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יבמות 32

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1 and partially pulled down.  Well, let the assumption be made!  — Had he first contracted the levirate marriage and then participated in the halizah, no objection could be raised — The preventive measure, however, has been enacted against the possibility of his participating in the halizah first and contracting the levirate marriage afterwards and thus placing himself under the prohibition of That doth not build up,  the All Merciful having said, 'Since he had not built  he must never again build'. Raba said: If he  gave a letter of divorce in respect of his ma'amar, her rival  is permitted;  but she herself is forbidden, because she might be mistaken for one who is the holder of a letter of divorce.  Others say that Raba said: If he  gave a letter of divorce in respect of his ma'amar even she herself becomes permitted.  What is the reason? — Because what he has done to her he has taken back. MISHNAH. IF TWO BROTHERS WERE MARRIED TO TWO SISTERS, AND ONE OF THE BROTHERS DIED, AND AFTERWARDS THE WIFE OF THE SECOND BROTHER DIED, BEHOLD, SHE  IS FORBIDDEN TO HIM  FOREVER, SINCE SHE WAS FORBIDDEN TO HIM FOR ONE MOMENT. GEMARA. Is not this obvious? If there,  where she  was not entirely excluded from that house  it has been said, 'No',  how much more so here  where the widow is completely excluded from that house!  -The Tanna had taught first this,  while the other  was regarded by him as a permissible case,  and so he permitted it — Later, however, he came to regard it as a case that was to be forbidden;  and, as it was dear to him  he placed it first; while our Mishnah was allowed to remain in its original form. Our Rabbis learned: If he  had intercourse with her,  he is guilty on account of both 'his brother's wife'  and 'his wife's sister';  so R. Jose. R. Simeon said: He is guilty on account of 'his brother's wife' on]y. But, surely. it was taught that R. Simeon said: He is guilty on account of 'his wife's sister' only! — This is no difficulty: There, it is a case where the surviving brother had married first  and the deceased had married afterwards;  here it is a case where the deceased had married first and the surviving brother afterwards.  As to R. Simeon, in the case where the deceased had married first and the surviving brother married afterwards, let her, since the prohibition of wife's sister cannot take effect, be permitted even to contract the levirate marriage! — R. Ashi replied: The prohibition of wife's sister remains suspended, and as soon as the prohibition of brother's wife is removed  the prohibition of wife's sister comes into force; hence It cannot be treated as non-existent. Does, then, R. Jose hold the view that one prohibition may be imposed upon another? Surely, it was taught: A man who committed a transgression which involves two death penalties  is punished by the severer one. R. Jose said: He is to be dealt with In accordance with that prohibition which came into force first.  And it was taught: How is one to understand R. Jose's statement that sentence must be in accordance with the prohibition which came into force first? [If the woman was first] his mother-in-law  and then became also a married women, he is to be sentenced for [an offence against] his mother-in-law; if she was first a married woman and then became his mother-in-law, he is to be sentenced for [an offence against] a married woman!ʰʲˡʳˢʷˣʸᵃᵃᵃᵇᵃᶜᵃᵈᵃᵉᵃᶠᵃᵍᵃʰᵃⁱᵃʲᵃᵏᵃˡᵃᵐ

2 — R. Abbahu replied: R. Jose admits  where the latter prohibition is of a wider range. This is satisfactory in the case where the surviving brother had married  first and the deceased had married  afterwards, since the prohibition. having been extended in the case of the brothers, had also been extended in his own case.  What extension of the prohibition is there, however, where the deceased had married  first  and the surviving brother had married  afterwards?  And were you to reply: Because thereby  he is forbidden to marry all the sisters,  [it may be retorted that] such is only a comprehensive prohibition! The fact is, said Raba, he is deemed  to have committed two offences,  but is liable for one only. Similarly when Rabin came  he stated in the name of R. Johanan: The offender is deemed  to have committed two offences, but he is only liable for one. What practical difference does this  make? — That he must be buried among confirmed sinners. This  is a question on which opinions differ. For It was stated: A common man  who performed some Temple service on the Sabbath, is. R. Hiyya said, liable for two offences.' Bar Kappara said: He is only liable for one.  R. Hiyya jumped up and took an oath. 'By the Temple',  [he exclaimed]. 'so have I heard from Rabbi:  two'! Bar Kappara jumped up and took an oath, 'By the Temple. thus have I heard from Rabbi:  one'! R. Hiyya began to argue the point thus: Work on the Sabbath was forbidden to all [Israelites,] and when it was permitted in the [Sanctuary], it was permitted to the priests, hence it was permitted to the priests only, but not to common men. Here, therefore, is involved the offence of Temple service by a common man, and that of the desecration of the Sabbath. Bar Kappara began to argue his point thus: Work on the Sabbath was forbidden to all [Israelites]. but when it was permitted in the Sanctuary, it was permitted [to all], hence only the offence of Temple service by a common man is here involved. A priest having a blemish who performed [some Temple] services  while unclean is. R. Hiyya said, guilty of two offences. Bar Kappara said: He is guilty of one offence only. R. Hiyya jumped up and took an oath, 'By the Temple. thus have I heard from Rabbi: two'! Bar Kappara jumped up and took an oath, 'By the Temple, thus have I heard from Rabbi: one'! R. Hiyya began to reason: [Temple service during one's] uncleanness was forbidden to all; and when it was permitted in the Sanctuary,  it was permitted to priests who had no blemish — Hence it must have been permitted only to priests who had no blemish, but not to those who had. Consequently. both the offence of service being done by one with a blemish and that of service during one's uncleanness are here involved. Bar Kappara began to reason thus: [Temple service during] uncleanness was forbidden to all. When it was permitted at the Sanctuary.  was [universally] permitted.  Consequently. only one offence, that of service by one who had a blemish, is involved. A common man who ate melikah  is. R. Hiyya said, guilty of two offences. Bar Kappara said: He is guilty only of one. R. Hiyya jumped up and took an oath, 'By the Temple. so I heard from Rabbi: two'! Bar Kappara jumped up and took an oath, 'By the Temple. so I heard from Rabbi: one'! R. Hiyya began to reason thus: Nebelah  was forbidden to all; and when it was permitted in the Sanctuary  it was permitted in the case of the priests. Hence it must be permitted to priests only and not to common men. Consequently. both the offence of consumption  by a common man, and that of melikah are here involved. Bar Kappara began to reason: Nebelah  was forbidden to all; and when it was permitted in the Sanctuary  it was [universally] permitted — Consequently. only the offence due to consumption  by a common man is here involved.                                              ᵃⁿᵃᵒᵃᵖᵃᵠᵃʳᵃˢᵃᵗᵃᵘᵃᵛᵃʷᵃˣᵃʸᵃᶻᵇᵃᵇᵇᵇᶜᵇᵈᵇᵉᵇᶠᵇᵍᵇʰᵇⁱᵇʲᵇᵏᵇˡᵇᵐᵇⁿᵇᵒᵇᵖ