Keritot

He raised [another] objection: [We have learnt:] ‘If it is doubtful whether [what is born] is a nine-months’ child of the first husband or a seven-months’ child of the second, he must put her away and the child is [deemed] legitimate, but each is liable to a suspensive guilt-offering!’1 — This, too, is according to R. Eliezer. He raised a [further] objection: [We have learnt:] ‘If [the stain] was found upon her cloth and immediately [after the coition], they are unclean and liable to sin-offerings; if upon hers some time after, they must regard themselves unclean by reason of the doubt, but are exempt from offerings. And upon this it was taught: They are nevertheless liable to suspensive guilt-offerings!’1 — This, too, is according to R. Eliezer. Rab Nahman said in the name of Rabbah b. Abbuha, who delivered it in the name of Rab: If there were before a person two pieces, one heleb and the other permitted fat, and he ate of one of them and does not know of which he ate, he is liable; if there was only one piece about which there was a doubt whether it was heleb or permitted fat, and he ate it, he is exempt. Said Rab Nahman: Rab's reason is that in the case of two pieces [the presence of] the forbidden substance is established, in the case of one piece [the presence of] the forbidden substance is not established. What is the practical difference between this reason that the forbidden substance is established and the one stated above that it is possible to determine the transgression? — A difference will arise in the case of two pieces, one heleb and the other permitted fat, and a gentile first ate one piece and then an Israelite the other. According to Raba [he is exempt, for] there were not two pieces at the time when the Israelite ate his. According to R. Zera, too, [he is exempt, for] it is not possible to determine the transgression. But according to Rab Nahman [he is liable, for] the presence of the forbidden substance was established. Raba raised an objection to Rab Nahman: ‘R. Eliezer says, [If one eats of the heleb of] a koy, he is liable to a suspensive guilt-offering!’2 — R. Eliezer does not hold that [the presence of] the forbidden substance must be established. He raised [another] objection: [We have learnt:] ‘If it is doubtful whether [what is born] is a nine-months’ child of the first husband or a seven-months’ child of the second, he must put her away and the child is [deemed] legitimate, but each is liable to a suspensive guilt-offering!’3 — This, too, is according to R. Eliezer. He raised a [further] objection: [We have learnt:] ‘If [the stain] was found on his cloth, they are both unclean and liable to offerings; if upon hers and immediately [after the coition], they are unclean and liable to offerings, but if upon hers some time after, they must regard themselves as unclean by reason of the doubt, but are exempt from offerings’. And upon this it was taught: They are nevertheless liable to suspensive guilt-offerings!’3 [To this objection] he remained silent. When the former4 had left, he said to himself: Why did I not reply that this law represents the view of R. Meir, who holds that the presence of the forbidden substance need not be established? As has been taught: If one slaughtered a suspensive guilt-offering outside [the Temple precincts], R. Meir holds him liable [to a sin-offering]. The Sages declare him exempt!5 But why did he not say: I might have retorted that that teaching represented R. Eliezer's view? — To indicate at the same time that R. Meir follows R. Eliezer regarding this law. Said Rabbah b. Abbuha in the name of Rab: The case where one ate a piece of fat about which there was a doubt whether it was heleb or permitted fat forms the subject of a dispute between R. Eliezer and the Sages.6 But why assume [the case] that he ate it, even If he did not eat it he may offer such a guilt-offering according to R. Eliezer, as we have learnt:7 R. Eliezer says, A man may freely offer every day a suspensive guilt-offering!8 — Said R. Ashi: R. Eliezer follows here the view of Baba b. Buta,9 of whom we have learnt:10 But they said unto him, Wait until you come into a state of doubt. Our Rabbis taught: If a person had before him two pieces, one permitted fat and the other heleb, and an Israelite first came and ate one piece and then a gentile came and ate the second piece, he is liable;11 this holds good also if the second piece was eaten by a dog or by a raven. If a gentile first came and ate one piece and then an Israelite came and ate the second, he is exempt; but Rabbi declares him liable.12 If he ate the first unwittingly and the second deliberately,13 he is liable; if the first deliberately and the second unwittingly, he is exempt;14 but Rabbi declares him liable. If he ate both pieces deliberately, he is altogether exempt.15 If two ate the two pieces, both unwittingly, they are both liable [to suspensive guilt-offerings], though the second is not liable by law,16 but rather because if you said that he was exempt, you would thereby establish a sin-offering for the first.17 Now whose view does the last clause follow? If Rabbi's, then the second should surely be liable by law.18 If that of the Sages, then [the question arises] how can we order the second [to bring a sacrifice], thereby causing a secular animal to be brought into the Temple precincts,19 merely on the ground that otherwise a sin-offering would be established for the first? 20 Said Rab Ashi: was offered unnecessarily, i.e., that no law had in fact been transgressed, and the animal therefore bore a secular character, so that its slaughtering outside the Temple precincts would involve no guilt. R. Meir, on the other hand, holds that in order to be liable to an offering it is not necessary to establish with certainty the trespass of a law, or even the certain presence of a prohibited thing. This guilt-offering is therefore at all events sacred, and he who slaughters it outside the Temple precincts is liable to a sin-offering. of something forbidden is not established. even to a transgression in doubt. however, it was not accepted, because it was thought unlikely that he needed expiation immediately after the atonement of his sins on that Holy Day. We thus see that there must be a probability of trespass before a suspensive guilt-offering may be brought. On account of this view the case stated above assumes that he ate something. guilt-offering, for at that time there were two pieces before him. at the time of eating. etc’. See Emden's glosses. liable to a sin-offering. misrepresentation?