Yevamot

— Rather, said Raba, it means a married woman. Similarly when Rabin came  he stated in the name of R. Johanan: A married woman. But why should this  be described as 'a lighter prohibition'? — Because [her husband] who causes her to be prohibited [to other men] does not cause her to be so prohibited during the whole of his lifetime. It  was taught likewise: Abba Hanan stated in the name of R. Eleazar: [It means] a married man. [And the argument runs thus:] If where a man cohabits with [a woman forbidden by] a lighter prohibition,  in which case he  who caused the prohibition of her does not cause her to be prohibited during the whole of his lifetime,  [it is nevertheless ruled] that the very person who causes the prohibition becomes prohibited,  then, in a case of cohabiting with [one forbidden] by a graver prohibition,  where the person, who causes the prohibition of her,  prohibits her during the whole of her lifetime,  how much more should we rule that the very person who causes the prohibition should become prohibited;  hence it was expressly stated, With her,  only cohabition  with her  causes her to be prohibited  but cohabitation  with her sister does not cause her  to be prohibited. R. JOSE STATED: WHOSOEVER DISQUALIFIES etc. What does R. Jose mean?  If it be suggested that while the first Tanna implied that 'Where a man's wife and his brother-in-law  went to a country beyond the sea,  the wife of his brother- in-law is forbidden,  though his own wife is permitted',  R. Jose said to him, 'As his own wife is permitted  so is the wife of his brother-in-law also permitted';  if so, [it may be objected, why the expression] WHOSOEVER DOES NOT DISQUALIFY FOR OTHERS DOES NOT DISQUALIFY FOR HIMSELF  where it should have been. 'Whosoever does not disqualify  for himself, does not disqualify for others'! If, however, [it be suggested that R. Jose implied]. 'As the wife of his brother-in-law is forbidden,  so is his wife also forbidden',  [the expression,] WHOSOEVER DISQUALIFIES would be satisfactorily explained; what, however, would be the purport of WHOSOEVER DOES NOT DISQUALIFY?  — R. Ammi replied: [He  refers] to an earlier clause:  'If she married with the authorization of the Beth din, she must leave, but is exempt from an offering. If she married, however, without the authorization of the Beth din, she must leave and is also liable to an offering, the authorization of the Beth din is thus more effective in that it exempts her from the offering.  Concerning this, the first Tanna stated [that his wife may return to him]  'irrespective of whether [the marriage  took place] on the evidence of two witnesses,  where the wife of his brother-in-law is permitted,  or whether [it took place] in accordance with a decision of the Beth din,  where the wife of his brother-in- law is forbidden',  and [to this] R. Jose replied. '[If the marriage took place] in accordance with a decision of the Beth din,  where he DISQUALIFIES FOR OTHERS  he DISQUALIFIES FOR HIMSELF;  [if, however, it took place] on the basis of the evidence of two witnesses,  where he DOES NOT DISQUALIFY FOR OTHERS  he DOES NOT DISQUALIFY FOR HIMSELF. R. Isaac Nappaha replied: [R. Jose may], in fact, refer to the latter clause,  one  [of his rulings applying] where [the persons who] had gone [were] the man's wife  and his brother-in-law. and the other [applying] where his betrothed and brother-in-law had gone. The first Tanna having ruled that 'irrespective of whether it was his wife and his brother-in-law or whether it was his betrothed and his brother-in-law, the wife of his brother-in-law is forbidden  while his wife is permitted,'  R. Jose said to him, 'In the case of his wife and brother-in-law where no one would assume that he had attached some condition to his marriage  and where consequently he does not cause [his sister-in-law] to be prohibited to the other,  he does not cause [his first wife] to be prohibited to him either; in the case of his betrothed and his brother-in-law, however, where someone might assume that he had attached some condition to his betrothal  and where, in consequence, he causes [his sister- in-law] to be prohibited to the other,  he causes [his first wife] also to be prohibited to him. Rab Judah Stated in the name of Samuel: The halachah is in agreement with R. Jose. R. Joseph demurred: Could Samuel have said this?  Surely it was stated: A yebamah,  Rab said, has the status of a married woman; and Samuel said: She has not the status of a married woman. And R. Huna said: Where, for instance, a man's brother betrothed a woman  and then went to a country beyond the sea, and he,  on hearing that his brother was dead, married his wife. [It is in such a case] that Rab ruled that 'she has the status of a married woman' and is consequently forbidden to the brother-inlaw;  and Samuel ruled that 'she has not the status of a married woman' and is, therefore, permitted to him!  Said Abaye to him:  Whence [do you infer] that when Samuel stated that 'the halachah is in agreement with R. Jose', he was referring to R. Isaac Nappaha's interpretation? Is it not possible that he was referring to that of R. Ammi!  And even if he refers to that of R. Isaac Nappaha, whence the proof that [he referred to the ruling] 'DISQUALIFIED'?