Yevamot

on what grounds do the Rabbis declare the man liable?  If it be suggested: Because he  is believed; surely [here it may be objected], even in the case of two witnesses, who in all other cases are trusted though the accused contradicts them, the Rabbis have exempted him!  The reason  must consequently be  because the accused remained silent, and silence is regarded as admission! [The fact], however, [is that this  is arrived at] by  a logical inference, this case being analogous to that of a piece of fat  concerning which there is doubt as to whether it was of the forbidden,  or of the permitted kind; if a single witness came and declared, 'l am certain that it was permitted fat', he is trusted.  Are [the two cases] similar? There  the prohibition  was not established; here  the prohibition of a married woman is established,  and no question of sexual relationship [may be decided on the evidence of] less than two witnesses! This  is rather analogous  to the case of a piece that was definitely forbidden fat;  if a single witness came and declared, 'I am certain that it was permitted fat,' he is not believed.  But are these cases, similar? In that case,  should even a hundred witnesses come they would not be believed; in this case,  however, since should two witnesses come they would be trusted, one witness also should be trusted! This  is rather analogous to the cases of tebel,  and consecrated and konam  objects. Whose tebel  is here to be understood? If his own,  [he would naturally be trusted] since it is in his power to make it fit for use;  if, however, it is that of another person, [the question may still be urged], what view is here adopted: If it is maintained that a man who sets apart priestly dues for his neighbours' produce out of his own does not require the owner s consent [it is quite obvious why the witness is here trusted] since it is in his power to make it fit for use;  and if it is maintained that the owner's consent is required and that the witness declares, 'I know that he has made it fit for use', whence is this very law  derived? As regards consecrated objects also, if it was a consecration of the value of an object [it is obvious why one witness is trusted] since it is in his power to redeem it;  but if an object has been consecrated,  [the objection may still be raised]: If it were his own  [he would naturally be trusted] since it is within his right to ask for the disallowance of his vow;  if, however, it belonged to another man, and the witness declared, 'I know that its owner has asked for the disallowance of his vow', whence is this very law  derived? With reference to konam  objects also, if it is maintained that the law of trespass  is applicable to konam objects and that the sanctity of their value  descends upon them [it is obvious why one witness is trusted] since it is within his power to redeem them;  and if it is maintained that the law of trespass  is not applicable to konam objects  and that it is only a mere prohibition with which he is saddled  [the question may be urged]: If any such object was his own [it is natural that he should be trusted] since it is within his power to ask for the disallowance of his vow;  if, however, it belonged to another man, and the witness declared, 'I know that its owner has asked for the disallowance of his vow, whence is this very law  derived? R. Zera replied:  Owing to the rigidity of the disabilities  that were later  imposed upon her the law was relaxed in her favour at the beginning.  Let there be, however, neither rigid disabilities nor a relaxation of the law! — In order [to avoid] perpetual desertion  the Rabbis have relaxed the law in her favour. MUST … LEAVE THE ONE AS WELL AS THE OTHER etc. Rab stated: This was taught only in respect [of a woman] who married on the evidence of a single witness, but if she married on the strength of the evidence of two witnesses, she need not leave.  In the West  they laughed at him. 'Her husband' [they remarked] comes, and there he stands, and you say: She need not leave!' — This  [it may be replied] was required only in the case when the man  was not known.  If he  is unknown, why is she to leave [her second husband] even where she only married on the evidence of a single witness? This is required only in the case where two witnesses came and stated, 'We were with him  from the moment he left until now, but you it is who are unable to recognize him';  as it is written, And Joseph knew his brethren but they knew him not,  on which R. Hisda remarked: This teaches that he went forth without any marks  of a beard and now he appeared with a full  beard. But, after all, there are two  against two