Bava Kamma — Daf 102b

ליקח לו חטין ולקח מהם שעורין שעורין ולקח מהם חטין תניא חדא אם פחתו פחתו לו ואם הותירו הותירו לו ותני חדא אם פחתו פחתו לו ואם הותירו הותירו לאמצע

אמר רבי יוחנן לא קשיא הא ר"מ והא רבי יהודה

הא ר"מ דאמר שינוי קונה והא רבי יהודה דאמר שינוי אינו קונה

מתקיף לה ר' אלעזר ממאי דלמא עד כאן לא קאמר ר"מ אלא במידי דחזי ליה לגופיה אבל לסחורה לא אמר

אלא א"ר אלעזר הא והא ר' מאיר ולא קשיא כאן לאכילה כאן לסחורה

מחכו עלה במערבא לר' יוחנן אליבא דר' יהודה וכי מי הודיעו לבעל חטין שיקנה חטין לבעל מעות מתקיף לה רב שמואל בר ססרטי אי הכי אפילו חטין וחטין נמי לא

אמר רבי אבהו שאני חטין וחטין דשליחותיה קא עביד וכי בעל הבית דמי

תדע דתנן אחד המקדיש נכסיו ואחד המעריך את עצמו אין לו בכסות אשתו ולא בכסות בניו ולא בצבע שצבע לשמן ולא בסנדלים חדשים שלקחן לשמן

ואמאי לימא הכא נמי מי הודיעו לצבע שיקנה צבעו לאשה אלא לאו משום דאמרינן [דשליחותיה קא עביד וכיד אשתו דמי הכא נמי] שליחותיה קא עביד וכיד בעה"ב דמי

א"ר אבא לא כל המקדיש נכסיו אין דעתו על כסות אשתו ובניו

מתקיף לה רבי זירא וכי דעתו של אדם על תפיליו ותנן המקדיש נכסיו מעלין לו תפילין א"ל אביי אין דעתו של אדם על תפילין המקדיש נכסיו סבר מצוה קא עבידנא ואין דעתו של אדם על כסות אשתו ובניו משום איבה

מתקיף לה רב אושעיא והלא חייבי ערכין שנו כאן ותנן חייבי ערכין ממשכנין אותן

וכי דעתו של אדם על עצמו למשכנו

אלא אמר רבי אבא כל המקדיש נכסיו נעשה כמי שהקנה להן כסות אשתו ובניו מעיקרא

תנו רבנן הלוקח שדה בשם חבירו אין כופין אותו למכור ואם אמר לו על מנת כופין אותו למכור

מאי קאמר אמר רב ששת ה"ק הלוקח שדה מחבירו בשם ריש גלותא אין כופין אותו ריש גלותא למכור ואם אמר על מנת כופין את ריש גלותא למכור

אמר מר הלוקח שדה בשם ריש גלותא אין כופין אותו ריש גלותא למכור מכלל דמקנא קניא ליה לימא פליגא דבני מערבא דאמרי וכי מי הודיעו לבעל חטין שיקנה חטין לבעל הבית

אי משום הא לא קשיא כגון דאודעיה לבעל שדה ואודעינהו לסהדי

אלא אימא סיפא על מנת כופין אותו ריש גלותא למכור אמאי ולימא ריש גלותא לא יקרייכו בעינא ולא זילותייכו בעינא

אלא אמר אביי ה"ק הלוקח שדה בשם חבירו (ריש גלותא)

to buy wheats and he bought with it barley, or barley and he bought with it wheat,  it was taught in one Baraitha that 'if there was a loss, the loss would be sustained by him,  and so also if there was a profit, the profit would be enjoyed by him,'  but in another Baraitha it was taught that 'if there was a loss, he would sustain the loss, but if there was a profit, the profit would be divided between them.'  [Why this difference of opinion?] — Said R. Johanan: There is no difficulty, as one  was in accordance with R. Meir and the other with R. Judah; the former was in accordance with R. Meir who said  that a change transfers ownership,  whereas the latter was in accordance with R. Judah who said  that a change does not transfer ownership.  R. Eleazar demurred: Whence [can you know this]? May it not be perhaps that R. Meir meant his view to apply only to a matter which was intended to be used by the owner personally,  but in regard to matters of merchandise  he would not say so?  — R. Eleazar therefore said that one as well as the other [Baraitha] might be in accordance with R. Meir, and there would still be no difficulty as the former dealt with a case where the grain was bought for domestic food,  whereas in the latter  it was bought for merchandise.  Moreover, in the West they were even amused  at the statement of R. Johanan regarding the view of R. Judah.  for [they said] who was it that informed the vendor of the wheat so that he might transfer the ownership of the wheat to the owner of the money?  R. Samuel b. Sasarti demurred: If so, why not also say the same even in the case where wheat [was wanted by the principal] and wheat [was bought by the agent]?  — R. Abbahu however said: The case where wheat [was wanted] and wheat [was bought] is different, as in this case the agent was acting for the principal upon the terms of his mandate and it is the same [in law] as if the principal himself had done it.  This could even be proved from what we have learnt: Neither in the case of one who has declared his possessions consecrated nor in the case of one who has dedicated the valuation of himself  can the Temple treasurer claim either the garments of the wife or the garments of the children  or the articles which were dyed for them or the new foot-wear bought for them.  Now, why not ask here also: Who informed the dyer that he was transferring the ownership of his dye to the wife?  But must we not then answer that since the husband was acting on behalf of his wife it is considered as if this was done by the actual hand of the wife? [If so,] also there as the agent was acting upon a mandate  it is considered as if the purchase of the wheat had been done by the actual hand of the principal. R. Abba, however, said: No; it was because when a man declares his possessions sacred, he has no intention to include the garments of his wife and children.  R. Zera demurred: Could it be said that in such circumstances a man would include in his mind even his Tefillin,  and we have nevertheless learnt that 'in the case of one who declares his possessions sacred, even his Tefillin would have to be included in the estimate'?  — Abaye, however, said to him: Yes, it is quite possible that a man may in his mind include even his Tefillin, as he who declares his possessions consecrated surely thinks that he is performing a commandment,  but no man would in his mind include the garments of his wife and children as this would create ill feeling.  R. Oshaia demurred: Was this not stated here as applying also to liabilities for vows of value, regarding which case we have learnt that those who have incurred liabilities for vows of value can be forced to give a pledge,  though it could hardly be said that it was in the mind of a man that the giving of a pledge should be enforced upon himself? — R. Abba therefore said: One who declares his possessions consecrated is regarded as having from the very beginning transferred the ownership of the garments of his wife and children to them. Our Rabbis taught: If one man buys a field in the name of another, he cannot compel the latter to sell it to him; but if he explicitly made this stipulation with the vendor he could force him to sell. What does this mean? Said R. Shesheth: What is meant is this: If one man buys a field from another in the name of the Exilarch,  he cannot subsequently force the Exilarch to sell it to him,  but if [when buying it] he explicitly made this stipulation  he could compel the Exilarch to sell it. The Master stated: 'If one buys a field in the name of the Exilarch, he cannot subsequently force the Exilarch to sell it', thus implying that he  would surely acquire title to it.  Shall we say that this differs from the view of the scholars of the West  who stated: Who indeed informed the vendor of the wheat so that he may transfer the ownership of the wheat to the owner of the money? — As far as that goes there would be no difficulty, as this could hold good where e.g., the vendee made this known to the owner of the field and also informed the witnesses [who signed the deed] about it. Read, however, the concluding clause: '[But if when buying it he explicitly made] this stipulation  he cold compel the Exilarch to sell it.'  But why should it be so? Why should the Exilarch not be entitled to say: 'I want neither your compliments  nor your insults.'  Abaye therefore said: what was meant was this: If one buys a field in the name of another