1and partially pulled down. Well, let the assumption be made! — Had he first contracted the levirate marriage and then participated in the halizah, no objection could be raised — The preventive measure, however, has been enacted against the possibility of his participating in the halizah first and contracting the levirate marriage afterwards and thus placing himself under the prohibition of That doth not build up, the All Merciful having said, 'Since he had not built he must never again build'. Raba said: If he gave a letter of divorce in respect of his ma'amar, her rival is permitted; but she herself is forbidden, because she might be mistaken for one who is the holder of a letter of divorce. Others say that Raba said: If he gave a letter of divorce in respect of his ma'amar even she herself becomes permitted. What is the reason? — Because what he has done to her he has taken back. MISHNAH. IF TWO BROTHERS WERE MARRIED TO TWO SISTERS, AND ONE OF THE BROTHERS DIED, AND AFTERWARDS THE WIFE OF THE SECOND BROTHER DIED, BEHOLD, SHE IS FORBIDDEN TO HIM FOREVER, SINCE SHE WAS FORBIDDEN TO HIM FOR ONE MOMENT. GEMARA. Is not this obvious? If there, where she was not entirely excluded from that house it has been said, 'No', how much more so here where the widow is completely excluded from that house! -The Tanna had taught first this, while the other was regarded by him as a permissible case, and so he permitted it — Later, however, he came to regard it as a case that was to be forbidden; and, as it was dear to him he placed it first; while our Mishnah was allowed to remain in its original form. Our Rabbis learned: If he had intercourse with her, he is guilty on account of both 'his brother's wife' and 'his wife's sister'; so R. Jose. R. Simeon said: He is guilty on account of 'his brother's wife' on]y. But, surely. it was taught that R. Simeon said: He is guilty on account of 'his wife's sister' only! — This is no difficulty: There, it is a case where the surviving brother had married first and the deceased had married afterwards; here it is a case where the deceased had married first and the surviving brother afterwards. As to R. Simeon, in the case where the deceased had married first and the surviving brother married afterwards, let her, since the prohibition of wife's sister cannot take effect, be permitted even to contract the levirate marriage! — R. Ashi replied: The prohibition of wife's sister remains suspended, and as soon as the prohibition of brother's wife is removed the prohibition of wife's sister comes into force; hence It cannot be treated as non-existent. Does, then, R. Jose hold the view that one prohibition may be imposed upon another? Surely, it was taught: A man who committed a transgression which involves two death penalties is punished by the severer one. R. Jose said: He is to be dealt with In accordance with that prohibition which came into force first. And it was taught: How is one to understand R. Jose's statement that sentence must be in accordance with the prohibition which came into force first? [If the woman was first] his mother-in-law and then became also a married women, he is to be sentenced for [an offence against] his mother-in-law; if she was first a married woman and then became his mother-in-law, he is to be sentenced for [an offence against] a married woman!ᵃᵇᶜᵈᵉᶠᵍʰⁱʲᵏˡᵐⁿᵒᵖᵠʳˢᵗᵘᵛʷˣʸᶻᵃᵃᵃᵇᵃᶜᵃᵈᵃᵉᵃᶠᵃᵍᵃʰᵃⁱᵃʲᵃᵏᵃˡᵃᵐ
2— R. Abbahu replied: R. Jose admits where the latter prohibition is of a wider range. This is satisfactory in the case where the surviving brother had married first and the deceased had married afterwards, since the prohibition. having been extended in the case of the brothers, had also been extended in his own case. What extension of the prohibition is there, however, where the deceased had married first and the surviving brother had married afterwards? And were you to reply: Because thereby he is forbidden to marry all the sisters, [it may be retorted that] such is only a comprehensive prohibition! The fact is, said Raba, he is deemed to have committed two offences, but is liable for one only. Similarly when Rabin came he stated in the name of R. Johanan: The offender is deemed to have committed two offences, but he is only liable for one. What practical difference does this make? — That he must be buried among confirmed sinners. This is a question on which opinions differ. For It was stated: A common man who performed some Temple service on the Sabbath, is. R. Hiyya said, liable for two offences.' Bar Kappara said: He is only liable for one. R. Hiyya jumped up and took an oath. 'By the Temple', [he exclaimed]. 'so have I heard from Rabbi: two'! Bar Kappara jumped up and took an oath, 'By the Temple. thus have I heard from Rabbi: one'! R. Hiyya began to argue the point thus: Work on the Sabbath was forbidden to all [Israelites,] and when it was permitted in the [Sanctuary], it was permitted to the priests, hence it was permitted to the priests only, but not to common men. Here, therefore, is involved the offence of Temple service by a common man, and that of the desecration of the Sabbath. Bar Kappara began to argue his point thus: Work on the Sabbath was forbidden to all [Israelites]. but when it was permitted in the Sanctuary, it was permitted [to all], hence only the offence of Temple service by a common man is here involved. A priest having a blemish who performed [some Temple] services while unclean is. R. Hiyya said, guilty of two offences. Bar Kappara said: He is guilty of one offence only. R. Hiyya jumped up and took an oath, 'By the Temple. thus have I heard from Rabbi: two'! Bar Kappara jumped up and took an oath, 'By the Temple, thus have I heard from Rabbi: one'! R. Hiyya began to reason: [Temple service during one's] uncleanness was forbidden to all; and when it was permitted in the Sanctuary, it was permitted to priests who had no blemish — Hence it must have been permitted only to priests who had no blemish, but not to those who had. Consequently. both the offence of service being done by one with a blemish and that of service during one's uncleanness are here involved. Bar Kappara began to reason thus: [Temple service during] uncleanness was forbidden to all. When it was permitted at the Sanctuary. was [universally] permitted. Consequently. only one offence, that of service by one who had a blemish, is involved. A common man who ate melikah is. R. Hiyya said, guilty of two offences. Bar Kappara said: He is guilty only of one. R. Hiyya jumped up and took an oath, 'By the Temple. so I heard from Rabbi: two'! Bar Kappara jumped up and took an oath, 'By the Temple. so I heard from Rabbi: one'! R. Hiyya began to reason thus: Nebelah was forbidden to all; and when it was permitted in the Sanctuary it was permitted in the case of the priests. Hence it must be permitted to priests only and not to common men. Consequently. both the offence of consumption by a common man, and that of melikah are here involved. Bar Kappara began to reason: Nebelah was forbidden to all; and when it was permitted in the Sanctuary it was [universally] permitted — Consequently. only the offence due to consumption by a common man is here involved. ᵃⁿᵃᵒᵃᵖᵃᵠᵃʳᵃˢᵃᵗᵃᵘᵃᵛᵃʷᵃˣᵃʸᵃᶻᵇᵃᵇᵇᵇᶜᵇᵈᵇᵉᵇᶠᵇᵍᵇʰᵇⁱᵇʲᵇᵏᵇˡᵇᵐᵇⁿᵇᵒᵇᵖ