חולין 13:1 — Soncino English Talmud

hut not [the mere expression of] his intention. — He replied. He certainly did not put the question in regard to the mere [expression of the] intention [of a minor]. What he asked was whether his intention could be inferred from his act. For example: there stood [an animal intended for] a burnt-offering on the south side [of the altar], and the minor brought it to the north side and slaughtered it there. Should we say that since he brought it to the north side and slaughtered it there [it is clear that] he had the proper intention, or should we rather say that he did not find a convenient place [in the south]? But has not R. Johanan already expressed his view in such a case? For we have learnt: If [a man] took his fruit up to the roof in order to keep it free from maggots and dew fell upon it, it does not come within the rule of ‘if water be put’. If, however, he had the Intention [that the dew should fall upon it] it comes within the rule of ‘if water be put’. If it was taken up by a deaf-mute, an imbecile or a minor, it does not come within the rule of ‘if water be put’, even though they had the intention [that the dew should fall upon it], because the law recognizes the act of a minor but not [mere] intention. And R. Johanan explained that this rule only applies where they did not turn the fruit over, but if they did turn the fruit over it comes within the rule of ‘if water be put’. The question [R. Johanan] put was this: Was this rule laid down by the Torah or only by the Rabbis? R. Nahman b. Isaac gives this version [of the foregoing argument]. R. Hiyya b. Abba said that R. Johanan put this question: Does the law recognize the act of a minor [as sufficient evidence of his expressed intention] or not? Said R. Ammi to R. Hiyya. He might as well have put the question in regard to the [expression of the] intention [of a minor]. Why did he not put the question in regard to the [expression of the] intention [of a minor]? Because we have learnt that the law does not recognize the [expression of the] intention of a minor [as sufficient evidence of his intention]; for the same reason he need not have put the question in regard to the act of a minor because we have learnt that the law recognizes the act of a minor [as sufficient evidence of his expressed intention]! — The question [R. Johanan] put was this: Is this rule laid down by the Torah or only by the Rabbis? — And [R. Johanan himself] solved [it]: The act of a minor [as sufficient evidence of his unexpressed intention] is recognized even by the Torah; [the mere expression of] his intention is not recognized even by the Rabbis; the [unexpressed] intention of the minor evidenced from his act is not recognized by the Torah but only by the Rabbis. Samuel put the following question to R. Huna: Whence do we know that an act performed incidentally in connection with sacrifices is invalid? — [He replied,] Because it is written: And he shall slaughter the bullock, thus teaching that the slaughtering should be intended for a bullock. Thereupon Samuel said: This we already know; but whence do we know that this rule is indispensable? — He replied: It is written: Ye shall slaughter it at your will, that is to say, slaughter it intentionally. MISHNAH. THAT WHICH IS SLAUGHTERED BY A GENTlle IS NEBELAH AND DEFILES BY CARRYING. GEMARA. It is nebelah only but it is not prohibited for all other purposes. Who is the authority for this view? — R. Hiyya b. Abba in the name of R. Johanan replied: It cannot be R. Eliezer, for were it R. Eliezer [it should also be prohibited for all other purposes] since he maintains that the thoughts of a gentile are usually directed towards idolatry. R. Ammi said that the Mishnah is to be interpreted thus: THAT WHICH IS SLAUGHTERED BY A GENTILE IS NEBELAH, but [that which is slaughtered] by a min is presumed to be intended for idolatry. We thus learnt here what our Rabbis have taught: That which is slaughtered by a min [is regarded as] intended for idolatry, his bread as the bread of Cutheans, his wine as wine used for idolatrous purposes, his scrolls of the Law as books of soothsayers, his fruit as tebel. Some add, even^ᵃ^ᵇ^ᶜ^ᵈ^ᵉ^ᶠ^ᵍ^ʰ^ⁱ^ʲ^ᵏ^ˡ^ᵐ^ⁿ^ᵒ^ᵖ^ᵠ^ʳ^ˢ^ᵗ^ᵘ^ᵛ^ʷ^ˣ^ʸ

^ᵃnote:I.e., where he did not express it.
^ᵇnote:In cases where the intention was unexpressed but the act was evidence thereof.
^ᶜnote:Sacrifices of the highest grade had to be slaughtered on the north side of the altar; v. Zeb, chap. V. Furthermore, every act in connection with any sacrifice had to be intended for the particular sacrifice.
^ᵈnote:So that the slaughtering of the animal may have been performed on the north side not because he knew that it was necessary to slaughter a burnt-offering there but because he found the place more convenient.
^ᵉnote:Maksh, VI, 1.
^ᶠnote:Lev. XI, 38. From this verse the law is derived that produce becomes susceptible to uncleanness only after it has been made wet by water or other liquids specified in Maksh. VI, 4. It is provided, however, that the owner must have applied the water to the produce intentionally, or, at least, that the presence of the water on the produce was acceptable to him. V. Maksh. I, 1.
^ᵍnote:I.e., the deaf-mute, the imbecile or the minor.
^ʰnote:Their turning over the fruit shows that they intended the dew to fall on the other side of the fruit too. It must be assumed, however, that they did not expressly state their Specific purpose, for if they did, it would not be necessary for R. Johanan to teach this, for it is obvious that their act is conclusive evidence of their expressed intention. Here is a clear case of an act which, though not conclusive, might well serve to indicate the minor's intention; yet R. Johanan ruled that the law was satisfied with such evidence of intention.
^ⁱnote:Viz., that the law recognizes the unexpressed intention of a minor where it can be inferred from his act.
^ʲnote:If the rule is Biblical then it would be applied in all cases, even where the effect of such application would produce a more lenient result; e.g., in the case of the burnt-offering mentioned above, the result of applying the rule would be to declare the sacrifice valid. If, however, the rule was only laid down by the Rabbis, it would only be applied in such cases where the effect of such application would produce a more stringent result; e.g, in the case of the fruit on the roof, the result of applying the rule would be to regard the fruit as susceptible to uncleanness.
^ᵏnote:And therefore the expression of his intention is ignored in all cases, even where the effect would produce a more stringent result.
^ˡnote:E.g., a person while handling a knife unintentionally slaughters a consecrated animal.
^ᵐnote:Lev. I, 5.
^ⁿnote:Lit., ‘that is in our hand’.
^ᵒnote:I.e., that if the proper intention was absent 1he sacrifice is invalid even after the act.
^ᵖnote:Lev. XIX, 5.
^ᵠnote:Since we have two verses each directing that the slaughtering of a consecrated animal must he accompanied by the proper intention the rule becomes indispensable, in accordance with the Rabbinic dictum: wherever Scripture repeats an injunction it is meant to be indispensable.
^ʳnote:Even though the slaughtering was performed according to ritual and in the presence of an Israelite, the animal is regarded as nebelah and may not he eaten; but also, like nebelah, it may be used for any other purpose.
^ˢnote:V. Glos.
^ᵗnote:V. Lev. XI, 40.
^ᵘnote:And it is established law that no use or benefit may he derived from anything connected with idolatrous worship.
^ᵛnote:Heb. ihn pl. ohbhn. A Jew or a gentile who is devoted to the worship of idols, or who acts as priest unto idols, V. Glos.
^ʷnote:The bread of Cutheans (i.e., Samaritans) was forbidden to be eaten. V. Sheb. VIII, 10: He who eats the bread of a Cuthean is as one who eats the flesh of swine.
^ˣnote:Which serve for idolatrous purposes. V. Git. 45b: A scroll of the Law written by a min must be destroyed by fire.
^ʸnote:Produce from which there have not yet been separated the tithes and the priestly dues, and which may not he eaten on penalty of death at the hands of Heaven.