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כתובות 95
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a tirpa [authorizing distraint on property sold] after the first of Iyar?' 'They', he replied, 'might tell you: You [are holding a deed] that was written on the first of Nisan'. What means of redress [can he have recourse to]? — They write out authorizations to one another. MISHNAH. IF A MAN WHO WAS MARRIED TO TWO WIVES SOLD HIS FIELD, AND THE FIRST WIFE HAD GIVEN A WRITTEN DECLARATION TO THE BUYER, 'I HAVE NO CLAIM WHATSOEVER UPON YOU', THE SECOND WIFE MAY DISTRAIN ON THE BUYER, AND THE FIRST WIFE ON THE SECOND, AND THE BUYER ON THE FIRST WIFE, AND SO THEY GO ON IN TURN UNTIL THEY ARRANGE SOME COMPROMISE BETWEEN THEM, THE SAME LAW APPLIES ALSO TO A CREDITOR AND TO A WOMAN CREDITOR, GEMARA. What matters it even if she HAD GIVEN him A WRITTEN DECLARATION? Has it not been a man says to another, 'I have no claim whatsoever on this field, I have no concern in it and I entirely dissociate myself from it', his statement is of no effect? — Here we are dealing with a case where a kinyan was executed. But even if kinyan had been executed, what is the use? Could she not say, 'I merely wished to oblige my husband'? Have we not, in fact, learned: If a man bought [a married woman's property] from her husband and then bought it also from the wife, his purchase is legally invalid. Does not this show clearly that the woman can plead, 'I merely wished to oblige my husband'? R. Zera replied in the name of R. Hisda: This is no difficulty. One ruling is that of R. Meir and the other is that of R. Judah. For it was taught: [If a husband] drew up a deed for the buyer [of a field of his wife], and she did not endorse it, [and then he drew up a deed] for another buyer [of a field of hers] and that she did endorse, she loses thereby [her claim to] her kethubah,' so R. Meir. R. Judah, however, said: She may plead, 'I merely meant to oblige my husband; what [claim] can you have against me?' As to Rabbi, however, would he allow the anonymous Mishnah here to represent the view of R. Meir and the anonymous Mishnah there to represent the view of R. Judah? R. Papa replied: [Our Mishnah deals] with the case of a divorced woman, and it represents the opinion of all. R. Ashi replied: Both Mishnahs represent the views of R. Meir, for R. Meir maintains his view only there where two buyers are concerned, since in such a case she may well be told, 'If you wished to oblige. you should have done so in the case of the first buyer', but where Only one buyer [is concerned]. even R. Meir admits [that the sale is invalid]. while our Mishnah [refers to a case] where [the husband had first] written out a deed for another buyer. Elsewhere we learned: Payment cannot be recovered from mortgaged property where free assets are available, even if they are only of the poorest quality. The question was raised: If the free assets were blasted may the mortgaged property be distrained on? — Come and hear: [If a husband] drew up a deed for the buyer [of a field of his wife] and she did not endorse it [and then he drew up a deed] for another buyer [of a field of hers] and that she did endorse, she loses thereby [her claim to] her kethubah,' so R. Meir. Now, if it could be imagined that where the free assets were blasted the mortgaged property may be distrained on [the difficulty would arise:] Granted that she lost [her right to recover] her kethubah from the second buyer, why should she not be entitled to recover it, at any rate, from the first buyer? — Said R. Nahman b. Isaac: The meaning of 'she loses' is that she loses [her right to recover her due] from the second buyer. Said Raba: Two objections may be raised against this explanation: In the first place [it may be pointed out] that [the expression of] 'she loses' implies total loss. And, furthermore, it was taught: If a man borrowed from one person and sold his property to two others, and the creditor gave a written declaration to the second buyer, 'I have no claim whatever upon you', [this creditor] has no claim whatever upon the first buyer, since the latter can tell him, 'I have left you a source from which to recover your debt'! — There, [it may be argued that] it was he who had deliberately caused the loss to himself. Said R. Yemar to R. Ashi:
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This, Surely, is the regular practice [of the courts of law]? For did not a man once pledge a vineyard to his friend for ten years but it aged after five years, and [when the creditor] came to the Rabbis they wrote out a tirpa for him? — There also it was they who caused the loss to themselves. For, having been aware that it may happen that a Vineyard should age, they should not have bought [any of the debtor's pledged land]. The law, however, is that where free assets are blasted, mortgaged property may be distrained on. Abaye ruled: [If a man said to a woman] 'My estate shall be yours and after you [it shall be given] to So-and-so', and then the woman married, her husband has the Status of a vendee and her successor has no legal claim in face of her husband. In agreement with whose view [was Abaye's ruling laid down]? In agreement with the following Tanna. For it has been taught: [If one man said to another,] 'My estate shall be yours and after you [it shall be given] to So-and-so' and the first recipient went down [into the estate] and sold it, the second may reclaim the estate from those who bought it; so Rabbi. R. Simeon b. Gamaliel ruled: The second may receive only that which the first has left. But could Abaye have laid down such a ruling? Did not Abaye in fact, Say, 'Who is a cunning rogue? He who counsels to sell an estate in accordance with the ruling of R. Simeon b. Gamaliel? — Did he Say, 'She may marry'? All he said was, 'The woman married'. Abaye further stated: [If a man said to a woman.] 'My estate shall be yours and after you [it shall be given] to So-and-so' and the woman sold [the estate] and died, her husband may seize It from the buyer, the woman's successor [may seize it] from the husband, and the buyer from the successor, and all the estate is confirmed in the possession of the buyer. But why should this case be different from the following where we learned: AND SO THEY GO ON IN TURN UNTIL THEY ARRANGE SOME COMPROMISE BETWEEN THEM? — There they are all suffering some loss but here it is only the buyer who suffers the loss. Rafram went to R. Ashi and recited this argument to him: Could Abaye have laid down such a ruling? Did he not, in fact, lay down: [If a man said to a woman.] 'My estate shall be yours and after you [it shall be given] to So-and-so', and then the woman married, her husband has the status of a vendee, and her successor has no legal claim in face of her husband? — The other replied: There [it is a woman] to whom he spoke while she was feme sole, but here [we are dealing with one] to whom he spoke when she was married. For it is this that he meant to tell her? 'Your successor only shall acquire Possession; your husband shall not'. THE SAME LAW APPLIES ALSO TO A CREDITOR. A Tanna taught: The same law applies to a creditor and two buyers and also to a woman, who was a creditor, and two buyers. MISHNAH. A WIDOW IS TO BE MAINTAINED OUT OF THE ESTATE OF [HER DECEASED HUSBAND'S] ORPHANS [AND] HER HANDIWORK BELONGS TO THEM. IT IS NOT THEIR DUTY, HOWEVER, TO BURY HER; IT IS THE DUTY OF HER HEIRS, EVEN THOSE WHO INHERIT HER KETHUBAH, TO BURY HER. GEMARA. The question was asked: Have we learnt, 'is to be maintained' or 'one who is maintained'? Have we learned, 'is to be maintained', in agreement with the men of Galilee, so that there is no way [by which the orphans] can avoid maintaining her; or have we rather learned 'one who is maintained', in agreement with the men of Judaea, so that [the orphans,] if they wish it, need not maintain her?
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