Bava Kamma

that in other respects a pit dug on one's own site is not subject to the law of Pit, but the case before us here is based on a different principle, since the defendant is entitled to plead [in reply to the plaintiff]: 'You had no right at all to spread out your fruits so near to the public ground as to involve me in liability through my cattle consuming them.' Samuel on the other hand could similarly contend: In other respects a pit dug on one's own site may be subject to the law of Pit, for it may be reasonable in the case of a pit for a plaintiff to plead that the pit may have been totally overlooked [by the animals that unwittingly fell in]. But in the case of fruits [spread out on private ground], is it possible to plead with reason that they may have been overlooked? Surely they must have been seen. May it not be suggested that the case of an animal 'turning its head [to the sideways]' is a point at issue between the following Tannaitic authorities? For it has been taught: In the case of an animal [unlawfully] consuming [the plaintiff's fruits] on the market, the payment will be [only] to the extent of the benefit; [but when the fruits had been placed] on the sideways of the market, the payment would be assessed for the damage done by the animal. This is the view of R. Meir and R. Judah. But R. Jose and R. Eleazar say: It is by no means usual for an animal to consume [fruits], Only to walk [there]. Now, is not R. Jose merely expressing the view already expressed by the first-mentioned Tannaitic authorities,  unless the case of an animal 'turning its head [to the sideways]' was the point at issue between them, so that the first-mentioned Tannaitic authorities  maintained that in the case of an animal 'turning its head [to the sideways]' the payment will still be fixed to the extent of the benefit it had derived, whereas R. Jose would maintain that the payment will be in accordance with the actual damage done by it?  — No; all may agree that in the case of an animal 'turning its head [to the sideways]' the law may prevail either in accordance with Rab or in accordance with Samuel; the Point at issue, however, between the Tannaitic authorities here [in the Baraitha] may have been as to the qualifying force of in another man's field.  The first Tannaitic authorities  maintain that the clause, And it [shall] feed in another man's field, is meant to exclude liability for damage done on public ground, whereas the succeeding authorities  are of the opinion that the clause And it [shall] feed in another man's field exempts [liability only for damage done to fruits which had been spread on] the defendant's domain.  On the defendant's domain! Is it not obvious that the defendant may plead: What right had your fruit to be on my ground?  — But the point at issue [between the authorities mentioned in the Baraitha] will therefore be in reference to the cases dealt With [above]  by Ilfa  and by R. Oshaia. MISHNAH. IF A DOG OR A GOAT JUMPS DOWN FROM THE TOP OF A ROOF AND BREAKS UTENSILS [ON THE PLAINTIFF'S GROUND] THE COMPENSATION MUST BE IN FULL, FOR ANY OF THEM IS CONSIDERED MU'AD IN RESPECT OF THAT DAMAGE].  IF [HOWEVER] A DOG TAKES HOLD OF A CAKE [WITH LIVE COALS STICKING TO IT] AND GOES [WITH IT] TO A BARN, CONSUMES THE CAKE AND SETS THE BARN ON FIRE, [THE OWNER OF THE DOG] PAYS FULL COMPENSATION FOR THE CAKE,  WHEREAS FOR THE BARN [HE] PAYS [ONLY] HALF DAMAGES. GEMARA. The reason of [the liability in the commencing clause] is that the dog or goat has jumped [from the roof],  but were it to have fallen down  [from the roof and thus broken utensils] there would be exemption. It can thus be inferred that the authority here accepted the view that the inception of [potential] negligence resulting in [mere] accident carries exemption. It has been explicitly taught to the same effect: 'If a dog or goat jumps down from the top of a roof and breaks utensils [on the plaintiff's ground] the compensation must be in full; were it, however, to have fallen down  [and thus broken the utensils] there would be exemption.' This ruling seems to be in accord with the view that where there is negligence at the beginning  but the actual damage results from [mere] accident  there is exemption,  but how could the ruling be explained according to the view that upholds liability? — The ruling may refer to a case where the utensils had, for example, been placed very near to the wall so that were the animal to have jumped it would by jumping have missed them altogether; in which case there was not even negligence at the beginning. R. Zebid in the name of Raba, however, said: There are certain circumstances where there will be liability even in the case of [the animal] falling down. This might come to pass when the wall had not been in good condition.  Still what was the negligence there? It could hardly be that the owner should have borne in mind the possibility of bricks falling down  [and doing damage], for since after all it was not bricks that came down but the animal that fell down, why should it not be subject to the law applicable to a case where the damage which might have been done by negligence at the inception actually resulted from accident?  — No, it has application where the wall of the railing was exceedingly narrow. Our Rabbis taught: In the case of a dog or goat jumping [and doing damage], if it was in an upward direction  there is exemption;  but if in a downward direction there is liability.  In case, however, of man or poultry jumping [and doing damage], whether in a downward or upward direction, there is liability.