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כתובות 94
Soncino English Talmud · Berean Standard Bible
[Their dispute relates to a case,] for instance, where It was found that one of the fields did not belong to him, their point of difference being the question [of the legality of the action] of a creditor of a later date who forestalled [one of an earlier date] and distrained [on the debtor's property]. The first Tanna holds that such distraint has no legal validity, and Ben Nannus holds that whatever he distrained on is legally his, R. Nahman in the name of Rabbah b. Abbuha replied: Both agree that the distraint [of a creditor of a later date] has no legal validity, but here they differ on the question whether provision is to be made against the possibility that [the fourth woman might] allow the ground to deteriorate. One Master is of the opinion that provision is to be made against the possibility that she might allow the ground to deteriorate, and the other Master is of the opinion that no provision need be made against such a possibility. Abaye replied: The difference between them is the ruling of Abaye the Elder who stated: The 'orphans' spoken of are grown-ups and there is no need to say that minors [are included]. The first Tanna does not hold the view of Abaye the Elder while Ben Nannus upholds it. R. Huna stated: If two brothers or two partners had a lawsuit against a third party and one of them went with that person to law, the other cannot say to him, 'You are not my party' because [the one who went to law] acted on his behalf also. R. Nahman once visited Sura and was asked what the law was in such a case. He replied: This is [a case that has been stated in] our Mishnah: THE FIRST MUST TAKE AN OATH [IN ORDER TO GIVE SATISFACTION] TO THE SECOND, THE SECOND TO THE THIRD AND THE THIRD TO THE FOURTH, but it was not stated, 'the first to the third'. Now, what could be the reason? Obviously because [the second] has acted on her behalf also. But are [the two cases] alike? In the latter, an oath for one person is the same as an oath for a hundred, but in this case he might well plead, 'Had I been present I would have submitted more convincing arguments'. This, however, applies only when he was not In town [when the action was tried] but if he was in town [his plea is disregarded, since if he had any valid arguments] he ought to have come. It was stated: If two deeds bearing the same date [are presented in court, the property in question], Rab ruled, should be divided [between the two claimants], and Samuel ruled: [The case is to be decided at] the discretion of the judges. Must it be assumed that Rab follows the view Of R. Meir who holds that the signatures of the witnesses make [a Get] effective,
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and that Samuel follows the view of R. Eleazar who holds that the witnesses to the delivery [Of a Get] make it effective? — No, all follow the view of R. Eleazar, but it is the following Principle on which they differ here. Rab is of the opinion that a division [between the claimants] is preferable and Samuel holds that [leaving the decision to] the discretion Of the judges is prefer. able. But can you maintain that Rab follows the view Of R. Eleazar? Surely, Rab Judah stated in the name of Rab, 'The halachah is in agreement with R. Eleazar in matters Of divorce' [and he added.] 'When I mentioned this in Samuel's presence he said: "Also in the case of other deeds". Does not this then imply that Rab is of the opinion that in the case Of deeds [the halachah is] not [in agreement with R. Eleazar]?' Clearly. Rab follows the view Of R. Meir and Samuel that of R. Eleazar. An objection was raised: 'If two deeds bearing the same date [are produced in court, the property In question] is to be divided. Is not this an objection against Samuel? — Samuel can answer you: This represents the view of R. Meir but I follow the view of R. Eleazar. But if this represents the view of R. Meir, read the final clause: 'If he wrote [a deed] for one man [and then he wrote a deed for,] and delivered it to another man, the one to whom he delivered [the deed] acquires legal possession'. Now if [this represents the view of] R. Meir why does he acquire possession? Did he not, in fact, lay down that the signatures of the witnesses make [a Get] effective? — This [is a question which is also in dispute between] Tannaim. For it was taught: And the Sages say [that the money] must be divided, while here it was ruled that the trustee shall use his own discretion. The mother of Rami b. Hama gave her property in writing to Rami b. Hama in the morning, but in the evening she gave it in writing to Mar 'Ukba b. Hama. Rami b. Hama came before R. Shesheth who confirmed him in the possession of the property. Mar 'Ukba then appeared before R. Nahman who Similarly confirmed him in the possession of the property. R. Shesheth, thereupon, came to R. Nahman and said to him, 'What is the reason that the Master has acted in this way?' 'And what is the reason', the other retorted, 'that the Master has acted in that way?' 'Because', the former replied, '[Rami's deed was written] first', 'Are we then', the other retorted, 'living in Jerusalem where the hours are inserted [in deeds]?' 'Then why [the former asked] did the Master act in this way?' '[I treated it,] the other retorted, [as a case to be decided] at the discretion of the judges'. 'I too'' the first said, '[treated the case as one to be decided at] the discretion of the judges', 'In the first place' the other retorted, 'I am a judge and the Master is no judge, and furthermore, you did not at first come with this argument', Two deeds [of sale] were once presented before R. Joseph, one being dated, 'On the fifth of Nisan', and the other was vaguely dated, 'In Nisan'. R. Joseph confirmed the [holder of the deed which had the entry,] 'fifth of Nisan' in the possession of the property. 'And I', said the other, 'must lose?' 'You', he replied, 'are at a disadvantage, since it may be suggested that your deed was one that was written on the twenty-ninth of Nisan' 'Will, then, the Master', the other asked, 'write for me
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