חולין 14 — Soncino English Talmud

¹MISHNAH. IF A MAN SLAUGHTERED ON THE SABBATH OR ON THE DAY OF ATONEMENT, NOTWITHSTANDING HE IS GUILTY AGAINST HIS OWN LIFE, THE SLAUGHTERING IS VALID. GEMARA. R. Huna said that Hiyya b. Rab in an exposition [on this Mishnah] said in the name of Rab that the animal was nevertheless forbidden to be eaten that same day. The colleagues thereupon suggested that [the reason for this decision was that] the view [expressed in the Mishnah] was that of R. Judah. Now where does R. Judah express such a view? — R. Abba said, in the matter of ‘Readiness’. For we have learnt: One may cut up [on the Sabbath] pumpkins for beasts or a carcass for dogs. R. Judah says. It is forbidden to do so if the animal was not dead on the eve of the Sabbath, for then it would not belong to that class of things set in readiness for the Sabbath. This therefore shows that since it was not set in readiness on the eve of the Sabbath [for that particular use] it is forbidden [to be so used on the Sabbath]; so, too, in the case of our Mishnah, since the animal was not set in readiness on the eve of the Sabbath [for food] it is forbidden [to be so used on the Sabbath]. Thereupon Abaye said to him: What a comparison! In the case quoted the animal was originally set in readiness to serve for human food but now it merely serves for dog's food, whereas in the case of our Mishnah the animal was originally set in readiness to serve for human food and now too it serves for human food! — [He replied.] You are assuming that a living animal is intended for food; in reality it is intended for breeding purposes. If so, why is it permitted, on this view of R. Judah, to slaughter an animal on a festival? — R. Abba then replied. The truth of the matter is that a living animal is intended both for breeding purposes and for food. If it is slaughtered, this act proves that it was intended originally to serve for food; if it is not slaughtered, it proves that it was intended originally for breeding purposes. But surely R. Judah does not hold bererah! Whence do we know this? Shall we say from the following [Baraitha] wherein it is taught: If a man bought wine from the Cutheans he may say. ‘Let two logs which I intend later to set aside be terumah, ten first tithe, nine second tithe’, and then, after redeeming [this latter tithe with money], he may drink it. This is the opinion of R. Meir. R. Judah. R. Jose and R. Simeon do not allow this? —^ᵃ^ᵇ^ᶜ^ᵈ^ᵉ^ᶠ^ᵍ^ʰ^ⁱ^ʲ^ᵏ^ˡ^ᵐ^ⁿ^ᵒ^ᵖ

^ᵃnote:For breaking the Sabbath the offender is put to death by stoning, cf. Exod. XXXI, 14-15 and Num. XV. 35; and for profaning the Day of Atonement he incurs the heavenly punishment of Kareth (v. Glos.) in accordance with Lev. XXIII, 30.
^ᵇnote:Even if he desires to eat it raw.
^ᶜnote:Heb. vbfv. The rule adopted by R. Judah is that such things which on the eve of the Sabbath were not set in readiness or intended for the purpose which they actually serve on the Sabbath are forbidden to be so used on the Sabbath. They are mukzeh (v. Glos.), set apart, not counted on for use. This rule is based on Ex. XVI, 5, and applies particularly to fruit which fell from the tree on the Sabbath and also to an animal slaughtered on the Sabbath. In these cases neither the fruit nor the animal can be said to have been set in readiness for food on the Sabbath since on the eve of the Sabbath the fruit was still on the tree and the animal was still alive; v. Bez. 2b.
^ᵈnote:Even though the animal died on the Sabbath.
^ᵉnote:Sc. to cut up the carcass.
^ᶠnote:Since on the eve of the Sabbath the animal was still alive and so was not set in readiness for food, it is forbidden to be so used (i.e., for food) on the Sabbath (Shab. 156b).
^ᵍnote:It should therefore be permitted on the Sabbath.
^ʰnote:Since the animal on the eve of the festival was kept for breeding purposes it is clearly mukzeh on the festival, and therefore forbidden. Nevertheless the law is established beyond all doubt that one may slaughter an animal on a festival.
^ⁱnote:At a time when it is permitted so to do.
^ʲnote:And so in the case of our Mishnah, since the animal was not slaughtered before the Sabbath, it is clear that the owner intended to keep it for breeding purposes, accordingly it is mukzeh and therefore forbidden to be eaten on the Sabbath.
^ᵏnote:Heb. vrhrc, retrospective designation, i.e., the legal effect resulting from an actual selection or disposal of things previously undefined as to their purpose. It is applied in our case thus: the purpose of a living animal is uncertain, but the subsequent use of the animal will define its purpose retrospectively. Unless we hold that the animal was definitely intended for food on the eve of the Festival it would be forbidden, according to R. Judah's view, to slaughter it and eat it on the Festival.
^ˡnote:Also called Samaritans. V. supra p. 5, n. 6. It was doubtful whether the Cutheans were wont to set aside the terumah (v. next note) and other dues or not, and therefore it was necessary when purchasing wine or other produce from them to set aside the various dues. The circumstances of this case are as follows: A man has bought 100 logs (a liquid measure) of wine from the Cutheans and has got no other vessels wherein to set aside the dues; or the case may be that it is the eve of Sabbath and there is not sufficient time wherein to set aside the dues before the Sabbath begins.
^ᵐnote:An offering to be given to the priest. The amount to be so given 15 not specified in the Torah but it was the general practice to offer two per cent of the produce. V. Glos.
^ⁿnote:This tithe had to be given to the Levite.
^ᵒnote:This tithe had to be consumed by the owner in Jerusalem. The Torah permits the redemption of this tithe with money, which money must be spent in Jerusalem; cf. Deut. XIV, 25. In the present case the circumstances do not prevent the owner from redeeming this tithe with some .money that he may possess.
^ᵖnote:It is assumed that the issue between these Rabbis relates to bererah. It must be remembered that the wine named as dues is not actually separate from the rest, and R. Meir, holding bererah, argues that when this purchaser subsequently sets aside the various dues, either after the Sabbath or when he acquires sufficient vessels, it is deemed that that which is now set aside is identical with that which was originally named, and there is no fear at all that this person has drunk any of the wine which was consecrated as dues. The other Rabbis, including R. Judah, apparently do not hold bererah, and therefore forbid this procedure on the ground that it is not established retrospectively that that which this person now separates as dues is identical with that which was previously named, and it is to be feared that he may have drunk of the wine consecrated as dues.

²[This case is quite different for] there the reasoning is expressly stated, viz., They said to R. Meir: Do you not agree that if the cask were to break the result would be that this person has from the outset been drinking untithed wine? To this [R. Meir] replied: When it breaks . . . ! Rather we can derive it, from the teaching of Ayyo. For Ayyo taught: R. Judah says that a person cannot conditionally reserve for himself two contingencies simultaneously. [He may declare that] if a Sage comes to the east his ‘erub at the east should serve him, and if to the west his ‘erub at the west should serve him; but on no account [may he make such conditions] in the event of two Sages coming one to this side and the other to that side. Now it was argued. Why is it that in the event of two Sages coming one to this side and the other to that side that he may not make conditions? It is, is it not, because bererah is not held? Then even in the event of the Sage coming [to one side only], either to the east or to — the west, he should not be allowed to make conditions. [for the very same reason] that bererah is not held? And R. Johanan had explained that [in the latter case] the Sage had already arrived. Rather said R. Joseph: It is the view of R. Judah expressed in the matter of ‘Vessels’. For we have learnt: Whatsoever vessels, which may be moved on the Sabbath, fragments thereof may likewise be moved on the Sabbath, provided they can perform aught in the nature of work, e.g., fragments of a kneading trough that can be used for stopping the bung-hole of a cask, or fragments of a glass for covering the mouth of a flask. R. Judah says: Provided they can perform aught in the nature of their former work, e.g., fragments of a kneading trough that can have porridge poured into them, or fragments of a glass that can have oil poured into them. Now according to R. Judah [they are permitted to be moved] only if they can perform aught in the nature of their former work, but not if they can perform aught in the nature of some other work. This, therefore, shows that since they were not set in readiness on the eve of the Sabbath for that particular work, it is forbidden [to use them for such purpose on the Sabbath]; so, too. In the case of our Mishnah, since the animal was not set in readiness on the eve of the Sabbath for food, it is forbidden [to be so used on the Sabbath]. Thereupon Abaye said to him: What a comparison! There we are dealing with something that was originally a vessel and is now a fragment of a vessel, which is a case of nolad and consequently forbidden; whereas here [in our Mishnah] we are dealing with something that was originally [intended for] food and now, too, is [intended for] food, it is therefore the same foodstuff merely more defined. And we have already ascertained that according to R. Judah, where the foodstuff is the same but more defined it is permitted. For we have learnt: One must not press fruit [on the Sabbath] in order to extract the juice, and even if the juice oozed out by itself it is forbidden. R. Judah says. If [the fruits were intended] to be eaten, the juice which oozed out is permitted, but if [they were kept only] for their juice, that which oozed out by itself is forbidden. [R. Joseph replied: But] has it not been stated in connection therewith: Rab Judah said in the name of Samuel that R. Judah accepts the opinion of the Rabbis in the case of baskets of olives and grapes? Now the reason for this is clear, namely, since these fruits are usually kept for pressing one would always be inclined to do so at all times. Similarly it must be said [here in the case of our Mishnah], since an animal is usually kept for slaughtering one would always be inclined to do so. — [Abaye replied]. Indeed, the whole argument is based upon Rab's original statement, is it not? And Rab has stated that R. Judah was in conflict with the Rabbis even in the case of baskets of olives and grapes! Rather said R. Shesheth b. Idi, It is the view of R. Judah expressed in the matter of ‘Lamps’. For it has been taught: A new lamp may be moved [on the Sabbath] from place to place but not an old one; so according to R. Judah. But perhaps we are to understand R. Judah's view only in case of mukzeh on account of nauseousness, but are we to understand that it applies also to cases of mukzeh in consequence of a ritual prohibition? — Yes, indeed, for it has been taught: R. Judah says,^ᵠ^ʳ^ˢ^ᵗ^ᵘ^ᵛ^ʷ^ˣ^ʸ^ᶻ^ᵃᵃ^ᵃᵇ^ᵃᶜ^ᵃᵈ^ᵃᵉ^ᵃᶠ^ᵃᵍ^ᵃʰ^ᵃⁱ^ᵃʲ^ᵃᵏ^ᵃˡ^ᵃᵐ^ᵃⁿ

^ᵠnote:And it is because of the possibility of such an event happening that R. Judah and his colleagues prohibit this procedure and not because they do not hold bererah.
^ʳnote:I.e., R. Meir regards such a possibility too remote to be taken into consideration.
^ˢnote:That R. Judah does not hold bererah.
^ᵗnote:This is explained anon.
^ᵘnote:According to Sabbath law no person is allowed to go on the Sabbath beyond two thousand cubits from the boundaries of his town. If, however, he desires to go further, he must make an ‘erub, i.e., he deposits on the eve of Sabbath some food, enough for two meals, at a spot at the limit of the prescribed two thousand cubits’ distance. This spot is regarded in law as his temporary abode and he may then go two thousand cubits beyond it. Having, however, gained two thousand cubits in one direction he forfeits his right of movement in any other direction outside the town boundaries. It is obvious that a person can make only one ‘erub and place it in that direction in which he intends to go. It is, however, provided for, in the event of a person being undecided as to which direction he will take on the Sabbath, that he may place a conditional ‘erub in each direction, and on the Sabbath when he makes his decision the ‘erub in the particular direction chosen will be effective.
^ᵛnote:In order that he be enabled to attend the lecture of the Sage on the Sabbath which will be held at some place more than two thousand cubits beyond the boundaries of his town.
^ʷnote:In the case of a conditional ‘erub recourse must be had to the principle of bererah. For when each ‘erub is placed, it is not known which is to be effective; it is only when the decision is made on the Sabbath that a particular ‘erub is determined retrospectively to be the one intended to be effective from the outset.
^ˣnote:The latter case therefore does not come within the purview of bererah since it is actually known and determined before the Sabbath which ‘erub is effective by the arrival of the Sage. All that remains is for this person to ascertain this fact. This Baraitha, however, clearly proves from the first clause that R. Judah does not hold bererah; hence the suggestion of R. Abba that the view in the Mishnah corresponds with that of R. Judah in the matter of ‘Readiness’ can no longer be maintained.
^ʸnote:In answer to the first question: Where does R. Judah express the view which accords with that of our Mishnah.
^ᶻnote:Even if the vessel was broken on the Sabbath.
^ᵃᵃnote:That they might still be regarded as vessels and not as potsherds.
^ᵃᵇnote:Heb, skub ‘born, created’. An object which is Produced, and only becomes available for a particular use, on a festival or on the Sabbath, may not be so used on that day.
^ᵃᶜnote:For it is established according to R. Judah that an animal while living is kept in order to be slaughtered and used as food, for otherwise it would be forbidden to slaughter an animal on the Festival.
^ᵃᵈnote:Lit., ‘broken off’, separated and distinct. Consequently the animal should be Permitted to be eaten even when slaughtered on the Sabbath.
^ᵃᵉnote:For it is not a case of nolad.
^ᵃᶠnote:Shab. 143b.
^ᵃᵍnote:It is a precautionary measure lest one will press the fruit deliberately for the sake of its juice on the Sabbath, which would constitute a breach of one of the main classes of work prohibited.
^ᵃʰnote:R. Judah does not regard the juice which oozed out of the fruit as nolad, i.e., something new issuing from the fruit, but as the fruit itself in a more particular and defined form.
^ᵃⁱnote:The statement which follows is a counter argument against Abaye, and it further attempts to show that the view of R. Judah in the Mishnah quoted corresponds with the view of our Mishnah.
^ᵃʲnote:For these fruits are usually kept for pressing, and it is only with such, other fruits as pomegranates and mulberries that R. Judah adopts a lenient view.
^ᵃᵏnote:And therefore the animal is forbidden to be eaten on the Sabbath for fear that one might deliberately slaughter it on the Sabbath.
^ᵃˡnote:In which case also, R. Judah maintains a lenient view. Accordingly a similar view should be adopted in our Mishnah; so that the original question remains open: Why, according to R. Judah, is the animal forbidden to be eaten on the Sabbath?
^ᵃᵐnote:A new earthenware lamp before being used for lighting might well be used for other purposes, but an old lamp having already had oil poured into it for lighting would rarely be used for another purpose — it would be nauseating to do so — and so would be regarded in law as mukzeh (set apart, not counted on for use), and consequently forbidden to be moved. This same reasoning applies to our Mishnah: since the animal was not slaughtered before the Sabbath it certainly was not counted on as food for the Sabbath; it is therefore mukzeh and forbidden to be eaten.
^ᵃⁿnote:As in the case of an old lamp which has been used for lighting. In the case of our Mishnah, however, the animal is mukzeh in consequence of a ritual prohibition.