Bava Metzia

'Raba, agreeing with R. Jonathan, interprets them on the basis of his views': 'The owner thereof being not with it, he shall surely make it good': this may imply that he is in his service either on both occasions or on one; in both cases he is free from responsibility. On the other hand, it is also written, 'But if the owner thereof be with it, he shall not make it good'; this too implies whether he is not with him on both occasions or only on one, he is liable. [Hence this contradiction is] to teach you: If he was with him at the time of the loan, he need not have been with him at the time of the injury or death; but though he were with him at the time of the injury or death he must also have been with him when the loan was made. But may I not reverse it? — It is logical that the time of the loan is stronger [in remitting liability], in that it brings it [the animal] into his possession. On the contrary, are not injury and death more likely [to cancel responsibility], since he then becomes [actually] liable for accidents? — Were there no loan, what would injury and death effect?  But if not for injury and death, what liability is imposed by borrowing?  — Even so, [the responsibility imposed by] borrowing is greater, since he thereby becomes responsible for his food. R. Ashi said: Scripture saith, 'And if a man borrow aught of his neighbour,' [implying, aught of his neighbour,] but not his neighbour with it [sc. the animal], then, 'he shall surely make it good:' hence, if his neighbour is with him [when he borrows], he is free from liability.  If so, what is the need of, 'the owner thereof being not with … But if the owner thereof be with it'?  — But for these, I should have thought that this [sc. aught of his neighbour] is the ordinary Scriptural idiom. Rami b. Hama propounded: What [is the law] if he borrows it in order to commit bestiality therewith? Must the loan be as people generally borrow, whereas people do not borrow for such a purpose?  Or perhaps the reason is because of the pleasure [he derives from the loan]: in which case here too he has pleasure?  What [again, is the law] if he borrows it for appearance's sake?  Is it necessary that something of monetary value shall be lent,  which [condition is fulfilled] here? Or perhaps, something of monetary value, by which he [the borrower] directly benefits, is required — which is not [the case here]? What if he borrows it for work worth less than a perutah: must there be monetary value, and there is some? Or perhaps less than a perutah is of no account? What if he borrows two cows for a perutah's value of work? Do we say, consider  the borrower and lender, and there is [monetary value]? Or perhaps, the criterion is [the work of] the cows, and in [that of] each there is none?  What if he borrows from partners, one of whom lends himself to him? Must all its owners [be in the bailee's service], which condition is absent here? Or perhaps, he after all bears no liability for his half?  What if partners borrow, and he [the animal's owner] lends himself to one of them? Must there be [a pledge of service] to all the borrowers, which, however, is absent here? Or perhaps, for that half [of the partnership] to which he is pledged there is no responsibility? What if he borrows from a woman, and her husband pledges his service? Or what if a woman borrows, and he [the owner] lends himself to her husband?  Is a title to usufruct as a title in the principal itself,  or is it not? Rabina asked R. Ashi: What if one says to his agent, 'Go and loan yourself [for service] on my account, together with my cow;' must there actually be its [sc. the bailment's] owner, which is absent here? Or perhaps, 'a man's agent is as himself;' hence the condition is fulfilled? — Said R. Aha, the son of R. Awia, to R. Ashi: As for the husband,  that is disputed by R. Johanan and Resh Lakish; with reference to an agent, that is disputed by R. Jonathan and R. Joshia. 'As for the husband, that is disputed by R. Johanan and Resh Lakish.' For it has been stated: If one sells his field to his neighbour for its usufruct, R. Johanan said: He must bring [the first fruits] and recite [the confession];  Resh Lakish maintained: He brings [the first fruits], but does not recite [the confession]. 'R. Johanan said: He must bring [the first fruits] and recite [the confession]' because he holds that a title to usufruct is equal to a title to the principal itself. 'Resh Lakish maintained: He brings [the first fruits] but does not recite,' — a title to usufruct is not as a title to the principal itself. 'With reference to an agent, that is disputed by R. Jonathan and R. Joshia.' For it has been taught: If one says to his epitropos,  'All vows which my wife may vow from now until I return from such a place, annul for her,' and he does so, I might think that they are annulled, therefore Scripture writes, Her husband may establish it, or her husband may make it void:  this is R. Joshia's view. R. Jonathan said: We find in the whole Torah that a man's agent is [legally] as himself. R. 'Ilish asked Raba: What [is the law] if one says to his slave, 'Go and loan yourself together with my cow'? The problem arises whether it be maintained that a man's agent is as himself or not. [Thus:] The problem arises on the view that a man's agent is as himself, for that may apply only to an agent who is subject to [Scriptural] commands, but not to a slave, who is not subject thereto.  Or, on the other hand, even on the view that a man's agent is not as himself, that may hold good of an [independent] agent, but as for a slave, 'the hand of a slave is as the hand of his master'?  — He replied: It is logical that 'the hand of a slave is as the hand of his master.' Rami b. Hama propounded: Does the husband rank as a borrower in his wife's property,