps he is a min? — R. Nahman in the name of Rabbah b. Abbuha answered: There are no minim among the gentiles. But we see that there are! Say: The majority of gentiles are not minim. For he accepts the opinion expressed by R. Hiyya b. Abba in the name of R. Johanan: The gentiles outside the land [of Israel] are not idolaters; they only continue the customs of their ancestors. R. Joseph b. Minyomi stated in the name of R. Nahman: There are no minim among the idolatrous nations. Now, to what would this rule apply? Do you say to shechitah? But surely, if what is slaughtered by a min who is an Israelite is prohibited, it goes without saying that what is slaughtered by a gentile min is prohibited! Do you then say it applies to the law of ‘casting down into a pit’? But surely, if a min who is an Israelite may be cast down, it goes without saying that a gentile min may be cast down! R. ‘Ukba b. Hama said: The rule applies to the matter of accepting sacrifices from them. For it has been taught: Of you, but not all of you, thus excluding an apostate. ‘Of you’, that is to say, among you [Israelites] is a distinction drawn but not among the gentiles. But are you correct in this? Perhaps this is the meaning [of the Baraitha]: As regards Israelites, you may accept sacrifices from the righteous but not from the wicked, but as regards gentiles you may not accept sacrifices from them at all? — You cannot entertain such a view, for it has been taught: [It would have sufficed had Scripture stated], a man, why does it state, ‘a man, a man? To include gentiles, that they may bring either votive or freewill-offerings like an Israelite. AND DEFILES BY CARRYING. Is not this obvious? Since it is nebelah [it follows that] it defiles by carrying! Raba answered: This is the interpretation. This animal defiles by carrying, but there is another [similar] case where the animal even defiles [men and utensils that are] in the same tent. Which is that? It is the case of an animal slaughtered as a sacrifice to idols. This then is in accordance with the view held by R. Judah b. Bathyra. Some report this statement as follows: Raba answered: This is the interpretation. This animal defiles by carrying, and there is another case which is similar to this one in that the animal [there too] only defiles by carrying but does not defile [men and utensils that are] in the same tent. Which is that? It is the case of an animal slaughtered as a sacrifice to idols. This then is not in agreement with R. Judah b. Bathyra. For it has been taught: R. Judah b. Bathyra said: Whence do we know that sacrifices unto idols defile [men and utensils that are] in the same tent? From the verse: They joined themselves also unto Baal-Peor and ate the sacrifices of the dead as a dead body defiles [men and utensils that are] in the same tent so also do sacrifices unto idols. MISHNAH. IF ONE SLAUGHTERED BY NIGHT, LIKEWISE IF A BLIND MAN SLAUGHTERED. THE SLAUGHTERING IS VALID. GEMARA. The expression ‘IF ONE SLAUGHTERED’ implies that the slaughtering is valid only after the act but it does not imply a right in the first instance. Now is not this contradicted [by the following statement]: At all times one may slaughter, by day or by night, and [in all places,] whether on the rooftop or on top of a ship? — R. Papa answered [that in the latter case] the man slaughters to the light of a torch. R. Ashi added. This is supported by the context, for in the latter case night and day are in juxtaposition, whereas in the Mishnah night and a blind man are in juxtaposition. This is conclusive.^ᶻ^ᵃᵃ^ᵃᵇ^ᵃᶜ^ᵃᵈ^ᵃᵉ^ᵃᶠ^ᵃᵍ^ᵃʰ^ᵃⁱ^ᵃʲ^ᵃᵏ^ᵃˡ^ᵃᵐ^ᵃⁿ^ᵃᵒ^ᵃᵖ

^ᶻnote:What is his view about the children?
^ᵃᵃnote:I.e., the law does not regard a gentile mill as a min.
^ᵃᵇnote:V. A.Z. 26a and b: Minim, betrayers and apostates may be endangered and need not be delivered from danger, whereas idolaters and Jewish shepherds of small cattle are not to be endangered, though one is not obliged to deliver them from danger. The expression ‘cast down into a pit’ is synonymous with ‘endangering life’.
^ᵃᶜnote:V. supra p. 19.
^ᵃᵈnote:Lev. I, 2.
^ᵃᵉnote:I.e., sacrifices may he accepted from all gentiles without exception.
^ᵃᶠnote:And so when the Baraitha states that no distinction is made among the gentiles it is entirely negative, i.e., on no account and in no circumstances may sacrifices be accepted from gentiles.
^ᵃᵍnote:Lev. XXII, 18. The verse, translated literally, reads: A man, a man of the children of Israel . . . that bringeth his offering etc. It is suggested that the repetition of ‘a man’ extends the law to include such persons other than those contemplated in the ordinary meaning of the verse; in this case, gentiles.
^ᵃʰnote:V. Num. XIX, 14: This is the law, when a man dieth in a tent, every one that cometh into the tent, and everything that is in the tent shall be unclean seven days. The rule laid down in this verse has been extended by the Rabbis to include a person or thing which is directly over (and thus forming a tent over) the unclean object.
^ᵃⁱnote:V. infra.
^ᵃʲnote:Ps. CVI, 28.
^ᵃᵏnote:In the dark.
^ᵃˡnote:And the reason is because it is to be feared that the slaughterer will not be able to ascertain whether he has sufficiently cut through the organs of the throat.
^ᵃᵐnote:This expression implies a right in the first instance to do so.
^ᵃⁿnote:Although we learnt (infra 41a) that one may not slaughter and allow the blood to run into the sea or vessel, lest it be said the slaughtering was an act of idolatrous worship to the deity of the sea, or that it was being collected for an idolatrous purpose, here, where the slaughtering is performed on the roof top and the blood collected in a vessel, there is no such apprehension, for it was collected in a vessel merely to avoid fouling the roof. Similarly where the blood is allowed to run into the sea from the top of the ship it is done merely to avoid fouling the top of the ship.
^ᵃᵒnote:Suggesting that the distinction is merely one of time but not necessarily that the slaughtering is done in the dark.
^ᵃᵖnote:Implying that the darkness of the night is intended, corresponding with the darkness of a blind man.