Kiddushin

and also in monetary cases.1 Now, these are all necessary. For if we were informed [thus] of kiddushin, [I would say] that is because they come to render her forbidden;2 but as for divorce, we might fear that he [one of these] desired her for himself.3 Again, if we were informed [thus] of divorce, that may be because a woman is not eligible to two men; but as for a monetary matter, I might argue that these [witnesses] are sharing therein. Thus they are [all] necessary. What is his4 opinion? If he holds that he who lends [money] to his neighbour in the presence of witnesses must repay him [likewise] before witnesses, then these5 are interested witnesses, for should they say: ‘We did not repay him,’ he [the debtor] can say to them, ‘Then pay me!’6 — But after all, he holds that he who lends money to his neighbour before witnesses need not repay him before witnesses, and since they can plead. ‘We returned it to the debtor,’ they can also testify, ‘We repaid the creditor.’ Now, however, that the Rabbis have instituted an oath of equity,7 these witnesses [sc. the agents] must swear that they repaid him [the creditor], the creditor swears that he did not receive it [the repayment], and the debtor must repay the creditor. 8 A MAN MAY GIVE HIS DAUGHTER [etc.]. We learnt elsewhere: A na'arah, who is betrothed9 she or her father can accept her divorce. Said R. Judah: Two hands cannot have a privilege simultaneously, but [only] her father can accept her divorce. And she who cannot take care of her Get10 cannot be divorced.11 Resh Lakish said: Just as they differ in respect to divorce, so they differ in respect to kiddushin. R. Johanan maintained: They differ in respect to divorce [only], but as for kiddushin, all agree that her father [alone can accept kiddushin on her behalf] but not she herself. R. Jose son of R. Hanina said: What is R. Johanan's reason according to the Rabbis? As for divorce, since she reverts thereby to12 parental control,13 both she herself and her father [can accept it]. But kiddushin, which frees her from paternal authority, only her father [can accept it], but not she herself. But what of a declaration,14 whereby she is freed from paternal control,15 yet we learnt: personally concerned, and as such, inadmissible as witnesses. Cur. ed. proceed: But after all, he holds, etc. BAH gives the following version: Whilst if he holds that he who lends money to his neighbour before witnesses need not repay him before witnesses, what is the purpose of these witnesses? — But after all, he holds that when one lends money to his neighbour before witnesses he need not repay him before witnesses. Now, if he pleads, ‘I myself repaid you,’ that indeed is so (and further witnesses are not required). The circumstances here are that he pleads, ‘I repaid you by an agent,’ and for that very reason he requires witnesses. Whilst the witnesses themselves (who in this case are alleged to have been entrusted with the money for repayment), since they can plead, etc., (continuing as in our text). rejected claim only if he partially admits it, but not if he entirely denies it. Hence, when the debtor pleads that he entrusted the money to two in the absence of witnesses, and they maintain that they returned it, thus altogether rejecting his claim, they are not liable to an oath. But the Rabbis imposed an oath even then: this is called an oath of equity. expressed my willingness to abide by his oath that he repaid me. But I cannot be forced to accept the oath of other persons.’ The witnesses, on the other hand, cannot simply testify that they repaid the creditor, without swearing, because if they maintained that they had returned the money to the debtor, they would have to swear an oath of equity, and so become interested witnesses. by the gift of money, which is valid by Rabbinical law only, for by Biblical law cohabitation alone is recognised (supra 2a).