נדרים 34 — Soncino English Talmud

¹Others report it in the following version: R. Ammi and R. Assi differ thereon: one said: This was taught only if the finder may not benefit from the loser's property. R. Joseph's perutah being rare; but if the loser may not benefit from the finder's property, he may not return it, because he [the finder] benefits him. While the other maintained: Even if the loser may not benefit from the finder's property, he may return it, for he is only returning his own. We learnt: WHERE PAYMENT IS TAKEN FOR THIS, THE BENEFIT MUST ACCRUE TO HEKDESH. Now that is well on the view that even if the loser may not benefit from the finder, he may also return it: thus he justifies WHERE [etc.], but on the view that if the loser may not benefit from the finder, he may not return it, how is WHERE [etc.] explained? This is a difficulty.^ᵃ^ᵇ

²Raba said: If a hefker loaf lies before a man, and he declares, 'This loaf be hekdesh', and he takes it to eat it, he trespasses in respect of its entire value; if to leave it to his children, he trespasses in respect of its goodwill value only. R. Hiyya b. Abin asked Raba: [What if one says to his neighbour,] 'My loaf [be forbidden] to you,' and then gifts it to him: now, he said, 'my loaf,' meaning only so long as it IS In his own possession; or perhaps, having said '[be forbidden] to you,' he has rendered it to him hekdesh? — He replied: It is obvious that even if he gifted it to him, it is forbidden. For what was it [his vow] to exclude? Surely not the case where it would be stolen from him? — He replied, No: It excludes the case where he invites him for it. ^ᶜ^ᵈ^ᵉ^ᶠ^ᵍ^ʰ

^ᶜnote:V. Glos.
^ᵈnote:A Zar (i.e., not a priest) is forbidden to eat consecrated food; if he does, he is guilty of trespass. and bound to make restitution of its value plus a fifth (Lev. XXII, 14). Now as soon as he takes this consecrated loaf, with the intent of eating it, he withdraws it from the possession of hekdesh into his own. Hence he has trespassed in respect of the whole of it. But if he merely intends leaving it to his children, he merely benefits by its goodwill value (i.e., the benefit he enjoys through his children's knowing that he wishes to leave it to them) and hence liable for that only. [Had, however, the loaf been his own, he would not have been guilty of a trespass by taking it up with the intent of eating it. Since it was all the time in his possession, both before and after the consecration, he would be treated in regard to it as a Temple Treasurer, to whom the law of trespass does not apply, v. B.K. (Sonc. ed.) p. 103.]
^ᵉnote:Therefore now that he gave it to him, it is no longer his; hence permitted.
^ᶠnote:So that the prohibition always remains.
^ᵍnote:When A says to E, 'My loaf be forbidden to you', thus excluding B from its enjoyment, what is his purpose? Obviously, as long as it is in A's possession it is forbidden to B in any case, since it does not belong to him. Surely A did not intend his vow only in the unlikely event of the loaf being stolen? Hence he must have meant, 'Even if I give you this loaf which is now mine, it shall be forbidden to you.'
^ʰnote:I.e., if A should invite B to dine with him off that loaf of bread, it should be forbidden to him; but not if he gives it to him. This interpretation follows Ran. Others explain the passage differently. According to all versions, [H] must be deleted from the text.