Shabbat

then [atonement for] the [first] reaping involves [atonement for] the [second] reaping and [atonement for] the [first] grinding involves [atonement for] the [second] grinding.  But if he was [first] apprised of his reaping [performed] in awareness of the Sabbath but unawareness in respect of labours: then [atonement for] this [second] reaping involves [atonement for] the [first] reaping and its accompanying grinding;  but the corresponding [second] grinding remains in its place.  Abaye maintained: [Atonement for the first] grinding involves atonement for the second grinding too: the designation of grinding is the same. Now, does then Raba hold the theory of involvement?  But it was stated: If one eats two olive-sized pieces of heleb  in one state of unawareness,  is apprised of one of them, and then eats another olive-sized piece whilst still unaware of the second — Raba said: If he offers a sacrifice for the first, the first and second are expiated,  but the third is not. If he brings a sacrifice for the third, the third and second are expiated, but not the first. If he offers a sacrifice for the middle one, all are atoned for.  Abaye maintained: Even if he offers a sacrifice for the first, all are expiated! — After hearing from Abaye he adopted it. If so, let grinding too be carried along with grinding?  — He accepts the theory of [direct], but not that of indirect involvement.  The matter that is clear to Abaye and Raba  was a problem to R. Zera: For R. Zera asked R. Assi — others state, R. Jeremiah asked R. Zera: What if one reaped or  ground [corn] of the quantity of half a dried fig in unawareness of the Sabbath but awareness in respect of the labours, then he again reaped or ground [corn] of the quantity of half a dried fig in awareness of the Sabbath but unawareness in respect of the labours; can they be combined?  — Said he to him: They are distinct in respect of sin-offerings,  therefore they do not combine. Now, wherever [acts] are distinct in respect of sin-offerings, do they not combine? Surely we learnt: If one eats heleb and [then again] heleb in one state of unawareness, he is culpable for only one [sin-offering]. If one eats heleb, blood, nothar, and piggul  in one state of unawareness, he is culpable for each separately: in this many kinds [of forbidden food] are more stringent then one kind. — But in the following one kind is more stringent than many kinds: viz., if one eats half the size of an olive and then eats half the size of an olive of the same kind of [commodity],  he is culpable; of two different commodities, he is not culpable. Now we questioned this: 'of the same commodity, he is culpable': need this be stated?  And Resh Lakish said on the authority of Bar Tutani: The reference here is to one e.g., who ate [them] from two tureens,  this being according to R. Joshua, who ruled: Tureens divide.  You might say that R. Joshua rules [thus] whether it leads to leniency or to stringency: hence we are informed that he did not rule thus leniently, but only stringently.  Thus here, though distinct in respect of sin-offerings, yet they combine? — Said he to him: You learn this in reference to the first clause: hence it presents a difficulty to you.  But we learn it in reference to the second clause, and it presents no difficulty to us. [Thus:] 'Of two kinds of [commodities], he is not culpable': need this be said? And Resh Lakish answered on the authority of Bar Tutani: After all, it means of the same kind of [commodity]. Yet why is it designated two kinds of [commodities]? Because he ate them out of two tureens, this agreeing with R. Joshua, who maintained: Tureens divide, and we are informed this: that R. Joshua ruled [thus] both leniently and stringently. Now, since the second clause refers to one kind of [commodity] and two tureens,