Yevamot

Come and hear: If a woman stated. 'My husband died first and my father-in-law died after him'. she may marry again and she also receives her kethubah. but her mother-in-law is forbidden.  Now, why is her  mother-in-law forbidden? Is it not because it is assumed that neither her  husband died nor did her father-in-law die  and that by her statement  she intended to damage the position of her mother-in-law.  hoping that [as a result]  she  would not in the future  come to torment her!  — There  it may be different because she  has experienced her annoyance. MISHNAH. IF ONE WITNESS STATED, ['THE HUSBAND  IS] DEAD', AND THEREUPON HIS WIFE MARRIED AGAIN, AND ANOTHER CAME AND STATED 'HE IS NOT DEAD'. SHE NEED NOT BE DIVORCED. IF ONE WITNESS SAID. 'HE  IS DEAD AND TWO WITNESSES SAID. 'HE IS NOT DEAD', SHE MUST, EVEN IF SHE MARRIED AGAIN, BE DIVORCED. IF TWO WITNESSES STATED, 'HE  IS DEAD', AND ONE WITNESS STATED, HE IS NOT DEAD', SHE MAY, EVEN IF SHE HAD NOT YET DONE SO,  MARRY AGAIN. GEMARA. The reason  then is because [the woman]  MARRIED AGAIN; had she, however, not married would she  not have been permitted to marry? But Surely. 'Ulla stated: Wherever the Torah declared one witness credible,  he is regarded  as two witnesses, and the evidence of one man  against that  of two men  has no Validity!  — It is this that was meant: IF ONE WITNESS STATED ['THE HUSBAND IS] DEAD' and after his wife had been permitted to marry again ANOTHER CAME AND STATED 'HE IS NOT DEAD', she is not to be deprived of  her former status of permissibility. IF ONE WITNESS SAID, 'HE IS DEAD', Is this not obvious?  For the evidence of one man against that Of  two men  has no validity! — [This ruling' is] required only in the case of ineligible witnesses  [this being] in accordance with the view of R. Nehemiah. For it was taught: R. Nehemiah stated, 'Wherever the Torah declares one witness credible,  the majority of statements is to be followed,  and [the evidence of] two women against that of one man is given the same validity as that of two men against one man'. And if you prefer I might reply: Wherever one eligible witness came first, even a hundred women  are regarded as one witness.  But [here it is such a case] as, for example, where a woman witness came in the first instance;  and [the statement] of R. Nehemiah is to be explained thus: R. Nehemiah stated, 'Wherever the Torah declares one witness credible, the majority of statements is to be followed, and [the evidence of] two women against one woman is given the same validity as that of two men against one man; but [the evidence of] two women against that of one man is regarded as half  and half. IF TWO WITNESSES STATED, 'HE IS DEAD' etc. What does this teach us?  [A ruling] in respect of ineligible witnesses, [the principle being the same] as that of R. Nehemiah who follows the majority of statements.  But is not this exactly the same [as the previous clause]!  — It might have been assumed that the majority is followed only when the law is thereby made more stringent,  but not [where it leads] to a relaxation of the law;  hence we were taught [the final clause], MISHNAH. IF ONE WIFE  SAID ['HER HUSBAND IS] DEAD' AND THE OTHER WIFE  SAID, 'HE IS NOT DEAD, THE ONE WHO SAID, 'HE IS DEAD' MAY MARRY AGAIN AND SHE ALSO RECEIVES HER KETHUBAH, WHILE THE ONE WHO SAID, 'HE IS NOT DEAD, MAY NEITHER MARRY AGAIN NOR IS SHE TO RECEIVE HER KETHUBAH. IF ONE WIFE  STATED, 'HE IS DEAD' AND THE OTHER STATED. 'HE WAS KILLED', R. MEIR RULED: SINCE THEY CONTRADICT ONE ANOTHER THEY MAY NOT MARRY AGAIN. R. JUDAH AND R. SIMEON RULED: SINCE BOTH  ADMIT THAT HE  IS NOT ALIVE, BOTH MAY MARRY AGAIN. IF ONE WITNESS STATED, 'HE  IS DEAD', AND ANOTHER WITNESS STATED.  'HE IS NOT DEAD',