Ketubot

'After all, however, [it may be objected] is not all that is ripe  for cutting  regarded as already cut?'  — 'I mean [dates] that are still dependent  on the palm-tree'. A boy orphan and girl orphan  once came before Raba.  'Grant a bigger [maintenance allowance] to the boy', said Raba, 'for the sake of the girl'.  Said the Rabbis to Raba: Did not the Master himself lay down [that payment may be exacted] from landed property but not from movable property whether in respect of [a daughter's] maintenance, [a wife's] kethubah or [a daughter's] marriage outfit?  — He answered them: Had he desired to have a handmaid to attend on him would we not have granted him [an Increased allowance for the purpose]?  How much more then [should the allowance be increased] here  where it serves  two [purposes]. Our Rabbis taught: Both landed property  and movable property may be seized  for the maintenance of a wife  or daughters;  so Rabbi.  R. Simeon b. Eleazar ruled: Landed property may be seized for daughters  from sons, for daughters from daughters,  and for sons from Sons;  for sons from daughters where the estate is large  but not where it is small.  Movable property  may be seized for sons from sons,  for daughters from daughters  and for sons from daughters, but not for daughters from sons.  Although we have an established rule that the halachah is in agreement with Rabbi [where he differs] from his colleague, the halachah here is in agreement with R. Simeon b. Eleazar; for Raba stated: The law is [that payment may be exacted] from landed property but not from movable property whether in respect of a kethubah, maintenance or marriage outfit. MISHNAH. [IF A HUSBAND] DID NOT WRITE A KETHUBAH FOR HIS WIFE  SHE MAY RECOVER TWO HUNDRED ZUZ  [IF AT MARRIAGE SHE WAS] A VIRGIN, AND ONE MANEH  [IF SHE WAS THEN] A WIDOW, BECAUSE [THE STATUTORY KETHUBAH] IS A CONDITION LAID DOWN BY BETH DIN. IF HE ASSIGNED TO HER IN WRITING A FIELD THAT WAS WORTH ONE MANEH INSTEAD OF THE TWO HUNDRED ZUZ,  AND DID NOT WRITE IN HER FAVOUR,  'ALL PROPERTY THAT I POSSESS IS SURETY FOR YOUR KETHUBAH',  HE IS NEVERTHELESS LIABLE [FOR THE FULL AMOUNT]  BECAUSE [THE CLAUSE MENTIONED] IS A CONDITION LAID DOWN BY BETH DIN. IF HE DID NOT WRITE IN HER FAVOUR  [THE CLAUSE], IF YOU ARE TAKEN CAPTIVE I WILL RANSOM YOU AND TAKE YOU AGAIN AS MY WIFE,'  OR, IN THE CASE OF A PRIEST'S WIFE,  '  WILL RESTORE YOU TO YOUR PARENTAL HOME',  HE IS NEVERTHELESS LIABLE [TO CARRY OUT THESE OBLIGATIONS], BECAUSE [THE CLAUSE] IS A CONDITION LAID DOWN BY BETH DIN. IF SHE IS TAKEN CAPTIVE IT IS HIS DUTY TO RANSOM HER; AND IF HE SAID, 'HERE  IS HER LETTER OF DIVORCE AND HER KETHUBAH LET HER RANSOM HERSELF', HE IS NOT ALLOWED [TO ACT ACCORDLNGLY].  IF SHE SUSTAINED AN INJURY IT IS HIS DUTY TO PROVIDE FOR HER MEDICAL TREATMENT,  BUT IF HE SAID, HERE  IS HER LETTER OF DIVORCE AND HER KETHUBAH, LET HER HEAL HERSELF', HE IS ALLOWED [TO ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH HIS DESIRE]. GEMARA. Whose [view is represented in our Mishnah]? It is [obviously that of] R. Meir who ruled [that the intercourse of] any man who undertakes to give a virgin less than two hundred zuz  or a widow less than 'a Maneh  is  an act of prostitution;  for if [it be suggested that it is the view of] R. Judah, he surely, [it can be objected] ruled, [that if a husband] wished he may write out for a virgin  a deed for two hundred zuz and she writes [a quittance]  'I have received from you a maneh,' and for a widow [he may write out a deed for] a maneh and she writes [a quittance], 'I received from you fifty zuz'.  Read, however, the final clause: IF HE ASSIGNED TO HER IN WRITING A FIELD THAT WAS WORTH ONE MANEH INSTEAD OF THE TWO HUNDRED ZUZ, AND DID NOT WRITE IN HER FAVOUR, ALL PROPERTY THAT I POSSESS  IS SURETY FOR YOUR KETHUBAH' HE IS NEVERTHELESS LIABLE [FOR THE FULL AMOUNT], BECAUSE [THE CLAUSE MENTIONED] IS A CONDITION LAID DOWN BY BETH DIN. Does not this obviously represent the view  of R. Judah who laid down that [the omission from a bond of the clause] pledging property  [is regarded as] the scribe's error?  for if [It be suggested that it represents the view of] R. Meir, he, surely, [it can be objected] ruled that [the omission of the clause] pledging property is not [regarded as] the scribe's error. For we have learned: If a man found notes of indebtedness