Ketubot

Does not [this ruling refer to a man] whose action had already been tried?  — No, [it deals] with one whose action had not yet been tried.  But, surely, since the first clause deals with the case of a man whose action had been tried, would not the final clause also deal with such a case? For in the first clause it was stated: 'I only knew [that liability  is incurred in] cases where compensation is paid for the actual value only, whence, however, is it deduced that [such liability is also incurred in] cases where the payment is double,  fourfold  or fivefold  and [in those of] the violator, the seducer and the calumniator?  From Scripture which explicitly stated, And commit a trespass,  [implying that all such are] included'. Now, how is this statement to be understood? If [it is one referring to] a man whose action had not yet been tried [the objection could be raised:] Is double compensation payable in such circumstances?  It is obvious, therefore, that [the reference is to one] whose action had already been tried. And since the first clause deals with one whose action had been tried, the final clause also must deal, must it not, with one whose action had already been tried?  — The other replied: I could have answered you that the first clause deals with one whose action had already been tried, and the final clause with one whose action had not yet been tried and that the entire Baraitha represents the view of R. Simeon, but I would not give you forced interpretations, for, were I to do so, you might retort: Then either the first clause should begin with 'R. Simeon said' or the final clause should conclude with 'these are the words of R. Simeon'.  The fact, however, is that the entire [Baraitha] refers to one whose action had already been tried, the first clause being the view of the Rabbis and the final clause that of R. Simeon, and I must agree with you in regard to the sacrifice for [taking a false] oath,  for the All-Merciful has exempted him  [as may be deduced] from [the text] And he deal falsely.  When I, however, said, that 'It is a civil liability' [I was only implying that a man had the right] to transmit such a liability as an inheritance to his sons. Again he  raised an objection against him:  R. SIMEON RULED, IF HER FATHER DIED BEFORE SHE COULD COLLECT [HER DUES] THEY BELONG TO HER. Now if you maintain [that such compensation] is a civil liability in respect of being transmitted as an inheritance to one's sons, why should the compensation belong to her? Should it not, in fact, belong to the brothers? — This subject, said Raba, both Rabbah and R. Joseph found difficult for twenty-two years  and no solution was forthcoming. It was only when  R. Joseph assumed the presidency of the academy  that he solved it: There  it is different [from other penal liabilities] because Scripture said, Then the man that lay with her shall give unto the damsel's father fifty [shekels of] silver  [which implies that] the Torah has not conferred upon the father the right of possession before the money had actually been handed to him; when Rabbah, however, said, 'It is a civil liability in respect of being transmitted as an inheritance to his sons' he was referring to other penal liabilities.  But then, in the case of a bondman it is written in Scripture, He shall give into their master thirty shekels of silver,  would it here  also [be maintained that] the Torah has not conferred upon the master the right of possession before the money had actually been handed to him? — The yitten  cannot be compared  with we-nathan.  If so,  [instead of deducing the exemption from sacrifice] from the Scriptural text, 'And he deal falsely',  should not the deduction rather be made from 'Then … shall give'?  — Raba replied: The text of 'And he deal falsely' was required in a case, for instance, where the girl's action had been tried and then she became adolescent  and died, in which case  when the father receives  [the fine] he inherits [it] from her.  If so,  [however, how could it be said:] 'These, therefore, are excluded [from liability] since they are in fact penal' when they are in fact  civil? — R. Nahman b. Isaac replied: [The meaning is], These are excluded since they were originally penal. He  pointed out to him  another objection: R. Simeon, however. exempts him, for no fine is paid on ones own admission.  The reason then  is because his action had not been tried  but if it had been tried,  in which case he does pay,  even on his own admission,  he would incur. also, would he not, [the obligation of bringing] a sacrifice for swearing [a false oath]?  — R. Simeon argues with the Rabbis on the lines of their own view. According to my own view [he argued] the All-Merciful has exempted the man  even after he had been tried [as may be deduced] from the text 'And deal falsely'.  According to your view, however, you must at least admit that [the man is exempt] if he has not yet been tried, since the claim advanced against him is penal