Sanhedrin

A problem was propounded to R. Shesheth. May one be appointed an agent [by Beth din] to flagellate and curse his father?  — He replied, Who then permitted even a stranger to do this, but that the Divine honour overrides [other prohibitions]: so here too, the Divine honour overrides [the prohibition against smiting and cursing one's parents].  An objection was raised: If one, whom it is a positive command to smite, may nevertheless not be smitten; how much more so, may one, whom it is not a positive command to smite, not be smitten. Now, do not both clauses relate to smiting as a precept, but that one treats of a son, the other of a stranger?  — No. In both clauses no distinction is drawn between a son and a stranger, yet there is no difficulty. The one treats of smiting as a precept, the other when not. And it is thus to be interpreted: If when a precept is involved, i.e., when it is a positive command to smite [sc. a person under sentence of flagellation], it is nevertheless a command not to smite [unnecessarily, i.e., with more than the prescribed number of lashes, viz., forty]; then when no positive command is involved, viz., when one is not to be flagellated, one is surely commanded not to smite unnecessarily.  Come and hear: If one was going forth to execution, and his son came and smote him and cursed him, he is liable; if a stranger did this, he is exempt. Now we pondered thereon, What is the difference between a son and a stranger? And R. Hisda answered: This refers to one who is being impelled forth, but holds back?  — R. Shesheth maintains that it refers to one who is not urged to go forth. If so, a stranger too [should be punished for beating him]? — As far as a stranger is concerned, he is already a dead man.  But did not R. Shesheth say: If one insulted a sleeping person, and he died [in his sleep], he is nevertheless liable [to punishment for same]?  — The reference here is to a blow which inflicted an injury less than a perutah in value. But did not R. Ammi say in R. Johanan's name: [Even] if one smote his neighbour with a blow inflicting less than a perutah's worth of damage, he is punished with lashes? — By 'exempt', non-liability to monetary compensation is meant. It follows then that a son is liable to monetary compensation!  But it must therefore mean, [he is liable] according to the law pertaining to him.  If so [a stranger too is exempt from] the law pertaining to him [for smiting his neighbour, viz., lashes].  But this is the reason why a stranger is exempt, because the Writ saith, Thou shalt not curse a prince among thy people:  meaning, [only] when he acts as is fitting for thy people.  This is well as far as cursing is concerned: but whence do we know the same of smiting? — Because we compare smiting with cursing. If so, should not the same apply to his son? — Even as R. Phineas said [elsewhere]: This refers to one who had repented. If so, even a stranger [should be liable]? — R. Mari answered, 'among thy people' implies 'abiding among thy people'.  If so, should not the same apply to his son?