Bava Kamma

But was it not [elsewhere] taught: 'In the case of a dog or goat jumping [and doing damage], whether in a downward or upward direction, there is exemption'?  — R. Papa thereupon interpreted the latter ruling  to refer to cases where the acts done by the animals were the reverse of their respective natural tendencies: e.g, the dog [jumped] by leaping and the goat by climbing. If so, why [complete] exemption?  — The exemption indeed is only from full compensation while there still remains liability for half damages. IF A DOG TAKES HOLD etc. It was stated: R. Johanan said: Fire [involves liability] on account of the human agency that brings it about.  Resh Lakish, however, maintained that Fire is chattel.  Why did Resh Lakish differ from R. Johanan? — His contention is: Human agency must emerge directly from human force whereas Fire does not emerge from human force.  Why, on the other hand, did not R. Johanan agree with Resh Lakish?  — He may say: Chattel contains tangible properties, whereas Fire  has no tangible properties. We have learnt:  IF A DOG TAKES HOLD OF A CAKE [TO WHICH LIVE COALS WERE STUCK] AND GOES [WITH IT] TO A BARN, CONSUMES THE CAKE AND SETS THE BARN ALIGHT, [THE OWNER] PAYS FULL COMPENSATION FOR THE CAKE, WHEREAS FOR THE BARN [HE] PAYS [ONLY] HALF DAMAGES. This decision accords well with the view that the liability for Fire is on account of the human agency that caused it; in the case of the dog, there is thus some liability upon the owner of the dog as the fire there was caused by the action of the dog.  But according to the principle that Fire is chattel, [why indeed should the owner of the dog be liable?] Could the fire be said to be the chattel of the owner of the dog? — Resh Lakish may reply: The Mishnaic ruling deals with a case where the burning coal was thrown by the dog [upon the barn]: full compensation must of course be made for the cake,  but only half will be paid for the damage done to the actual spot upon which the coal had originally been thrown,  whereas for the barn as a whole there is exemption altogether.  R. Johanan, however, maintains that the ruling refers to a dog actually placing the coal upon the barn: For the cake  as well as for the damage done to the spot upon which the coal had originally been placed the compensation must be in full,  whereas for the barn as a whole only half damages will be paid. Come and hear: A camel laden with flax passes through a public thoroughfare. The flax enters a shop, catches fire by coming in contact with the shopkeeper's candle and sets alight the whole building. The owner of the camel is then liable. If, however, the shopkeeper left his candle outside [his shop], he is liable. R. Judah says: In the case of a Chanucah candle  the shopkeeper would always be quit.  Now this accords well with the view that Fire implies human agency: the agency of the camel could thus be traced in the setting alight of the whole building. But according to the view that Fire is chattel, [why should the owner of the camel be liable?] Was the fire in this case the chattel of the owner of the camel? — Resh Lakish may reply that the camel in this case [passed along the entire building and] set every bit of it on fire.  If so, read the concluding clause: If, however, the shopkeeper left his candle outside [his shop] he is liable. Now, if the camel set the whole of the building on fire, why indeed should the shopkeeper be liable? — The camel in this case stood still [all of a sudden].  But [it is immediately objected] if the camel stood still and yet managed to set fire to every bit of the building, is it not still more fitting that the shopkeeper should be free but the owner of the camel fully liable?  — R. Huna b. Manoah in the name of R. Ika [thereupon] said: The rulings apply to [a case where the camel] stood still to pass water;