Yevamot

OR IF ONE WOMAN STATED. 'HE  IS DEAD', AND ANOTHER WOMAN  STATED,  'HE IS NOT DEAD', SHE  MAY NOT MARRY AGAIN. GEMARA. The reason. then,  is because she said, 'HE IS NOT DEAD'; had she, however, kept silent she would presumably have been allowed to marry again; but [it may be objected], no rival may give evidence on behalf of her associate!  — It was necessary [to teach the case where the OTHER WIFE SAID], 'HE IS NOT DEAD.  Since it might have been assumed that [their husband] was really dead and that by stating  'HE IS NOT DEAD' she evidently  intended to inflict injury upon her rival in the spirit of  Let me  die with the Philistines,  we are informed [that she is nevertheless forbidden to marry again]. IF ONE WIFE STATED, 'HE IS DEAD' etc. R. Meir should have expressed his disagreement in the first clause also!  R. Eleazar replied: [The first clause] is a subject  in dispute and it  represents the opinion of R. Judah and R. Simeon.  R. Johanan. however. stated that it  may be said [to represent even the view of] R. Meir, for in such a case even R. Meir agrees,  since in the case of testimony relating to a woman  the evidence [of the nature of] 'He is not dead' is not [regarded as a valid] contradiction, We learned: IF ONE WITNESS STATED, HE IS DEAD' AND ANOTHER WITNESS STATED, HE IS NOT DEAD', OR IF ONE WOMAN STATED, 'HE IS DEAD AND ANOTHER WOMAN STATED, HE IS NOT DEAD', SHE MAY NOT MARRY AGAIN. Now according to R. Eleazar  it may well be explained that the anonymous statement [in the final clause]  is in agreement with R. Meir. According to R. Johanan,  however, there is a difficulty! — This is a difficulty. MISHNAH. IF A WOMAN AND HER HUSBAND WENT TO A COUNTRY BEYOND THE SEA, AND SHE RETURNED AND STATED, MY HUSBAND IS DEAD'. SHE MAY BE MARRIED AGAIN AND SHE ALSO RECEIVES HER KETHUBAH. HER RIVAL, HOWEVER, IS FORBIDDEN.  IF [HER RIVAL] WAS THE DAUGHTER OF AN ISRAELITE [WHO WAS MARRIED] TO A PRIEST, SHE IS PERMITTED TO EAT TERUMAH;  SO R. TARFON. R. AKIBA, HOWEVER, SAID: THIS  IS NOT A WAY THAT WOULD LEAD HER OUT OF THE POWER OF TRANSGRESSION, UNLESS [IT BE ENACTED THAT] SHE SHALL BE FORBIDDEN BOTH TO MARRY AND TO EAT TERUMAH. IF SHE STATED, 'MY HUSBAND DIED FIRST AND MY FATHER-IN-LAW DIED AFTER HIM, SHE MAY MARRY AGAIN AND SHE ALSO RECEIVES HER KETHUBAH, BUT HER MOTHER-IN-LAWS  IS FORBIDDEN.  IF [THE LATTER] WAS THE DAUGHTER OF AN ISRAELITE [WHO WAS MARRIED] TO A PRIEST, SHE IS PERMITTED TO EAT TERUMAH; SO R. TARFON. R. AKIBA, HOWEVER, SAID.. THIS  IS NOT A WAY THAT WOULD LEAD HER OUT OF THE POWER OF TRANSGRESSION, UNLESS [IT BE ENACTED THAT] SHE SHALL BE FORBIDDEN BOTH TO MARRY AGAIN AND TO EAT TERUMAH. GEMARA. And [both statements  were] necessary. For If the first only had been stated, it might have been assumed that only in that did N. Tarfon maintain [his view],  since the grievance is personal.  but that in respect of a mother-in-law, the grievance against whom is merely general,  he agrees with N. Akiba.  And had the latter only been stated it might have been assumed that R. Akiba maintained [his view] there only, but that in the former case he agrees with R. Tarfon. [Hence both statements were] necessary. Rab Judah stated in the name of Samuel: The halachah is in agreement with R. Tarfon. Said Abaye: We also learned the same: [If a woman  states],  'A son was given to me in a country beyond the sea, and my son died first while my husband died after him', she is believed.  [If, however, she states]. 'My husband [died first] and my son died after him', she is not believed,  though note must be taken of her statement, and she must, therefore, perform halizah  but may not  contract the levirate marriage.  [From which it follows that] 'note must be taken of her statement', but that no note need be taken of the statement of a rival. Thus our point is proved.