כריתות 12 — Soncino English Talmud

¹It must thus refer to one witness giving evidence; and yet it says that if there is no contradiction his evidence is valid. We have thus proved it. SAID R. MEIR, etc. The question was asked: What is the reason of the Rabbis? Is it that they hold that regarding oneself a man is believed more than a hundred witnesses, or perhaps that we adopt the argument of miggo: for if he said, I transgressed willfully, he would certainly have been exempted, so if he says, I did not eat at all, he is to be believed, and is therefore exempted? And in which way is this question of avail? With reference to the application of the law to uncleanness. If you say the reason of the Rabbis is that regarding oneself a man is believed more than a hundred witnesses, there will be no difference between the old and fresh uncleanness; but if you say the reason of the Rabbis is that we adopt the argument of miggo, they would exempt him in the case of old uncleanness but declare him liable in the case of new uncleanness. For what reason? For in the case of old uncleanness, if he wanted, he could have said,I have already immersed ,’and be exempt; he is therefore exempt also when he says, I have not become unclean, since it can be said that what he meant [when he said,] ‘I have not become unclean’ is ‘I did not remain unclean, for I have immersed’. In the case of fresh uncleanness, however, he is liable. For what reason? For even if he asserted, I have immersed, he would be guilty, since the witnesses maintain that he has just become unclean. How is it? — Come and hear: If one witness says to a person. Thou art unclean, and he himself says, I am not unclean, he is exempted. I might assume [this holds good] also in the case of two witnesses, but, says R. Meir, against this there is an a fortiori argument: since two witnesses are capable of inflicting the severe penalty of death, how much more can they impose the less severe punishment of a sacrifice! The Rabbis say: Regarding oneself a man is believed more than a hundred witnesses. It thus seems that the argument of the Rabbis is that regarding oneself a man is believed more than a hundred witnesses! — Said R. Ammi: Indeed the argument of the Rabbis is the conclusion of miggo; and understand their reasoning thus: As he could, if he wanted, have said, I did not remain unclean, and would then be exempted, therefore regarding himself he is to be believed more than a hundred witnesses. If so, is not this instance identical with that concerning heleb? — I might have thought, in the case of heleb I may assume that he explains his words: I did not eat in error, but wilfully. But [when he is told], Thou art unclean, and he replies, I am not unclean, I might think his words are not capable of explanation; therefore he lets us know that also in this instance we interpret his words as conveying, I have not remained unclean for I have immersed. Come and hear: And he shall confess, [implies that] if he confesses he is liable to an offering, if he does not confess he is exempted. If, therefore, a witness says to him, Thou art unclean, and he says, I am not unclean, he is exempted. I might think this holds good even in the case where he contradicts two witnesses, but says R. Meir, since two witnesses are capable of inflicting the severe penalty of death, how much more can they impose the less severe punishment of a sacrifice! R. Judah says: Regarding oneself a man is believed more than a hundred witnesses. The Rabbis, however, agree with R. Judah in regard to heleb and the entering of the Temple precincts. but not in regard to uncleanness. Now, to which [uncleanness] does this refer? Shall I say^ᵃ^ᵇ^ᶜ^ᵈ^ᵉ^ᶠ^ᵍ^ʰ^ⁱ^ʲ^ᵏ^ˡ^ᵐ^ⁿ^ᵒ

^ᵃnote:So that he has to bring an offering.
^ᵇnote:I.e., in matters relating to the salvation of his soul, for the sacrifice is to bring about his propitiation and conciliation with the Lord.
^ᶜnote:I.e., a logical rule that a man's statement is to be accepted as true whenever another credible and more advantageous assertion could have been made; for it is argued, that had he intended to lie he would have invented the more advantageous statement.
^ᵈnote:I.e., if two people say e.g., you have entered the Temple precincts while unclean.
^ᵉnote:Fresh uncleanness is one contracted on the same day; old uncleanness one contracted on previous days. In the first instance the witnesses say the contraction of the uncleanness and the entering of the Temple precincts were both on the same day, in the latter on different days.
^ᶠnote:In the case of fresh uncleanness there has not yet been an opportunity of becoming clean again, for immersion alone is not sufficient; one has to wait till sunset to be clean. In the instance of old uncleanness one may well assert one's cleanness by saying, I have immersed.
^ᵍnote:The actual statement is capable of an interpretation similar in sense to the assertion that might have been made.
^ʰnote:If he enters the precincts of the Temple before sunset, even after immersion, he is guilty.
^ⁱnote:Toh. V, 9.
^ʲnote:I.e., I immersed.
^ᵏnote:And therefore superfluous.
^ˡnote:I.e., he may give you a wider meaning to his words, so that the assertion he actually makes harmonises with the one he could have made.
^ᵐnote:Lev. V, 5.
^ⁿnote:I.e., when the question is whether he has eaten heleb, or whether he has entered the Temple while unclean, for in these two instances the argument is that he might have said the transgression was wilful, and the assertions actually made, viz., ‘I did not eat heleb’ and ‘I did not enter the Temple’, may be interpreted as being in harmony with the assertion he could have made thus: ‘I did not eat heleb and I did not enter the Temple in a manner which would make me liable to an offering’.
^ᵒnote:I.e., when the question is whether he has at all become unclean. The miggo that he might have said, I did it wilfully, is no longer valid.

²[it refers] to old uncleanness, why do the Rabbis agree with R. Judah only with regard to heleb and the entering of the Temple precincts because he might have said, I did it wilfully? Also in the instance of old uncleanness he could have interpreted his words and say, if he wanted, I did not remain unclean but immersed! — Said Rabina: It refers in fact to old uncleanness, but to a case where the witnesses said to him, Thou hast eaten sacred food while thy body was unclean, and his reply was, I was not unclean; his words are then not open to an explanation, for we cannot say he meant, I did not remain unclean but immersed, for this would convey, I immersed and indeed did eat, which statement would contradict the first assertion at least in respect of the uncleanness through contact. Said R. Nahman: The halachah is according to R. Judah. Said R. Joseph: He holds [that he is clean] only in private and when appertaining to himself. Said Resh Lakish: R. Meir agrees with the Rabbis that if two witnesses say to a person, Thou hast had intercourse with a designated bondmaid, and he maintains that he has had no intercourse, he is to be trusted, for he could, if he wishes, have answered them, I did not complete the act of cohabitation. Said R. Shesheth: R. Meir agrees with the Rabbis with regard to the uncleanness of a nazirite, that if two witnesses say to him, Thou art unclean, and he replies, I am not unclean, he is exempted, because he could, if he wanted, have replied, I am absolved from the vow of naziriteship. Said Abaye: R. Meir agrees with the Rabbis that if two witnesses say to a person, Thou knowest evidence against a certain man, and he says, I do not know, he is exempted, because he could, if he wanted, have said, I was not intent upon giving evidence. IF ONE ATE TWICE HELEB IN ONE SPELL OF UNAWARENESS etc. To this R. Zera demurred: Why is he liable to only one sin-offering? Has he not eaten two olive-sizes of heleb? — Replied to him Abaye: It is the different spells of unawareness that effect separate offerings, but in our instance there was but one spell of unawareness. Some raise the difficulty in the following version: The reason [that he is liable only to one offering], is that there was only one spell of unawareness; if, however, there were two spells of unawareness he would indeed be liable to two offerings; but why? Were not both meals of the same denomination of heleb? — Replied to him Abaye: Different spells of unawareness effect separate offerings. IF ONE ATE HELEB, BLOOD, PIGGUL AND NOTHAR etc. [It is stated,] IF OF ONE KIND HE IS LIABLE; is this not obvious? — Said Resh Lakish in the name of Bar Tutini: We suppose it was eaten in two different dishes, and this law is in conformity with the view of R. Joshua who [generally] holds that different dishes do not combine with one another. Now I might have thought that R. Joshua upholds his opinion no matter whether greater leniency or greater stringency result from it; therefore we are taught that he is liable [to an offering], implying that he upholds his view only when it leads to greater stringency, but not when it leads to greater leniency. Some refer the discussion to the latter part of the passage: IF OF TWO KINDS, HE IS EXEMPTED; is this not obvious? — Said Resh Lakish in the name of Bar Tutini: We suppose they were eaten in two different dishes and this law is in accordance with R. Joshua who holds different dishes do not combine with one another. Now I might have thought that R. Joshua upholds his rule only if it leads to greater stringency but not if greater leniency results from it; therefore we are taught: IF OF TWO KINDS, HE IS EXEMPTED: ‘Two kinds’ means in fact ‘one kind’; it is called ‘two kinds’ because the eating was in two different dishes; and as it is stated that he is then exempted, hence we may conclude that R. Joshua upholds his rule both if it leads to greater leniency and if it results in greater stringency. Now, since the latter part of the passage deals with one kind consumed in two dishes, the former part must, as its contrast, refer to one kind consumed in one dish. Is not the law then obvious? — Said Rabina: It refers to a case where he became aware [of his sin] in between, and the law is in accordance with Rabban Gamaliel, who holds awareness is of no avail with regard to half-sizes; as we have learnt: If one writes two letters in two different spells of unawareness, one in the morning and the other in the evening, Rabban Gamaliel holds he is guilty, but the Rabbis exempt him. Rabban Gamaliel holds awareness is of no avail with regard to half-sizes, whereas the Rabbis maintain it is of avail. MISHNAH. WITHIN WHAT TIME MUST HE EAT THEM? [THE TIME HE WOULD NEED] IF HE ATE A LIKE BULK OF PARCHED GRAINS OF CORN. THUS THE VIEW OF R. MEIR; BUT THE RABBIS SAY, HE MUST TAKE FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE END NO MORE TIME THAN IS REQUIRED FOR THE EATING OF A PERAS, TO BECOME LIABLE. IF ONE EATS UNCLEAN EDIBLES OR DRINKS UNCLEAN DRINKS, OR IF [A PRIEST] DRINKS A QUARTER [OF A LOG] OF WINE AND THEN ENTERS THE TEMPLE, IF NO MORE TIME HAS ELAPSED THAN IS REQUIRED FOR THE EATING OF A PERAS, HE IS LIABLE. R. ELEAZAR SAYS: IF THE DRINKING WAS INTERRUPTED OR THE WINE DILUTED WITH WATER OF THE SMALLEST QUANTITY, HE IS EXEMPTED. GEMARA. They asked: Is R. Meir's statement in the direction of stringency or of leniency? Is it in the direction of stringency, and this is what he means: [THE TIME HE WOULD NEED] IF HE ATE OF PARCHED GRAINS OF CORN, though lasting the whole day. Thus even though the time that elapsed between the beginning and the end of the meal was longer than is required for the eating of a peras, yet since it was one protracted meal, he is liable; while the Rabbis retorted: If no more time has elapsed than is required for the eating of a peras, he is guilty, if more he is exempted? Or is it in the direction of leniency, and this is what he means: [THE TIME HE WOULD NEED] IF HE ATE OF PARCHED GRAINS OF CORN, provided it was without interruption, but if with interruption he is exempted even though the time that elapsed between the beginning and the end of the meal is within that required for the eating of a peras; while the Rabbis retorted: Since the time elapsed between the beginning and the end of the meal was within that required for the eating of a peras, he is guilty? — Come and hear: BUT THE SAGES SAY, HE MUST TAKE FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE END NO MORE TIME THAN IS REQUIRED FOR THE EATING OF A PERAS.^ᵖ^ᵠ^ʳ^ˢ^ᵗ^ᵘ^ᵛ^ʷ^ˣ^ʸ^ᶻ^ᵃᵃ^ᵃᵇ^ᵃᶜ^ᵃᵈ^ᵃᵉ^ᵃᶠ^ᵃᵍ^ᵃʰ^ᵃⁱ^ᵃʲ^ᵃᵏ^ᵃˡ^ᵃᵐ^ᵃⁿ^ᵃᵒ^ᵃᵖ

^ᵖnote:We must therefore assume that the Baraitha refers to fresh uncleanness, in which case there is no miggo. It seems at all events to be implicitly accepted that the reason of the Sages’ view is based upon the conclusion of miggo, while R. Judah who holds that even in the case of fresh uncleanness he is exempted, bases his view obviously upon the rule that regarding oneself a man is at all events believed more than a hundred witnesses. The query set forth at the outset of the discussion is thus resolved: R. Judah, who as the opponent of R. Meir is often quoted anonymously, bases his view upon the first argument of the query, the Sages upon the second.
^ᵠnote:And both R. Judah and the Sages may base their arguments in the instance of heleb upon the rule of miggo, but this case is such that the Sages hold miggo is not applicable to it.
^ʳnote:This statement contains a twofold assertion: That he was unclean and that he ate sacred things. Were his contradiction, I did not eat, we might have understood it in the sense, I did not transgress for I had immersed before. His reply, I am not unclean, is taken to imply, I did not come into contact with an unclean object, and this is in open contradiction to the evidence of the witnesses, wherefore his statement is not accepted and he is liable to an offering.
^ˢnote:I.e., the assertion of the witnesses.
^ᵗnote:For his words imply, he did not come into contact with an unclean object.
^ᵘnote:He is not permitted to partake of sacred food in the presence of others, for this might be interpreted as neglectful treatment of the laws of purity.
^ᵛnote:He is not believed with reference to other people. If he has come into contact with sacred things they are regarded as unclean for others. The trust put in him when he says he is not unclean is subjective, because we believe him in matters appertaining to his own conscience and salvation.
^ʷnote:I.e., a maidservant designated by her master for marriage to one chosen by him; Lev. XIX, 20.
^ˣnote:V. 11b, where the completion of the act is an essential condition of the transgression.
^ʸnote:From an offering at the end of seven days; v. Num. VI, 9f.
^ᶻnote:Absolution can be granted from a vow by a scholar if there are good reasons to assume that the consequences of the vow were not foreseen.
^ᵃᵃnote:The refusal to give evidence if adjured to do so is punishable with an offering; v. Lev. V, 1.
^ᵃᵇnote:Supra 4b quoted as Bar Tutani.
^ᵃᶜnote:Viz., to make up the requisite standard size of an olive. The non-combination of the two half-olives brings about his exemption from an offering. If on the other hand one has, e.g., eaten two full quantities in two dishes the non-combination leads to greater stringency of the law, for he is then liable to two offerings.
^ᵃᵈnote:I.e., two pieces of heleb, e.g., each of the size of half an olive, eaten in two meals.
^ᵃᵉnote:Viz., IF OF TWO KINDS etc.
^ᵃᶠnote:Between the two meals he learnt, e.g., that the first piece of fat was heleb.
^ᵃᵍnote:I.e., half-sizes may be combined one with the other even if eaten in two spells of unawareness.
^ᵃʰnote:Shab. 105a. Only when one writes two letters is a sacrifice prescribed.
^ᵃⁱnote:We have learnt in the previous Mishnah that if one eats two half-sizes of prohibited food, he is guilty because the two meals combine to make up the requisite size. What time may pass between the two meals to be still considered as one?
^ᵃʲnote:I.e., the time it takes to eat an olive-size of food crumbled into small pieces of the size of parched ears, eaten one after the other.
^ᵃᵏnote:Lit., ‘portion’ or ‘half’; viz., half a loaf; v. also ‘Er. 83a.
^ᵃˡnote:If one eats unclean food of the size of half a peras, or drinks of an unclean drink the quantity of a fourth of a log, he is regarded as unfit to eat sacred food until he has taken an immersion.
^ᵃᵐnote:To perform his service.
^ᵃⁿnote:R. Eliezer refers to the last instance.
^ᵃᵒnote:The criterion of R. Meir is then to indicate that the meal may be interrupted.
^ᵃᵖnote:The time required for the eating of an olive-size of parched corn without interruption is less than that required for the eating of a peras.