Eruvin

even though1 another Israelite2 had taken possession of his estate, [the latter] imposes restrictions;3 [but if he died] after dusk4 no restrictions are imposed even though no other Israelite took Possession of his estate. Now is not this statement self-contradictory? You first stated: ‘While it was yet day, even though another Israelite had taken possession [the latter] imposes restrictions’ and,5 much more so6 if one did not take possession of it; [but is not the law just] the reverse, viz., that where no one took possession no restrictions are imposed?7 _ R. Papa replied. Read: ‘Although he had not taken possession’. But was it not stated: ‘Though he had taken possession’? — It is this that was meant: Though he did not take possession while it was yet day and did so only after dusk8 he imposes restrictions, since9 he could have taken possession while it was yet day.10 ‘After dusk, no restrictions are imposed even though no other Israelite took possession of his estate’. You Say, ‘Even though no other Israelite took possession of his estate’ and11 much less so12 if one did take possession; but is not the law just the reverse, viz., that where one did take possession restrictions are imposed?13 — R. Papa replied: Read: ‘Though he did take possession’.14 but was it not stated: ‘Even, though he did not take possession’? — It is this that was meant: Though he took possession15 after dusk he imposes no restrictions, since he could not take possession while it was yet day.16 At all events it was stated in the first clause that ‘restrictions are imposed’. But why should restrictions be imposed? Let him17 renounce his share? — The ruling that he imposes restrictions18 applies only so long as he does not make his renunciation. R. Johanan replied: The Baraithas19 represent the view of Beth Shammai who ruled that no renunciation is allowed on the Sabbath.20 For we learned: WHEN MUST ONE'S SHARE BE PRESENTED? BETH SHAMMAI RULED: WHILE IT IS YET DAY AND BETH HILLEL RULED: AFTER DUSK. Said Ulla: What is Beth Hillel's reason?21 The case of renunciation is on a par with that of saying,22 ‘You should have gone to the better kind’.23 What, objected Abaye, is the comparison with the case of saying. ‘You should have gone to the better kind’, where the gentile died on the Sabbath?’24 Rather it is this principle on which they are here at variance: Beth Shammai are of the opinion that the renunciation of a domain25 is like conferring acquisition26 of a domain [to another], but conferring acquisition of a domain on the Sabbath is forbidden;27 while Beth Hillel are of the opinion that renunciation is merely the giving up of one's domain, and the giving up of a domain on the Sabbath is perfectly permissible. MISHNAH. IF A HOUSEHOLDER WAS IN PARTNERSHIP WITH HIS NEIGHBOURS,28 WITH THE ONE IN WINE AND WITH THE OTHER IN WINE,29 THEY NEED NOT PREPARE AN ERUB;30 BUT IF HIS PARTNERSHIP WAS WITH THE ONE IN WINE AND WITH THE OTHER IN OIL,31 IT IS NECESSARY FOR THEM TO JOIN IN AN ‘ERUB.32 R. SIMEON RULED: NEITHER IN THE ONE CASE NOR IN THE OTHER NEED THEY JOIN IN AN ERUB. GEMARA. Rab explained:33 Only [if the wine34 was kept] in one container.35 Said Raba: A deduction also supports this view. For it was stated: WITH THE ONE IN WINE AND WITH THE OTHER IN OIL, IT IS NECESSARY FOR THEM TO JOIN IN AN ‘ERUB; now if you grant that the first clause deals with one container and the final clause with two containers both rulings are quite correct,36 but if you contend that the first clause deals with two containers and the final clause deals with two containers, why. [it might be objected,] should a difference be made between wine and wine and between wine and oil?37 — Wine and wine,38 Abaye retorted, can properly be mixed,39 but wine and oil cannot properly be mixed.40 R. SIMEON RULED: NEITHER IN THE ONE CASE NOR IN THE OTHER NEED THEY JOIN IN AN ‘ERUB. Even if the partnership was with the one in wine and with the other in oil?41 — Rabbah replied: Here we are dealing with a courtyard that was situated between two alleys,42 R. Simeon following his own View.43 For we learned: R. Simeon remarked: To what may this case be compared? To three courtyards that open one into the other and also into a public domain, where, if the two outer ones made an ‘erub with the middle one, it is permitted to have access to them and they are permitted access to it, but the two other ones are forbidden access to one another.44 Said Abaye to him:45 Are the two cases at all alike, seeing that there46 it was stated: ‘The two outer ones are forbidden,’ while here It was stated that THEY NEED NOT JOIN IN AN ‘ERUB at all?47 — The ruling that48 THEY NEED NOT JOIN IN AN ‘ERUB applies only to one between the neighbours and the householder, but the neighbours among themselves must certainly join in an ‘erub. Sabbath the place was free from restrictions. could not be regarded as a permitted domain even during a part of the Sabbath. place was free from all restrictions. Sabbath. R. Nahman, however, may disagree with their view, following that of Beth Hillel. produce on his behalf without his previous consent. assumed retrospectively to have appointed the person as his agent. Similarly in the case of renunciation: The tenant's present act of renunciation is taken as an indication of his retrospective desire to join with the other tenants in their ‘erub and that his failing to do so was due to mere forgetfulness. in the case of the wine and the oil spoken of in the final clause, since they were kept in two containers, a special ‘erub was rightly required. purpose. Hence, contrary to the submission of Raba, the first clause also may be dealing with two containers. common with those of the other, so that the wine and the oil do not serve the purpose of one ‘erub but that of two ‘erubs, one for each alley. the latter, not having been joined to each other by an ‘erub, are forbidden access from one to the other. n. 10) were not joined to one another, and access between them is forbidden, the courtyard may be joined to both of them and access between it and the alleys is permitted.