1What is the point at issue between them? -R. Jose's view with regard to a comprehensive prohibition. R. Hiyya is of the opinion that in the case of a comprehensive prohibition R. Jose deems the transgressor guilty of two offences, while Bar Kappara is of the opinion that he deems him guilty of one offence only. But what comprehensive prohibition. is here involved? In the case of a common man this may well be understood, since at first he was permitted to do ordinary work though forbidden to perform the Temple service, and when Sabbath came in, as he was now forbidden to do any other work, so he was also forbidden to perform the Temple service. [Similarly with a priest] who had a blemish, since he was at first permitted to eat [of sacrificial meat] though forbidden to perform the Temple service, now that he became defiled, as he was forbidden to eat of sacrificial meat so he was also forbidden to perform the Temple service. Mehkah. however, is only an illustration of prohibitions that set in simultaneously but not of a comprehensive prohibition! -Rather, the point at issue between them is that of simultaneous prohibitions' and R. Jose's view regarding them. R. Hiyya is of the opinion that in the case of simultaneous prohibitions R. Jose deems the transgressor guilty of two offences, while Bar Kappara is of the opinion that he deems him guilty of one offence only. But how are here simultaneous prohibitions possible? — In the case of a common man who performed the Temple service on the Sabbath, when, for instance, he grew two hairs on the Sabbath, so that the prohibitions of Temple service by a common man and of work on the Sabbath have simultaneously arisen. [In the case of a priest] who had a blemish, also, when, for instance, he grew two hairs, while he was unclean, so that [his disability as] a man with a blemish and his uncleanness have simultaneously arisen. Or else, if a man cut his finger with an unclean knife. Now according to [the statement of] R. Hiyya it is quite possible to explain that he was taught in accordance with the view of R. Jose, and that Bar Kappara was taught in accordance with the view of R. Simeon. According to [the statement of] Bar Kappara, however, did R. Hiyya swear falsely? -Rather, the question at issue between them is that of simultaneous prohibitions, and the view of R. Simeon on the subject. One can well understand why R. Hiyya took an oath. He did it in order to weaken the force of R. Simeon s view. What need, however, was there for Bar Kappara to take an oath? — This is a difficulty. Now according to [the statement of] Bar Kappara. it is possible to explain that when Rabbi taught him he was enunciating the opinion of R. Simeon, and that when he taught R. Hiyya he was enunciating the opinion of R. Jose. According to [the statement] of R. Hiyya. however, did Bar Kappara tell a lie? R. Hiyya can answer you: When Rabbi taught him, he taught him two instances only where the transgressor is exempt,ᵃᵇᶜᵈᵉᶠᵍʰⁱʲᵏˡᵐⁿᵒᵖᵠʳˢᵗᵘᵛʷˣʸᶻᵃᵃᵃᵇᵃᶜᵃᵈᵃᵉᵃᶠᵃᵍᵃʰᵃⁱᵃʲᵃᵏᵃˡᵃᵐᵃⁿᵃᵒᵃᵖᵃᵠᵃʳᵃˢᵃᵗ
2and [thereby he, in fact.] taught him the law of comprehensive prohibition in accordance with the view of R. Simeon. Bar Kappara. however, considered the case of a common man who ate melikah and, as it seemed to be similar to the others, he treated it like the others. When, later, he examined it and found it to be possible only as a case of simultaneity of prohibitions. he imagined that as this one is a case of simultaneity so are also the others cases of simultaneity; and as the others are cases where the transgressor is exempt so [he assumed] is this also one in which the transgressor is exempt. An objection was raised: If a common man performed some Temple service on the Sabbath, or if a priest having a blemish performed Temple service while he was levitically unclean, the offences of service by a common man and the desecration of the Sabbath or those of service by a man with a blemish and levitical uncleanness are here respectively involved. These are the words of R. Jose. R. Simeon who said: Only the offence of service by a common man or that of service by a man with a blemish respectively is here involved. [The case of] melikah, however, is here omitted. Now, on account of whom was it omitted? If it be suggested. on account of R. Jose [it may be retorted]. if R. Jose subjects one to two penalties where the prohibition is comprehensive, how much more so when it is simultaneous. Consequently It must have been on account of R. Simeon who thus grants exemption only where the prohibition is comprehensive but imposes both penalties when the prohibitions are simultaneous — This, then, is a refutation against Bar Kappara! This is indeed a refutation. 'If a common man performed some Temple service on the Sabbath'. Of what nature? If slaughtering, slaughtering is permitted by a common man. If reception or carriage. this involves only a mere movement. If burning, surely R. Jose said, 'The prohibition of kindling a fire [on the Sabbath] was mentioned separately in order to [indicate that its transgression is] a prohibition only'! — R. Aha b. Jacob replied: The slaughtering of the bullock of the High Priest, and in accordance with the view of him who stated that the slaughtering of the bullock of the High priest on the Day of Atonement by a common man is invalid. If so, what reason is there for mentioning a common man? Even a common priest would have been equally forbidden! — What was meant was one who is a common man as far as it is concerned. R. Ashi demurred: Was any mention made of sin-offerings or of negative precepts? Surely, only forbidden acts were spoken of! — The point at issue is whether he is to be buried among confirmed sinners. MISHNAH. IF TWO MEN BETROTHED TWO WOMEN, AND AS THESE WERE ENTERING INTO THE BRIDAL CHAMBER, THEY EXCHANGED THE ONE FOR THE OTHER, BEHOLD, THEY ARE GUILTY OF AN OFFENCE AGAINST A MARRIED WOMAN. IF THEY WERE BROTHERS THEY ARE GUILTY ALSO OF AN OFFENCE AGAINST A BROTHER'S WIFE. IF [THE BETROTHED WOMEN] WERE SISTERS, THEY ARE GUILTY ALSO ON ACCOUNT OF THE PROHIBITION, [AND THOU SHALT NOT TAKE] A WOMAN TO HER SISTER. IF THESE WERE MENSTRUANTS [THEY ARE GUILTY ALSO] ON ACCOUNT OF [THE LAW OF THE] MENSTRUANT. THEY MUST BE KEPT APART FOR THREE MONTHS, SINCE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THEY ARE PREGNANT. IF THEY WERE MINORS INCAPABLE OF BEARING CHILDREN, THEY MAY BE RESTORED AT ONCE. IF THEY WERE PRIESTLY WOMEN THEY ARE DISQUALIFIED FROM THE PRIESTHOOD. GEMARA. THEY EXCHANGED? Are we discussing wicked men! Furthermore, [there is the difficulty] of the statement made by R. Hiyya, that sixteen sin-offerings are here [involved]. Is any sacrifice brought where the act was wilful? Rab Judah replied: Read THEY WERE EXCHANGED. This may also be proved by logical reasoning. For in the latter clause it was stated, IF THEY WERE MINORS INCAPABLE OF BEARING CHILDREN THEY MAY BE RESTORED AT ONCE. Now, if the act had been willful, would [this have been] permitted! — This is no difficulty. The seduction of a minor is deemed to be an outrage, and an outraged woman is permitted to an Israelite. But, then, what of that which is stated, that THEY MUST BE KEPT APART FOR THREE MONTHS, SINCE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THEY ARE PREGNANT, implying that if they were not pregnant they would be permitted. Now if the act had been wilful would she be permitted! Consequently the reading must have been THEY WERE EXCHANGED. This may be taken as proved. ᵃᵘᵃᵛᵃʷᵃˣᵃʸᵃᶻᵇᵃᵇᵇᵇᶜᵇᵈᵇᵉᵇᶠᵇᵍᵇʰᵇⁱᵇʲᵇᵏᵇˡᵇᵐᵇⁿᵇᵒᵇᵖᵇᵠᵇʳᵇˢᵇᵗᵇᵘᵇᵛᵇʷᵇˣᵇʸᵇᶻᶜᵃᶜᵇᶜᶜᶜᵈᶜᵉᶜᶠᶜᵍᶜʰᶜⁱᶜʲᶜᵏᶜˡᶜᵐᶜⁿᶜᵒᶜᵖᶜᵠᶜʳᶜˢᶜᵗᶜᵘᶜᵛᶜʷ