Bava Kamma — Daf 103a

אין כופין את המוכר למכור זימנא אחריתי ואם אמר לו על מנת כופין את המוכר למכור

אמר מר הלוקח שדה בשם חבירו אין כופין את המוכר למכור זימנא אחריתי פשיטא מהו דתימא מצי א"ל מידע ידעת דאנא לנפשאי שקילנא ופנחיא בעלמא הוא דקבעינא וזוזי בכדי לא שדינא אלא אדעתא דכתב ליה שטרא אחרינא קא משמע לן דאמר ליה עניינא עבדי לך בהדי ההוא דזבנת ליה בשמיה ויכתוב לך שטרא אחרינא

ואם אמר לו על מנת כופין את המוכר למכור פשיטא לא צריכא דאמר להו לסהדי קמיה דידיה חזו דשטרא אחרינא קא בעינא מהו דתימא מצי א"ל אמינא שטרא מהיאך דקא שקלת בשמיה קאמרת קא משמע לן דאמר ליה להכי טרחי ואמרי להו לעדים קמך דמינך הוא דקא בעינא

רב כהנא יהב זוזא אכיתנא לסוף אייקר כיתנא זבניה מרוותיה דכיתנא אתא לקמיה דרב א"ל מה אעביד איזיל אישקיל זוזאי א"ל אי כי קא זבני אמרי האי כיתנא דכהנא הוא זיל שקול ואי לא לא תשקול

כמאן כבני מערבא דאמרי מי הודיעו לבעל חטין שיקנה חטין לבעל מעות

אטו מי יהיב רב כהנא ארבע ושקיל תמני כיתנא ממילא הוא דאייקר מיגזל גזלוה ותנן כל הגזלנין משלמין כשעת הגזלה

אמרי התם אמנה הואי ולא משכיה רב כהנא לכיתנא ורב לטעמיה דאמר רב עושין אמנה בפירות ואין עושין אמנה בדמים:

מתני׳ הגוזל את חבירו שוה פרוטה ונשבע לו יוליכנו אחריו למדי לא יתן לא לבנו ולא לשלוחו אבל נותן לשליח בית דין ואם מת יחזיר ליורשיו

נתן לו את הקרן ולא נתן לו את החומש מחל לו על הקרן ולא מחל לו על החומש מחל לו על זה ועל זה חוץ מפחות שוה פרוטה בקרן אינו צריך לילך אחריו נתן לו את החומש ולא נתן לו את הקרן מחל לו על החומש ולא מחל לו על הקרן מחל לו על זה ועל זה חוץ משוה פרוטה בקרן צריך לילך אחריו

נתן לו את הקרן ונשבע לו על החומש

[such as] the Exilarch  he cannot compel the vendor to sell it to him again. But if when buying it he explicitly made this stipulation he could compel the vendor to sell it to him again.  The Master stated: 'If one man buys a field in the name of another [such as] the Exilarch, he cannot compel the vendor to sell it to him again'. But is this not quite obvious? — You might, however, have said that the vendee could argue: 'You very well knew that I was taking the field for myself, and that [in buying it in the name of the other person] I merely wanted protection, and as I was surely not prepared to throw away money for nothing I undoubtedly made the purchase on the understanding that a new deed should be drawn up for me [by you].' It is therefore made known to us that the vendor can retort to him: 'It is for you to make arrangements with the person in whose name you bought the field that he should draw up for you a new title deed.' 'But if when buying it he explicitly made this stipulation he could compel the vendor to sell it to him again.' But is this not obvious? — No, it is required to meet the case where the vendee said to the witnesses in the presence of the vendor: 'You see that I want another deed.' You might in this case think that the vendor could say to him: 'I thought that you referred to a deed to be drawn up by the one in whose name you bought the field'; it is therefore made known to us that the vendee can reply to him: 'It was for that purpose that I took the trouble and stated to the witnesses in your own presence, [to show] that it was from you that I wanted the other deed.' R. Kahana transmitted some money for the purchase of flax. But as flax subsequently went up in price, the owners of the flax sold it [on his behalf]. He thereupon came before Rab and said to him: What shall I do? May I go and accept the purchase money?  — He replied to him: If when they sold it they stated that it was Kahana's flax, you may go and receive the money,  but if not you may not accept it.  But was this ruling made in accordance with the view of the Western scholars who asked: 'Who was it that informed the vendor of the wheat so that he might transfer the ownership of his wheat to the owner of the money?  [But what comparison is there?] Had R. Kahana given four to receive eight [so that it were usury]? Was it not his flax  which had by itself gone up in price and which was definitely misappropriated [by the vendors],  and regarding this we have learnt that 'All kinds of robbers have to pay in accordance with the value at the time of the robbery'?  — It may, however, be said that there it was a case of advance payment.  and R. Kahana had never pulled the flax [to acquire title to it],  and Rab was following his own reasoning, for Rab [elsewhere] stated: Advance payment  [at present prices] may be made for [the future delivery of] products,  but no advance payment [at present prices] may be made [if the value of the products will subsequently be paid] in actual money  [in lieu of them]. MISHNAH. IF ONE MAN ROBBED ANOTHER TO THE EXTENT OF A PERUTAH  AND TOOK [NEVERTHELESS] AN OATH  [THAT HE DID NOT DO SO], HE WOULD HAVE TO CONVEY IT PERSONALLY TO HIM  [EVEN AS FAR AS] TO MEDIA.  HE MAY GIVE IT NEITHER TO HIS SON NOR TO HIS AGENT, THOUGH HE MAY GIVE IT TO THE SHERIFF OF THE COURT OF LAW. IF THE PLAINTIFF DIED, THE ROBBER WOULD HAVE TO RESTORE IT TO THE HEIRS. IF HE REFUNDED TO HIM THE PRINCIPAL BUT DID NOT PAY HIM THE [ADDITIONAL] FIFTH,  OR IF THE OTHER EXCUSED HIM THE PRINCIPAL THOUGH NOT THE FIFTH, OR EXCUSED HIM BOTH ONE AND THE OTHER, WITH THE EXCEPTION, HOWEVER, OF LESS THAN THE VALUE OF A PERUTAH ON ACCOUNT OF THE PRINCIPAL, HE WOULD NOT HAVE TO GO AFTER HIM.  IF, HOWEVER, HE PAID HIM THE FIFTH BUT DID NOT REFUND THE PRINCIPAL, OR WHERE THE OTHER EXCUSED HIM THE FIFTH BUT NOT THE PRINCIPAL, OR EVEN WHERE HE REMITTED HIM BOTH ONE AND THE OTHER, WITH THE EXCEPTION, HOWEVER, OF THE VALUE OF A PERUTAH ON ACCOUNT OF THE PRINCIPAL, HE WOULD HAVE TO CONVEY IT PERSONALLY TO HIM.  IF HE REFUNDED TO HIM THE PRINCIPAL AND TOOK AN OATH  REGARDING THE FIFTH,