Bava Kamma

[so that] in the commencing clause the owner of the camel is liable, for he should not have overloaded [his camel],  but in the concluding clause the shopkeeper is liable for leaving his candle outside [his shop]. Come and hear: In the case of a barn being set on fire, where a goat was bound to it and a slave [being loose] was near by it, and all were burnt, there is liability [for barn and goat].  In the case, however, of the slave being chained to it and the goat  near by it and all being burnt, there is exemption [for barn and goat].  Now this is in accordance with the view maintaining the liability for Fire to be based upon human agency: there is therefore exemption here [since capital punishment is attached to that agency].  But, according to the view that Fire is chattel, why should there be exemption? Would there be exemption also in the case of cattle killing a slave?  — R. Simeon b. Lakish may reply to you that the exemption refers to a case where the fire was actually put upon the body of the slave  so that no other but the major punishment is inflicted.  If so, [is it not obvious?] Why state it at all? — No; it has application [in the case] where the goat belonged to one person and the slave to another. Come and hear: In the case of fire being entrusted to a deaf-mute, an idiot or a minor  [and damage resulting], no action can be instituted in civil courts, but there is liability  according to divine justice.  This again is perfectly consistent with the view maintaining that Fire implies human agency, and as the agency in this case is the action of the deaf mute [there is no liability]; but according to the [other] view that Fire is chattel, [why exemption?] Would there similarly be exemption in the case of any other chattel being entrusted to a deaf-mute, an idiot, or a minor?  — Behold, the following has already been stated in connection therewith:  Resh Lakish said in the name of Hezekiah that the ruling  applies only to a case where it was a [flickering] coal that had been handed over to [the deaf-mute] who fanned it into flame, whereas In the case of a [ready] flame having been handed over there is liability on the ground that the instrument of damage has been fully prepared. R. Johanan, on the other hand, stated that even in the case of a ready flame there is exemption, maintaining that it was only the handling by  the deaf-mute that caused [the damage]; there could therefore be no liability unless chopped wood, chips and actual fire were [carelessly] given him. Raba said: [Both] Scripture and a Baraitha support [the View of] R. Johanan. 'Scripture': For it is written, If fire break out;  'break out' implies 'of itself' and yet [Scripture continues], He that kindled the fire  shall surely make restitution.  It could thus be inferred that Fire implies human agency. 'A Baraitha': For it was taught. The verse,  though commencing with damage