Bava Metzia

or as a hirer?  — Said Raba: His very subtlety has led him into error; what will you? If he ranks as a borrower, it is a loan when the owner is in his service; if a hirer, it is a hiring in similar circumstances?  — But when does Rami b. Hama's problem arise? If he hired a cow from her and then married her  — what [is the law] then? Does he rank as a borrower or as a hirer? Does he rank as a borrower, and so the [present] loan, when the owner is in his service,  abrogates hiring effected when the owner was not in his service? Or, perhaps, he ranks as a hirer, and the status of a hirer remains unchanged? But wherefore this differentiation? [If it is maintained that] should he rank as borrower, the borrowing effected when the owner is in his service cancels the hiring effected without the owner being engaged in his service, why not apply the same principle even if he is considered a hirer, and say that the [new] hiring effected with the owner in his service abrogates the [old] hiring effected without the owner's being in his service? — But when does Rami b. Hama's problem arise? E.g., if she hired a cow from a stranger  and then was married [not to the owner]. Now, on the view of the Rabbis, who maintain that the borrower must pay the hirer, there is no problem, for it is certainly a case of a loan plus the owner's service. Where the problem arises is on the view of R. Jose, who ruled, the cow must be returned to its first owner. [Hence the question,] what [is the law] then? Does he rank as a borrower or as a hirer?  — Said Raba: The husband ranks neither as a borrower nor as a hirer, but as a purchaser.  This follows from the dictum of R. Jose son of R. Hanina. For R. Jose son of R. Hanina said: In Usha it was enacted:  If a woman sells of her 'property of plucking' in her husband's lifetime, and then dies, her husband [as her heir] can claim it from the purchaser. Rami b. Hama propounded: When the husband [obtains the privilege of usufruct] in his wife's property [which belonged to hekdesh], who is liable to a trespass offering?  Raba [thereupon] observed: Who then should be liable to a trespass offering? The husband? He is willing to acquire a right in what is permitted, but not in what is forbidden! The wife?  But she [herself] does not [particularly] wish him [the husband] to acquire even what is permitted!  The Beth din?  When did the Rabbis enact that the husband ranks as a purchaser, only in respect of what is permitted, not in respect of what is forbidden! — But, said Raba, the husband is liable to a trespass offering when he actually expends it, just as in general, when one withdraws money of hekdesh [and converts it] into hullin. The scholars propounded: What if it [the borrowed animal] became emaciated through its work?  Said one of the Rabbis, R. Helkiah the son of R. Awia by name:  Then it follows that if it died through the work, he is certainly responsible. But let him say to him [the lender], 'I did not borrow for exhibition in a show case!'  — But, said Raba, not only is it unnecessary to state that if it became emaciated through work he is not responsible, but even if it died through work, he is still not liable, because he can say, 'I did not borrow it that it should stand in a showcase.' A man once borrowed an axe from his neighbour, and it broke. When he came before Raba, he said to him, 'Go and bring witnesses that you did not put it to foreign use, and you are free from liability.' But what if there are no witnesses? — Come and hear: For a man once borrowed an axe from his neighbour, and it broke. When he came before Rab, he said to him, 'Go and return him a good axe.' Said R. Kahana and R. Assi to Rab: