Kiddushin

No declaration may be made to a minor [widowed] from erusin1 except with her father's consent;2 whereas in the case of a na'arah, either her own or her father's consent [is required]!3 But if stated, it was thus stated: R. Jose son of R. Hanina said: What is R. Johanan's reason according to the Rabbis? Kiddushin, which requires her consent, [only] her father [can accept it] but not she;4 divorce, which is even against her will, either she or her father [can accept it].5 But a declaration [too] requires her consent, yet it is taught, either she or her father [can accept it]? — There the reference is to a declaration which is [made] against her will, and it is in agreement with Rabbi. For it was taught: If one makes a declaration to his yebamah without her consent,6 Rabbi ruled: He acquires her;7 but the Sages say: He does not. What is Rabbi's reason? — He deduces it from intercourse with a yebamah: just as intercourse with a yebamah [acquires her even] against her will, so here too [sc. declaration, it is valid even] against her will. But the Rabbis hold: We learn from [ordinary] kiddushin: just as kiddushin must be with her8 consent, so here too her consent is required. Wherein do they differ? — Rabbi maintains: The provisions of a yebamah are to be learnt from a yebamah. But the Rabbis hold: Kiddushin should be learned from kiddushin.9 Reason too supports R. Johanan's answer,10 since the second clause states: Which is not so in the case of kiddushin.11 Shall we then say that this refutes Resh Lakish?12 — Resh Lakish can answer you: That agrees with R. Judah, who ruled: Two hands cannot have a privilege simultaneously.13 If R. Judah, [why state,] ‘which is not so in the case of kiddushin’; let him teach, which is not so in the case of divorce?14 — That indeed is so: [but] as he teaches [the law of] declaration, which is similar to kiddushin, he also states: ‘which is not so in the case of kiddushin’. Now, on R. Judah's view, why does declaration differ?15 — Because she already stands tied [to the yabam].16 Now that you have arrived at this [distinction], R. Johanan[‘s view] also need not cause you any difficulty at the very outset:17 a declaration is different, because she already stands tied. We learnt: A MAN MAY GIVE HIS DAUGHTER IN BETROTHAL WHEN A NA'ARAH, HIMSELF OR THROUGH HIS AGENT: only HIMSELF OR THROUGH HIS AGENT, but not through herself or her agent:18 this refutes Resh Lakish? — Resh Lakish can answer you: This too is in accordance with R. Judah. Can you then interpret this as R. Judah[‘s ruling]? But the second clause19 teaches: If one says to a woman, ‘Be thou betrothed unto me with this date, be thou betrothed unto me with this one etc.’20 Now we said thereon: Which Tanna [rules thus concerning] ‘Be thou betrothed, be thou betrothed?’21 And Rabbah replied: It is R. Simeon, who maintained, ‘Unless he declared to each separately,’ [I take] an oath.’22 And should you answer: It is all the opinion of R. Judah, who, however, agrees with R. Simeon in the matter of detailed enumeration,23 yet does he hold thus? Surely it was taught: This is the rule: For a comprehensive statement only one [sacrifice] is incurred; for a detailed enumeration each one separately involves liability:24 this is R. Meir's opinion. R. Judah said: [If he declares, ‘I take] an oath [that I am] not indebted to you, not to you, not to you,’ he is liable in respect of each separately. R. Eleazar said: [If he declares, ‘I am] not [indebted] to you, not to you, not to you, and not to you: [for this I take] an oath’: he is liable in respect of each.25 R. Simeon said: He is never liable [for each separately] unless he declares [I take] an oath to each separately!26 — But the whole is in accordance with R. Simeon, who in the matter of agency agrees with R. Judah.27 R. Assi did not go to the Beth Hamidrash.28 Meeting R. Zera, he asked him, ‘What has been taught to-day in the schoolhouse?’ ‘I too did not go,’ he replied: ‘but R. Abin was present, and he told me that the entire band [of disciples] agreed with R. Johanan;29 and though Resh Lakish cried like a crane,30 and when she is departed . . she may be [another man's wife],31 none heeded him.’ ‘Is R. Abin reliable?’ he asked him, ‘Yes,’ he replied: ‘as from the sea into the frying pan!’32 R. Nahman b. Isaac said: I [read in this story] neither R. Abin b. R. Hiyya nor R. Abin b. Kahana, but simply R. Abin. What does it matter? — In proving a self-contradiction.33 Raba asked R. Nahman: woman herself; in the case of a na'arah or a minor it is her father. whereas the latter does, the same applies to kiddushin and divorce. only her father can accept it. he stated: ‘Be thou betrothed’ before each date separately, it is not the equivalent of saying: ‘Be thou betrothed unto me with all these dates.’ takes an oath, ‘I swear that I did not receive a deposit from you, not from you, not from you, etc., he incurs a separate sacrifice on account of each (v. Lev. V, 21.26). R. Simeon maintained: He incurs only one sacrifice for all, unless he declares to each one separately, ‘An oath that I did not receive a deposit from you,’ ‘An oath that I did not receive a deposit from you,’ etc., — Hence the Mishnah on 46a, which is a sequel to 41a, agrees with R. Simeon, not R. Judah. enumeration, he makes his declaration equivalent to a number of separate statements. whether she can appoint an agent, as it is generally admitted that a na'arah certainly cannot (infra b), but whether she herself can rank as her father's agent (since Scripture vested the power in him — supra 3b.) — Maharsha. Lakish. [Others explain the phrase as names of two places next to each other. Horowitz Palestine, p. 323 n. 9. takes it as a corruption of comminatio litigo, R. Zera cautioning R. Assi to occasion no strife by impugning the authority of R. Abin.] may be meant.