Keritot

It follows R. Eliezer's opinion, who holds that a man may freely offer every day a suspensive guilt-offering.1 We therefore advise the second to bring a suspensive guilt-offering and to stipulate thus: if the first ate the permitted fat, and therefore he the heleb, let it be an expiatory offering,2 otherwise let it be a freewill-offering. Our Rabbis taught: If one ate doubtful heleb and came to know of it,3 then again ate doubtful heleb and came to know of it, Rabbi says: I hold, just as he would be liable to bring separate sin-offerings,4 so is he also liable to bring separate suspensive guilt-offerings. R. Jose son of R. Judah, R. Eliezer and R. Simeon5 hold: He is only liable to one suspensive guilt-offering, for it says, For his error which he erred;6 even in the case of many errors, he is liable to only one [offering]. Said R. Zera: Rabbi has here taught that the awareness of the doubt separates [the acts] for sin-offerings.7 Raba said: Awareness of the doubt does not separate [the acts] for sin-offerings; but this is what he [Rabbi] meant to teach: Just as he would be liable to separate sin-offerings if he became aware [after each act] that the transgression was certain, so he is also liable to separate suspensive guilt-offerings, if he became each time aware of the doubt. Said Abaye to him [Raba]: And are you not of the opinion that awareness of the doubt separates [the acts] for sin-offerings? But surely if you were to assume that awareness of the doubt does not separate [the acts] for sin-offerings, so that he brings only one sin-offering, then why should he bring a [separate] suspensive guilt-offering for each? Has it not been taught:8 This is the general rule. Wherever a separation is effected with regard to sin-offerings there also a separation is effected with regard to suspensive guilt-offerings!9 Said Raba b. Hanan to Abaye: Also according to you, who hold that the awareness of the doubt separates the acts for sin-offerings, it should follow that if one ate an olive's bulk of heleb before the Day of Atonement and again an olive's bulk of heleb after the Day of Atonement — since the Day of Atonement is equivalent to a suspensive guilt-offering — he should have to bring two sin-offerings; but this cannot be, for he ate [at both times] in one spell of unawareness!10 — Abaye replied: Who says that the Day of Atonement atones even when the sin remained unknown, perhaps only when he is aware of it?11 — Said Raba to him: We have explicitly learnt: [The Day of Atonement atones . . .] both for known and unknown sins.12 According to another version, Raba b. Hanan said thus to Abaye: What if one ate an olive's bulk of heleb in the morning of the Day of Atonement and another in the afternoon of the Day of Atonement, would he also be liable to two sin-offerings?13 — Retorted Abaye: Who says that every moment of the Day of Atonement atones, perhaps only the day as a whole atones, from the evening?14 — Said to him Raba b. Hanan: Simpleton have we not learnt: If one committed a doubtful sin on the Day of Atonement, even if it was already twilight, he is exempt15 for the whole day effects atonement?16 R. Idi son of Abin raised an objection: [We have learnt:] If one ate and drank [on the Day of Atonement] in one spell of unawareness,17 he is liable to one sin-offering only.18 Now, it is hardly possible that between the eating and the drinking there was not an interval, during which he might become aware [that it was the Day of Atonement],19 so that [that interval of the Day of Atonement] effected atonement for him, [in accordance with the rule that] the Day of Atonement has the same effect as a suspensive guilt-offering. Yet it states that he is liable to one sin-offering only. Now, if it is true that the awareness of the doubt separates [the acts] for sin-offerings, he should be liable to two sin-offerings!20 — Say: R. Zera only interpreted Rabbi's view, whilst this follows that of the Rabbis.21 But is not the latter clause [in the cited Mishnah] in pursuance of Rabbi's opinion? For it teaches: If he drank brine or pickle-juice, he is exempt;22 from which it may be inferred that if vinegar he is liable, and this is in accordance with Rabbi, for it has been taught: Vinegar is not a refreshing drink;23 Rabbi says, It is.24 Now, as the latter clause follows Rabbi, have we not to assume that also the first is in accordance with his view? — Say: the latter clause follows Rabbi, but the former follows the Rabbis.21 Raba raised an objection [to R. Zera]: If one25 ate [of holy things] on one day and then again on the following day, or made use thereof on one day and again on the following day, or ate thereof on one day and made use thereof on the following day, or made use thereof on one day and ate thereof on the following day, or even when a period of three years intervened,26 whence do we know that they combine one with the other?27 The text tells us: If anyone trespasses a trespass,28 to include [every trespass]. Now, why should he be liable? Has not the intervening Day of Atonement atoned for it? — Say: The Day of Atonement effects atonement for the transgression of a prohibition, but not for [the misappropriation of] money. Or you could say: The Day of Atonement effects atonement for transgressions involving full standard measure, but not for half-measures. Resh Lakish also said: Rabbi has here taught that the awareness of the doubt separates [the acts] for sin-offerings. But R. Johanan said: The awareness of the doubt does not separate [the acts] for sin-offerings; and what he [Rabbi] meant to teach is this: Just as he would be liable to separate sin-offerings if he became aware [in between the acts of the transgression] of a definite sin, so he is also liable to separate suspensive guilt-offerings if he became each time aware of the doubtful sin. Now according to R. Johanan it is right that the guilt-offering is dependent upon the sin-offering,29 but according to Resh Lakish the sin-offering should be made dependent upon the guilt-offering!30 This is indeed a difficulty. Now one can point out a contradiction between the statements of R. Johanan and also a contradiction between the statements of Resh Lakish. For it was taught: If there were two roads, one unclean and the other clean,31 and a person passed through one of them and did not enter [the Temple precincts], and then through the other and entered [the Temple precincts], he is liable; if he passed through one and entered [the Temple precincts], he is exempt; if he then passed through the other and entered [the Temple precincts], he is liable; if he passed through one and entered [the Temple precincts], and was sprinkled upon once and also a second time and immersed himself,32 and then he passed through the other and entered [the Temple precincts], he is liable. 33 offence. indicate that several errors may be covered by one guilt-offering. learnt untimately, i.e., after all the meals, that the food was certainly heleb, although the intervening spells of awareness which separated the acts, acquainted him each time only of the fact that there was reason to doubt the permissibility of the food he had taken. Raba, on the other hand, understands Rabbi's ruling, that the offender is liable to separate sin-offerings, as applying only to the case where the inter vening spells of awareness related each time to the certainty of having eaten forbidden food. Rabbi. guilt-offering for transgressions committed before that day. If each olive's bulk in our instance was of doubtful heleb, he is only liable but once, viz., for the second; yet taking into consideration the intervening Day of Atonement, which has the effect of a suspensive guilt-offering, it is as if he offered two such guilt-offerings. According to the quoted rule he should in the corresponding case of certain heleb be liable to two sin-offerings, which is untenable, because both sins were committed in one spell of unawareness. The rule is thus proved to be incorrect. V. Tosaf. s.v. tkt. interruption in the unawareness of sin. guilt-offerings were brought. In the corresponding case of certain heleb it would follow that he would be liable to two sin-offerings, which is, of course, absurd. sin, that length of time of the Day of Atonement would have atoned for his first act before the second was committed. awareness of doubtful sins; it should, according to Abaye, separate the acts for sin-offerings, i.e., even in the case of certain heleb. granted, and a similar law regarding guilt-offerings is derived therefrom. regard to suspensive guilt-offerings is established in the Torah. By analogy it is extended to apply also to sin-offerings. The sin-offering should therefore be dependent upon the guilt-offering. through it perforce became unclean and therefore unfit to enter the sacred precincts of the Temple. In the first and third instances he is liable, because after the second act there is no doubt that he entered the Temple precincts in a state of uncleanness. In connection with the law concerning the defilement of Temple precincts it is an essential condition that the offender had at one time been aware of his uncleanness, though unconscious of it at the time of entering the Temple precincts. In these two cases there was a moment when he was in no doubt as to his state of certain uncleanness. He is therefore liable to an offering. and then has to immerse himself in order to become clean. offender had at no time been certain that he was unclean, for the first possible uncleanness was annulled before passing through the second road, nevertheless he had been aware of doubtful uncleanness, and this is regarded as sufficient by the Sages, who therefore declare him liable. R. Simeon, on the other hand, holds that awareness of doubtful uncleanness is not sufficient.