Nazir

[IF A WOMAN SAYS,] 'I INTEND TO BE A NAZIRITE, AND HER HUSBAND OVERHEARS AND ADDS, 'I TOO,' HE CANNOT DECLARE [HER VOW] VOID: The question was propounded: Does the husband nullify  or does he only terminate [the vow]?  The difference is of importance for deciding the case of a woman who vows to be a nazirite and whose companion overhears and says, 'I too,' and whose husband subsequently hears of the matter and declares her vow void. If it be decided that he nullifies [her vow], her companion is also set free,  but if it be decided that he merely terminates [the vow], she herself will be released, and her companion will remain bound [to the vow]. What, then, is the law? Come and hear: [IF A WOMAN SAYS,] 'I INTEND TO BE A NAZIRITE,' AND HER HUSBAND OVERHEARS AND ADDS, 'I TOO,' HE CANNOT DECLARE [HER VOW] VOID. Now, should you suppose that the husband terminates [the vow], he ought to be able to declare his wife's [vow] void, whilst remaining bound himself.  It surely follows, therefore, [from the fact that he cannot do so] that a husband nullifies [his wife's vow]?  — Not at all! Strictly speaking, the husband [in general] only terminates [the wife's vow,] and here by rights he should be able to declare her vow void,  and the reason why he cannot do so is because his saying, 'I too,' is equivalent to saying, 'I confirm it for you,'  and so if he [later] seeks to have the confirmation revoked,  he can then declare [his wife's vow] void,  but not otherwise. Come and hear: If a woman undertakes a nazirite vow and sets aside the requisite animal [for the sacrifice] and her husband subsequently declares [the vow] void, then, if the animal was one of his own, it can be put to pasture with the herd,  but if it was one of hers, the sin-offering is to be left to die [etc.].  Now, should you suppose that the husband nullifies [the vow, the animal] should become profane?  It surely follows, therefore, that the husband [merely] terminates [the vow]?  — In point of fact, we can maintain that the husband nullifies [the vow], but [the animal remains sacred] for this reason. Since she no longer requires atonement,  [the case] is similar to that of a sin-offering whose owner has died, and it is a tradition that sin-offerings whose owners have died are left to die. Come and hear: If a woman undertakes a nazirite vow and then drinks wine or is defiled by a corpse, she is to receive forty stripes.  What exactly are the circumstances? If her husband has not declared [the vow] void, would it have been necessary to tell us this?  Obviously, then, her husband must have declared [the vow] void.  Now if you suppose that the husband nullifies [the vow], why should she receive forty stripes?  It surely follows, therefore, that the husband [only] terminates [the vow]?  — In point of fact, we can maintain that the husband really nullifies [the vow], but [in this case] because we are told in the clause that follows: If her husband declares it void without her being aware of it, and she drinks wine or is defiled by a corpse, she does not receive the stripes;