Menachot

But if you say that they are regarded as two bodies [there], why are they combined [here]?1 The author of that [Baraitha] is Rabbi. For it was taught: If he slaughtered the lamb intending to eat a half-olive's bulk of the one loaf [on the morrow], and likewise [he slaughtered] the other lamb intending to eat a half-olive's bulk of the other loaf [on the morrow], Rabbi says, I maintain that this offering is valid. Now this is so only because he referred to two halves,2 but had he referred to an olive's bulk of both [loaves] they would be combined.3 Whose ruling does Rabbi follow? If you say that of the Rabbis, but [according to them] even though the intention was in respect of one loaf only [both would be piggul]; and if you say that of R. Jose, then our original question confronts us again.4 It must be that he follows the ruling of the Rabbis, but read not [in the above mentioned Baraitha] ‘unless he expressed an intention which makes piggul with regard to an olive's bulk from both’,5 but rather ‘unless he expressed an intention which makes piggul with regard to an olive's bulk in both’,6 even though the intention was only [in respect of an olive's bulk] of one [loaf]. He thus rejects the view of R. Meir who said, A wrongful intention expressed during the service of half the mattir renders the offering piggul; and he teaches us [that it is not so]. If so, why is this introduced by the expression ‘It must be’?7 If, of course, you would have said that the author of that Baraitha meant from both [loaves] and in both [lambs],8 adopting thus the view of R. Jose and rejecting the views of R. Meir9 and the Rabbis,10 the expression ‘It must be’ would be quite in order. But if you merely say that he adopted the view of the Rabbis, rejecting only the view of R. Meir, why then the expression ‘It must be’? Moreover R. Ashi had raised an objection [against R. Huna from the following]: Come and hear: Rabbi says in the name of R. Jose, If11 [whilst performing a service outside]12 he expressed an intention which makes piggul in respect of another service which is performed outside, the offering is piggul, if in respect of another service which is performed inside, it is not piggul. Thus, if whilst standing outside he said, ‘Behold I am slaughtering with the intention of sprinkling the blood thereof on the morrow’, it is not piggul, for this is an intention expressed whilst serving outside in respect of a service performed inside. If whilst standing inside he said, ‘Behold I am sprinkling the blood with the intention of burning the sacrificial portions on the morrow’, or, ‘of pouring out the residue of the blood on the morrow’, it is not piggul for this is an intention expressed whilst serving inside in respect of a service performed outside. If whilst standing outside he said, ‘Behold I am slaughtering with the intention of pouring out the residue of the blood on the morrow’, or ‘of burning the sacrificial portions on the morrow’, it is piggul; for this is an intention expressed whilst serving outside in respect of a service performed outside. Now [in the latter case] where the intention was of pouring out the residue of the blood, what is it that becomes piggul?13 Should you say that it is the blood that becomes piggul,14 but does the blood become piggul? Behold we have learnt:15 For the following things the penalty of piggul is not incurred: viz., the handful, the frankincense, the incense-offering, the meal-offering of the priests, the meal-offering offered with the drink-offerings, the meal-offering of the anointed [High] Priest, and the blood!16 Obviously then it is the flesh that becomes piggul. Now if in that case where no intention was expressed with regard to the flesh at all R. Jose holds that it nevertheless becomes piggul, how much more so in this case where he actually expressed an intention with regard to the [flesh of the] offering!17 Moreover Rabina had raised an objection [against R. Huna] from the following: Come and hear: if he took out the handful intending to eat the remainder or to burn the handful on the morrow, in this case R. Jose agrees that the offering is piggul and that the penalty of kareth is incurred on account thereof. Now where the intention was to burn the handful, what is it that becomes piggul? Should you say that it is the handful that becomes piggul, but does the handful become piggul? Behold we have learnt: For the following things the penalty of piggul is not incurred: viz., the handful, etc. Obviously then it is the remainder that becomes piggul. Now if in that case where no intention was expressed with regard to the remainder at all in respect of one will not affect the other, then the two loaves are a fortiori regarded as two entities and can by no means be combined in one merely by the form of intention expressed. Why then is it held that where the intention was in respect of an olive's bulk of the two loaves both are piggul? loaf, and therefore the two intentions cannot be combined to make the offering piggul. wrongful intention which makes piggul must be expressed during the service of both lambs, which together form the mattir, i.e., that which renders the loaves permissible, and not during the slaughtering of one of the lambs which is only half the mattir. This clearly conflicts with R. Meir's view. of both loaves. This would be in accordance with R. Jose's view as stated in our Mishnah. mattir, renders piggul. This view is rejected by the statement in the Baraitha ‘in both’. rejected by the expression ‘from both’. XV, 24). The procedure in these offerings (v. Zeb. V, 2) was as follows: the animals were slaughtered outside in the courtyard; the blood was sprinkled inside the Temple, i.e., on the veil and on the golden altar; the sacrificial portions, i.e., the entire beast, were burnt outside upon the outer altar; and the residue of the blood was poured out at the western base of the outer altar which stood in the Temple courtyard. ‘inside’ within the Temple building. two counts of kareth, (a) for eating blood, and (b) for eating piggul. for the law of piggul does not apply to that part of the offering which is the mattir, i.e., which renders other parts permissible. V. Zeb. 42b, 43a. piggul-contra R. Huna. This sentence is found in the text in cur. edd., but it is wanting in MS.M. Sh. Mek. strikes it out as a gloss.