Yevamot — Daf 88a

מ"ט קא מחייבי רבנן אילימא משום דמהימן והא תרי בעלמא דאע"ג דקא מכחיש להו אינהו מהימני וקא פטרי רבנן אלא לאו משום דאישתיק ושתיקה כהודאה דמיא

אלא סברא היא מידי דהוה אחתיכה ספק של חלב ספק של שומן ואתא עד אחד ואמר ברי לי דשומן הוא דמהימן

מי דמי התם לא איתחזק איסורא הכא איתחזק איסורא דאשת איש ואין דבר שבערוה פחות משנים

הא לא דמיא אלא לחתיכה דודאי חלב ואתא עד אחד ואמר ברי לי דשומן הוה דלא מהימן מי דמי התם אפי' אתו בי מאה לא מהימני הכא כיון דכי אתו בי תרי מהימני חד נמי להימניה מידי דהוה אטבל הקדש וקונמות

האי טבל היכי דמי אי דידיה משום דבידו לתקנו אלא דאחר מאי קסבר

אי קא סבר תורם משלו על של חברו אינו צריך דעת בעלים משום דבידו לתקנו ואי קסבר צריך דעת בעלים ואמר אנא ידענא ביה דמתקן היא גופה מנלן

הקדש נמי אי קדושת דמים משום דבידו לפדותו אי קדושת הגוף אי דידיה משום דבידו לאיתשולי עליה אלא דאחר ואמר ידענא ביה דאיתשיל מריה עליה היא גופה מנלן

קונמות נמי אי קסבר יש מעילה בקונמות וקדושת דמים נחתא להו משום דבידו לפדותו ואי קסבר אין מעילה בקונמות ואיסור בעלמא הוא דרכיב להו אכתפיה אי דידיה משום דבידו לאיתשולי עליה

אלא דאחר ואמר אנא ידענא דאיתשיל מריה עליה היא גופה מנלן

אמר ר' זירא מתוך חומר שהחמרת עליה בסופה הקלת עליה בתחלה לא ליחמיר ולא ליקיל

משום עיגונא אקילו בה רבנן:

תצא מזה ומזה וכו': אמר רב לא שנו אלא שניסת בעד אחד אבל ניסת על פי שני עדים לא תצא מחכו עליה במערבא אתא גברא וקאי ואת אמרת לא תצא לא צריכא דלא ידעינן ליה

אי דלא ידעינן ליה בעד אחד אמאי תצא לא צריכא דאתו בי תרי ואמרי אנן הוינן בהדיה מכי נפק ועד השתא ואתון הוא דלא ידעיתו ליה דכתיב (בראשית מב, ח) ויכר יוסף את אחיו והם לא הכירוהו ואמר רב חסדא מלמד שיצא בלא חתימת זקן ובא בחתימת זקן

סוף סוף תרי ותרי נינהו

on what grounds do the Rabbis declare the man liable?  If it be suggested: Because he  is believed; surely [here it may be objected], even in the case of two witnesses, who in all other cases are trusted though the accused contradicts them, the Rabbis have exempted him!  The reason  must consequently be  because the accused remained silent, and silence is regarded as admission! [The fact], however, [is that this  is arrived at] by  a logical inference, this case being analogous to that of a piece of fat  concerning which there is doubt as to whether it was of the forbidden,  or of the permitted kind; if a single witness came and declared, 'l am certain that it was permitted fat', he is trusted.  Are [the two cases] similar? There  the prohibition  was not established; here  the prohibition of a married woman is established,  and no question of sexual relationship [may be decided on the evidence of] less than two witnesses! This  is rather analogous  to the case of a piece that was definitely forbidden fat;  if a single witness came and declared, 'I am certain that it was permitted fat,' he is not believed.  But are these cases, similar? In that case,  should even a hundred witnesses come they would not be believed; in this case,  however, since should two witnesses come they would be trusted, one witness also should be trusted! This  is rather analogous to the cases of tebel,  and consecrated and konam  objects. Whose tebel  is here to be understood? If his own,  [he would naturally be trusted] since it is in his power to make it fit for use;  if, however, it is that of another person, [the question may still be urged], what view is here adopted: If it is maintained that a man who sets apart priestly dues for his neighbours' produce out of his own does not require the owner s consent [it is quite obvious why the witness is here trusted] since it is in his power to make it fit for use;  and if it is maintained that the owner's consent is required and that the witness declares, 'I know that he has made it fit for use', whence is this very law  derived? As regards consecrated objects also, if it was a consecration of the value of an object [it is obvious why one witness is trusted] since it is in his power to redeem it;  but if an object has been consecrated,  [the objection may still be raised]: If it were his own  [he would naturally be trusted] since it is within his right to ask for the disallowance of his vow;  if, however, it belonged to another man, and the witness declared, 'I know that its owner has asked for the disallowance of his vow', whence is this very law  derived? With reference to konam  objects also, if it is maintained that the law of trespass  is applicable to konam objects and that the sanctity of their value  descends upon them [it is obvious why one witness is trusted] since it is within his power to redeem them;  and if it is maintained that the law of trespass  is not applicable to konam objects  and that it is only a mere prohibition with which he is saddled  [the question may be urged]: If any such object was his own [it is natural that he should be trusted] since it is within his power to ask for the disallowance of his vow;  if, however, it belonged to another man, and the witness declared, 'I know that its owner has asked for the disallowance of his vow, whence is this very law  derived? R. Zera replied:  Owing to the rigidity of the disabilities  that were later  imposed upon her the law was relaxed in her favour at the beginning.  Let there be, however, neither rigid disabilities nor a relaxation of the law! — In order [to avoid] perpetual desertion  the Rabbis have relaxed the law in her favour. MUST … LEAVE THE ONE AS WELL AS THE OTHER etc. Rab stated: This was taught only in respect [of a woman] who married on the evidence of a single witness, but if she married on the strength of the evidence of two witnesses, she need not leave.  In the West  they laughed at him. 'Her husband' [they remarked] comes, and there he stands, and you say: She need not leave!' — This  [it may be replied] was required only in the case when the man  was not known.  If he  is unknown, why is she to leave [her second husband] even where she only married on the evidence of a single witness? This is required only in the case where two witnesses came and stated, 'We were with him  from the moment he left until now, but you it is who are unable to recognize him';  as it is written, And Joseph knew his brethren but they knew him not,  on which R. Hisda remarked: This teaches that he went forth without any marks  of a beard and now he appeared with a full  beard. But, after all, there are two  against two